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Terminology 
This thesis is concerned with the regulation of prenuptial agreements. Couples use these in an 
attempt to avoid the default laws of financial orders. Previously, the making of such orders 
was referred to as ancillary relief, however, Rule 2.3 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 
served to update the terminology. Much of the academic commentary and judicial decision is 
couched in the old terminology, and so the terms ancillary relief and financial order will be 
used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
There is no statutory definition of a prenuptial agreement in England and Wales. Therefore, 
for the purpose of this thesis, a prenuptial agreement shall be defined as a contract that is 
entered into by a couple intending to marry, prior to the date of their marriage, which 
purports to regulate the financial aspect of any future reallocation of assets upon divorce.  
It is prudent at this stage to highlight that there are two alternative forms of financial 
agreement affecting ‘matrimonial property’.  The postnuptial agreement has the same 
characteristics as a prenuptial agreement, save for the fact that it is signed at some point 
following the marriage ceremony, while the separation agreement, which again regulates the 
financial aspect of divorce, is not entered into until after the couple’s relationship has 
irretrievably broken down. In that respect, a separation agreement is somewhat 
distinguishable from a prenuptial and a postnuptial agreement. At the time of entering into 
the separation agreement, the parties have greater awareness of all the circumstances and 
arguably the extent of the assets to be divided. 
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Radmacher v Granatino,1 separation agreements were 
deemed enforceable by the Court of Appeal in Edgar v Edgar,2 while Baroness Hale, sitting 
in the Privy Council, upheld a postnuptial agreement in Macleod v Macleod,3contending that 
prenuptial agreements and postnuptial agreements were ‘very different’.4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
1 [2010] UKSC 42.      
2 [1980] EWCA Civ 2.  
3 [2008] UKPC 64, 
4 ibid [36].   
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The majority of the Supreme Court in Radmacher emphatically overturned this approach. 
The court expressed a preference for the umbrella term ‘nuptial agreements’,5 encapsulating 
financial agreements made both prior to and after the date of the marriage. The effect of this 
decision is that English courts will no longer look to draw a distinction between prenuptial 
and postnuptial agreements. However, for the sake of clarity it will sometimes be necessary 
to maintain the division within this thesis. Therefore, as far as it is possible to do so, I will 
endeavour to distinguish financial agreements as follows: 
i) ‘Prenuptial agreement’ will be used when referring specifically to a prenuptial 
agreement. 
ii) ‘Postnuptial agreement’ and ‘separation agreement’ will only be used any time 
that reference is made specifically to one of these types of agreement. 
iii) ‘Marital property agreements’, ‘nuptial agreements’ and ‘financial 
agreements’ will be used interchangeably as umbrella terms, incorporating all 
three types of agreement.  
 
It should also be noted that the cases discussed within this thesis deal with the breakdown of 
a marriage between a man and a woman, however, all of the ideas promulgated apply equally 
to civil partners. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
5 Radmacher (n1) [1]. 
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Introduction 
Prenuptial agreements are family law’s ‘hot topic’.1 Some married couples utilise prenuptial 
agreements in an attempt to establish contract-like terms that will serve to dictate the 
distribution of their assets in the event of divorce.   
Legal practitioners have described prenuptial agreements as unromantic, expensive2 and even 
‘cold blooded’.3 In England and Wales, the courts have traditionally been highly suspicious4 
of prenuptial agreements and what they represent. Public perception on the other hand is 
more complex and there is no single, unanimous view that can be gleaned. 
Michael Winner, who in 2011 finally decided to marry his partner of over 50 years, 
‘absolutely declined’5 to sign a prenuptial agreement, although he acknowledged that there 
were several members of the legal profession willing to charge him extortionate amounts to 
aid him in drawing one up.6 Winner is known for his abrupt manner, but is his view reflective 
of the stereotypical British approach towards prenuptial agreements? 
It has been suggested that prenuptial agreements may still be a ‘bit too un-British’7 to gain 
widespread acceptance. A survey by Internet bank ‘Smile’ in 2004, found that 46% of the 
population supported the option of enforceable prenuptial agreements.8 In 2006, the Family 
Law group at solicitors firm ASB undertook a survey of nearly 2500 men and women. Over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
1 NG v KR (Pre-Nuptial Contract) [2008] EWHC 1532 (F) [36]. 
2 Tony Yerburgh, ‘Prenuptial Agreements: Are they Worth the Paper they are Written On?’ (11 December 2003) 
< http://www.collyerbristow.com/Default.aspx?sID=88&cID=224&ctID=43&lID=0> accessed 17 April 2012. 
3 Janice Montague, ‘Family Law: Ancillary Relief – Pre- and –Post-Nuptial Agreements’ (2008)13(2) Cov LJ 
36, 38. 
4 Law Commission, Marital Property Agreements – A Consultation Paper (Law Com No 198, 2011) [1.4]. 
5 Michael Winner, ‘I was Always Massively in Love with Myself’ The Telegraph (London, 1 November 2011) 
< http://www.telegraph.co.uk/relationships/8860874/Michael-Winner-I-was-always-massively-in-love-with-
myself.html > accessed 24 November 2011. 
6 ibid. 
7 Afua Hirsch, ‘William and Kate – the Prince, the Princess and the Prenups’ The Guardian (London,17 
November 2011) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/afua-hirsch-law-blog/2010/nov/16/prenups-prince-william-
kate-royals> accessed 24 November 2011. 
8 Editorial, ‘Half of Brits Want a Prenuptial Agreement Whilst No Cheating Tops Wish List of Marriage 
Clauses’ (29 April 2004) < http://www2.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=121959> accessed 17 April 
2012. 
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half of the respondents disagreed with the statement that ‘you should not get married if you 
think you need a pre-nup’.9 On the basis of this evidence, opinion appears to be divided. 
To date there is a lack of ‘published empirical, statistically significant evidence’10 as to the 
British public’s opinion on prenuptial agreements. It is currently estimated that forty-five per 
cent of all marriages will end in divorce proceedings.11  Marriage is no longer a lifelong 
commitment and some have argued that gambling upon the sentiment of everlasting love is 
naïve, particularly where finances are concerned.12 Furthermore, a higher median age at first 
marriage, coupled with an increased volume of re-marriages,13 has culminated in an ever-
increasing proportion of newlyweds holding significant levels of pre-accumulated wealth.14  
One scenario in which prenuptial agreements are reportedly valuable is where a couple are 
contemplating entering into a marriage that, for either party, is not their first.15 Divorce is an 
emotionally draining experience. In this situation, a well-drafted prenuptial agreement could 
be used to assist ‘mature couples…to regulate future enjoyment of their assets’.16  
Another driver for pre-nuptial agreements is the large degree of unpredictability associated 
with ancillary relief in some circumstances. This does nothing to reduce the anxiety that 
surrounds the possibility of future divorce proceedings. In contrast, the existence of a 
prenuptial agreement could encourage cohabitants to enjoy the benefits of a formalised 
marriage relationship, with a safety net in place to ease their worries as to potential future 
ancillary relief claims.17  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
9 Newsline Extra [2006] Fam Law 805, 811. 
10 Marital Property Agreements (n 4) [1.51]. 
11 Ben Wilson and Steve Smallwood, ‘The Proportion of Marriages Ending in Divorce’ (2008) 131 Population 
Trends 28, 35. 
12 Zahra Pabani, ‘All You Need is Love: Protecting Clients’ Wealth’ [2010] Fam Law 1005, 1006. 
13 In 2009 16% of marriages were between couples where both parties were getting remarried, whilst 35% of 
marriages involved at least one spouse who had been previously married. Contrast this with 1940, where nearly 
three times the number of marriages that took place in 2009 occurred, but 91% of all marriages were the first for 
both parties. Office for National Statistics, ‘Marriages in England and Wales, 2009’ (2011) 
<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/vsob1/marriages-in-england-and-wales--provisional-/2009/index.html> 
accessed 17 April 2012. 
14 Ian Smith, ‘The Law and Economics of Marriage Contracts’ (2003) 17 Journal of Economic Surveys 201, 202. 
15 Marital Property Agreements (n 4) [5.19]. 
16 Radmacher (formerly Granatino) v Granatino [2009] EWCA Civ 649.   
17 Brigitte Clark, ‘Should Greater Prominence Be Given to Pre-Nuptial Contracts in the Law of Ancillary 
Relief?’ [2004] CFLQ 399, 400. 
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Until relatively recently any legal professional would have advised that prenuptial 
agreements could not be relied upon.18 Following the ruling in Radmacher v Granatino,19 
which will be discussed in detail in the chapters to follow, this is arguably no longer the case. 
Resultantly, the prenuptial agreement has become an increasingly attractive, and indeed 
viable, option for couples seeking to determine for themselves the way in which their assets 
will be divided upon divorce. 
It is a common misconception that prenuptial agreements are only accessible to the rich and 
famous. This notion is not entirely without foundation. The media frequently reports on 
agreements that may, or indeed may not, have been reached by ‘glitterati’20 including Britney 
Spears,21 Demi Moore22 and Kim Kardashian.23 These reports buttress the notion that only 
celebrities draw up prenuptial agreements, but this should not be seen to imply that prenuptial 
agreements are only used, or useful, in such circumstances. 
There can be little doubt that prenuptial agreements may be useful tools for the extremely 
wealthy seeking to safeguard their assets; after all without the use of prenuptial agreement 
‘avoiding marriage entirely is the only way of reliably avoiding the equal sharing principle’.24 
This is equally applicable whether both parties have considerable assets to protect, or one 
party is seeking to preserve their own personal fortune. Nevertheless, it is not the case that a 
prenuptial agreement can only be useful in ‘big money cases’.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
18 Nicholas Francis & Susan Phillips, ‘New Light on Pre-Nuptial Agreements’ [2003] Fam Law 164, 164. 
19 Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42. 
20 Chris Barton, ‘Domestic Partnership Contracts: Sliced Bread or a Slice of the Bread?’ [2008] Fam Law 900, 
902. 
21 Caroline Graham, ‘Every Detail of Britney Spears’ Pre-Nup’ Daily Mail (London, 14 February 2007) 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-415881/exclusive--every-britney-spears-pre-nup-65-million-
fortune.html> accessed 25 February 2011. 
22 Editorial, ‘Demi Moore to ‘Punish’ Ashton Kutcher in Divorce’ London Evening Standard (London, 21 
November 2011) < http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/showbiz/demi-moore-to-punish-ashton-kutcher-in-divorce-
6370239.html > accessed 25 November 2011. 
23 Claire Rutter, ‘Will Kim Kardashian’s Prenup Be ‘Worthless’ Over Reggie Bush Rumours’ (3 November 
2011) < http://www.entertainmentwise.com/news/64696/Will-Kim-Kardashians-Prenup-Be-Worthless-Over-
Reggie-Bush-Rumours> accessed 25 November 2011. 
24 Joanna Miles, ‘Marriage and Divorce in the Supreme Court and the Law Commission: for Love or Money’ 
(2011)74(3) Mod L Rev 430, 442. 
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Prenuptial agreements appear to be an increasingly prevalent mechanism used within modern 
society. It has been suggested that there has been a ‘dramatic increase’25 in both the number 
of agreements and the number of enquires as to their availability.  Whilst it is impossible to 
put a precise figure on their incidence, practitioners have estimated that the number of 
couples seeking to create prenuptial agreements has doubled in the space of just a few 
years.26 As such, they merit close scrutiny, not least to evaluate the possible avenues open to 
the Government for reform.  
When the enforceability of prenuptial agreements was first considered in 1998, 27 ministers 
made it clear that their use should not be limited to ‘pop and film stars’.28 Amongst the 
judiciary, Lord Justice Thorpe, much more recently, has emphasised that prenuptial 
agreements should not be reserved for the super-rich.29 While the Supreme Court judgment in 
Radmacher will almost certainly serve to further protect the interests of the wealthy, whose 
agreements will now seemingly be adhered to unless they are manifestly unfair, this is not to 
say that the use of prenuptial agreements should be limited to affluent couples.  It is now 
arguable that a prenuptial agreement could potentially provide couples a practical alternative 
to ancillary relief. However, it remains to be seen whether the Radmacher decision alone will 
be enough to open up prenuptial agreements to a wider demographic, or whether statutory 
assistance will be necessary in order to turn prenuptial agreements into a more accessible 
vehicle for the protection of assets in marriage.  
Looking Towards the Future 
The debate surrounding the enforceability of prenuptial agreements has reached a critical 
stage. Following the publication of the Law Commission’s initial consultation paper on 
marital property agreements in 2011,30 it had appeared as though England and Wales was on 
the cusp of statutory reform. However, following the publication of a follow-up paper 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
25 Emma Hitchings ‘From Pre-Nups to Post-Nups: Dealing with Marital Property Agreements’ [2009] Fam Law 
1056, 1058. 
26 Yerburgh, (n 2). 
27 Home Office, Supporting Families: A Consultation Document (Cm 3922, 1998). 
28 Colin Brown, ‘Prenuptial Deals Backed in Family Green Paper’ The Independent (London, 29 October 1998) 
< http://www.independent.co.uk/news/prenuptial-deals-backed-in-family-green-paper-1181308.html> accessed 
25 November 2011. 
29 Radmacher (formerly Granatino) (n 16) [27]. 
30	  Law Commission, Marital Property Agreements – A Consultation Paper (Law Com No 198, 2011).	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concerning matrimonial property and needs earlier in 2012,31 it has become difficult to 
predict the stance that the Law Commission will take when it publishes its final report 2013, 
although there remains a strong case for statutory intervention. What can be stated with some 
certainty is that the current position continues to cause both ‘irritation’32 and anxiety for a 
whole range of reasons. The time is therefore ripe for a detailed exploration of the potential 
avenues for reform within this thesis.  
When reflecting on the future of pre-nuptial agreements in England and Wales, the 
Commonwealth of Australia provides an optimal comparison. A former dominion of the 
British Empire, Australia only finally severed its constitutional links with the United 
Kingdom with the passing of the Australia Act 1986.  Much of the historical common law 
that has developed in relation to contracts that regulate the breakdown of marriage is adopted 
from England and Wales.  
Layered on top of this common law foundation, Australia has developed its own principles in 
regard to contract law and, more pertinently, ancillary relief. The Family Law Act 1975 
(Australia) replaced the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 and provides for no-fault divorce.33 It 
deals with ancillary relief under Part VIII, which has remained virtually unchanged since its 
inception.34 In addition, the Family Law Act (Cth) 1975 amendment, adopted in November 
2000, introduced a new Part VIIIA, under which couples were empowered to enter into 
financial agreements that could be binding and enforceable providing certain criterion were 
met.  
The more advanced stage of development that the law has reached in Australia is reflected in 
the way that prenuptial agreements are perceived in public and in the media. Australian 
lifestyle gurus have tackled the issue by accepting that prenuptial agreements ‘may be the 
least romantic thing in the world’35 and provide a ‘land-mine’36 to be negotiated by couples, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
31	  Law Commission, Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements – A Supplementary Consultation Paper 
(Law Com No 208, 2012).	  
32 Joanna Miles, ‘Agreements for Grown-Ups’ [2009] CLJ 285, 288. 
33 Family Law Act 1975 (Aus), s 48.  
34 The Hon Chief Justice Alastair Nicholson and Margaret Harrison, ‘Family Law and the Family Court of 
Australia: Experience of the First 25 Years’ (2000) 24 Melb U L Rev 756, 774.  
35 Sacha Crouch, ‘How to (Tactfully) Raise the Issue of a Prenup’ (18 April 2011) 
<http://au.lifestyle.yahoo.com/health/blogs/show/2475863/how-to-tactfully-raise-the-issue-of-a-prenup/> 
accessed 20 November 2011. 
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but ultimately assert that it ‘pays to be practical’.37 In Australia, prenuptial agreements appear 
not to be viewed solely as a product of ‘selfishness and mistrust’.38  
The Australian public may well have accepted prenuptial agreements as the ‘celebutante face 
of a practical new trend’,39 which, whilst a ‘tad pessimistic’,40 ‘may be the most important 
document ever signed’.41 To draw the fairy-tale analogy, a signed prenuptial agreement 
allows the couple to get on with living ‘happily ever after’,42 free from lingering worries as to 
their financial affairs.  
The semantics used to describe prenuptial agreements in Australia suggest that they have 
become an accepted norm and, in fact, one commentator went as far as critiquing the 
statutory regulation in place for being excessively ‘arduous’.43 Whilst this acceptance is 
arguably itself a by-product of statutory regulation, it might become evident that the practical 
benefits of drawing up a prenuptial agreement hold more weight in Australia than any 
objections based upon traditional notions of romance and sanctity of marriage. This suggests 
that, in this context, Australian law may have been aligned to reflect a set of modern social 
norms.  
Australia is a jurisdiction that has, over the course of the last decade, made significant 
advancements in the law in relation to prenuptial agreements. However, the judiciary is still 
grappling to come to terms with the legislation in place. A fairly extensive pool of common 
law has emanated from the alterations made to the statute. It is these decisions that provide 
useful material from which to instigate a comparative study. The decisions handed down by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
36 Emma Krieger, ‘The Prenup: Should You or Shouldn’t You?’ Bride Tasmania (Hobart, 15 April 2011) 
<http://www.bridetas.com.au/blog/item/61-the-prenup-should-you-or-shouldnt you> accessed 20 November 
2011. 
37 ibid. 
38 Crouch, (n 35). 
39 Janice Revell, ‘Prenup Agreements aren’t just for the Wealthy Anymore’ (24 August 2011) < 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/28/pf/marriage_prenup_agreement.fortune/index.htm> accessed 17 April 2012. 
40 Monique Friedlander, ‘The Prenup’ <http://www.essentialgroom.com.au/grooms-guide/the-pre-nup> accessed 
20 November 2011. 
41 Bina Brown, ‘Sign or Be Sorry’ The Australian (Sydney, 21 February 2007) 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/wealth/sign-or-be-sorry/story-e6frgac6-1111113006951> accessed 
20 November 2011. 
42 Caroline Counsel, ‘I love You Kate, Now Sign Here…’ The Age (Melbourne, 11 March 2011) 
<http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/i-love-you-kate-now-sign-here-20110310-1bpns.html> accessed 20 
November 2011. 
43 Emily Bourke, ‘Pre-Nup Changes a Boon for Lawyers’ (2 January 2010) < http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-
01-02/pre-nup-changes-a-boon-for-lawyers/1196084> accessed 20 November 2011. 
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members of the Australian judiciary will hopefully serve to highlight some of the difficulties 
that will hinder future reform in England and Wales.   
A strong case can be made for the statutory introduction of prenuptial agreements in England 
and Wales, but this thesis will evaluate the merits, and indeed de-merits, of the different 
potential avenues of reform that Parliament could choose to explore in relation to prenuptial 
agreements. This will be undertaken through a thorough examination of the position that the 
law in England and Wales has reached and the way that the law has developed in Australia.  
This introduction has been devoted to highlighting the complexity of reform in this area. 
There is no universally held view as to the way in which reform should take place and the 
regulation of prenuptial agreements is an intricate process. Discussion as to future cannot take 
place without at least a basic understanding of the reasons why couples are attempting to 
contract out of the principles that have developed.  
Chapter 1 will look at prenuptial agreements from a theoretical perspective. The issues that 
currently surround the regulation of agreements will be identified and the reasons for their 
existence explored. This discussion will be couched in the terms of ‘autonomy’ and 
‘protection’. Autonomy in this context refers to the scope and freedom that couples should be 
afforded to implement a prenuptial agreement that will enable them to avoid the default rules 
on ancillary relief, whereas protection is used here to refer to the checks and balances that 
will ensure that the law continues to provide an appropriate level of security to individuals. 
The tension between these principles will continue to run throughout the remainder of this 
thesis and will finding a compromise position between the two of them is central to this work.  
Traditionally, public policy objections have played an important role in the regulation of 
marital property agreements, but these historical objections have been rendered ‘obsolete’44 
in modern society. The chapter will proceed to explore whether prenuptial agreements should 
be regulated as unique hybrid entities, with their own new legal standing and deserving of 
their own set of regulations.  
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As will become apparent in the course of the thesis, the regulation of prenuptial agreements 
cannot be dealt with in an absolutist manner and rigid rules would not appear to be a viable 
option. It is not simply a case of either having binding and enforceable prenuptial agreements 
or not. Whether or not couples should be afforded autonomy to enter into agreements will 
need to be scrutinised – are enforceable prenuptial agreements that cannot be set aside 
desirable, or will simply giving an increased weighting, while maintaining certain safeguards, 
be the more appropriate course of action?  To aid in this process, it will be helpful to map the 
potential different legal perspectives that it is possible to take prenuptial agreements, ranging 
from a desire to afford couples full contractual autonomy to enter into agreements that they 
see fit, to continuing to ensure that the state provides individuals with the appropriate level of 
protection. 
Chapter 2 will provide a summary of the relevant laws in England and Wales. Initially, some 
of the more important general principles of ancillary relief will be explained. Following on 
from this, a detailed exploration of the development of the common law in relation to 
prenuptial agreements within this jurisdiction will be undertaken. Chapter 3 will then analyse 
how the law has developed in Australia. The context for the implementation of the FLA 1975 
will be briefly discussed. The inception of the new Part VIIIA provisions regulating 
prenuptial agreements, and the subsequent amendments that have been introduced, will then 
be charted. Included in this discussion will be the particulars of a number of the key 
judgments that have been handed down by the courts in Australia. The tensions between 
autonomy and protection will be clearly visible throughout the discussion on the points of 
contention within both jurisdictions.  
Chapter 4 breaks down the issues that have affected the judiciary in both jurisdictions. This 
will be split across the life-course of the agreement into sections dealing with potential time 
constraints, independent legal advice, full and frank disclosure and, finally, the concept of 
fairness. A number of these issues can be found within the wording of the six safeguards 
recommended by the Government in 1998,45 and have provided focal points of contention 
within much of the ensuing case law. The approaches that judges have adopted will be 
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considered, in order to assess whether some of the reasoning used by the Australian judiciary 
may provide guidance as to the future direction of the law in England and Wales.  
The overarching question to be determined when examining each aspect is what the logical 
next step is for the law within this jurisdiction. In order to provide an answer that strikes the 
appropriate balance between autonomy and protection, conclusions will need to be drawn as 
to which components can be taken from Australia; whether there are any elements of the 
existing law that should remain intact; whether the procedural safeguards that might be put in 
place to avoid substantively unfair agreements are enough to protect individuals; and finally, 
whether Parliament is prepared to afford couples the autonomy to enter prima facie 
enforceable agreements or not.  
 
Regulating Prenuptial Agreements?  Balancing Autonomy and Protection 
 
	  
13	  
Chapter 1: The Tension between Autonomy 
and Protection 
At the core of the debate on prenuptial agreements is one central issue: striking the balance 
between affording couples the autonomy to enter into contracts and continuing to provide an 
appropriate level of state protection for individuals.1 This closely mirrors the more general 
conflict that exists throughout family law between state intervention and private ordering. 
This tension underlies many of the problematic aspects that the judiciary and the Law 
Commission have had to deal with in the prenuptial agreement context. This tension will be 
explored throughout much of what is discussed in the upcoming chapters of the thesis.  
Before going any further, it is prudent to explain what is meant by autonomy and protection 
in the prenuptial agreement context. Recently, family law has begun to place a much greater 
emphasis upon self-determination and self-sufficiency.2  When considering autonomy, this 
thesis is focussing upon the extent to which individuals should be able to circumvent the 
jurisdiction of the court to make orders for ancillary relief as conferred under section 25 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (hereafter the ‘MCA 1973’) and instead implement their own 
terms governing the reallocation of their assets. However, Jonathan Herring has recognised 
the need to temper this vision of autonomy by considering the interdependency and 
vulnerability of individuals. 3  Therefore, when talking about providing the appropriate 
protection for individuals, the financially weaker party, who may be relying upon the court to 
ensure that their financial needs are met through an ancillary relief order, must be taken into 
consideration. 
The whole purpose of most prenuptial agreements is that they place one party at a financial 
advantage against another. Therefore, from a protection perspective, great significance is 
placed upon ensuring that one spouse cannot implement an agreement in a way that is unfair, 
or impose unfair contractual terms upon the other party. Conversely, from an autonomy angle 
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2 Jonathan Herring, Relational Autonomy and Family Law’, in Julie Wallbank, Shazia Choudhry and Jonathan 
Herring (eds), Rights, Gender and Family Law (Routledge 2010), 259.  
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emphasis is placed upon individuals being able to enter into enforceable agreements without 
state intervention. It is recognised that ‘the contract model is colonising’ an increasing 
number of ‘areas of contemporary life’.4 Through the regulation of prenuptial agreements, the 
area of marriage ‘may not be immune’ from this phenomenon.5 An increased emphasis 
placed upon autonomy, has led to the emergence of a school of analysis that has identified a 
paradigm of ‘contract marriage’, which would enable couples to escape an ‘outmoded legal 
tradition’ by implementing agreements that are ‘tailored to fit their needs’.6  
The current approach of the law is ambivalent. Both autonomy and protection are embraced 
to varying degrees throughout the judicial reasoning.  For example, the Supreme Court in 
Radmacher v Granatino7 explicitly recognised that it would be ‘patronising’ not to give 
‘respect’ to individual autonomy,8 but in the same judgment, reiterated that parties could not 
by agreement oust the jurisdiction of the court.9 This thesis will suggest that this decision has 
had a substantial impact on the complexities of the law as it stands, but to take a logical 
approach, a preliminary issue must be addressed and a decision reached as to what exactly a 
prenuptial agreement is. Firstly, it must be determined whether the prenuptial agreement 
should be conceptualised as a valid, binding contract. If this is the case, to what extent should 
any statutory approach to prenuptial agreements strictly apply the general principles of 
contract law? If a prenuptial agreement is not to be treated as prima facie a valid contract, 
what is the correct balance between autonomy and protection? 
The courts themselves appear to be indecisive. The Supreme Court recently termed the 
distinction drawn between prenuptial and postnuptial agreements by Baroness Hale10 as a 
‘red herring’,11 suggesting that they are now prepared to afford both the same legal weighting. 
However, as neither is recognised within statute, a concrete position in between autonomy 
and protection has not yet been established. Before the implementation of a legal framework 
can even be considered for prenuptial agreements, their status and position within legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
4 David McLellan, ‘Contract Marriage – The Way Forward or Dead End?’ (1996)(23) Journal of Law and 
Society 234, 234 
5 ibid.  
6 ibid 236. 
7 [2010] UKSC 42. 
8 ibid [78]. 
9 ibid [2]. 
10 Macleod v Macleod [2008] UKPC 64 [36]. 
11 Radmacher (n 6) [63]. 
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theory must first be clarified. This will give any possible reform the greatest chance of 
widespread success and acceptance.  
The first section of this chapter will outline some of the traditional public policy objections to 
marital property contracts. The decreasing relevance that the courts have been attaching to 
these objections will simultaneously be illustrated, in order to demonstrate the rapid 
developments that family law is currently undertaking as a result of changing social trends. 
Whether full contractual autonomy is in fact what is desired or appropriate will then be 
examined. It is oft stated that prenuptial agreements cannot be equated to, and treated like, 
contracts in a commercial sense. This issue will be explored through the lens of relational 
contract theory, which provides a useful tool to aid the delineation of prenuptial agreements 
as a hybridised contract, which draws upon elements from both the contract law and family 
law approach. This will allow a more holistic approach to be taken to evaluating the extent to 
which couples should be afforded contractual autonomy to pre-determine the financial side of 
relationship breakdown. Ultimately, this will lead to conclusions as to whether a prenuptial 
agreement should function as a creature of contract law, of family law, or, if in fact a new 
hybrid legal model is required, which is influenced by, and draws upon, characteristics of 
both the contract and family law approaches.  
Public Policy Objections to Marital Property Agreements 
Prior to discussing the status of prenuptial agreements, the traditional public policy objections 
to the existence of contracts contemplating marital breakdown must be explored. Public 
policy is a difficult concept to define. It was long argued that no one has successfully 
managed to encapsulate the full meaning of public policy within one definition12 and even 
today there is no widely accepted definition, so that: ‘most frequently public policy is 
regarded as having merely a negative function’;13 in other words, it is used to justify 
intervention with the law on the grounds of principle. Public policy arguments seek to protect 
the interests of the wider public as a whole, rather than just the person who brings the claim 
in question before a court. 
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13 Ernest G Lorenzen, ‘Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws’ (1923) 33 Yale LJ 736, 746. 
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The rules that regard prenuptial agreements as contrary to public policy are ‘long standing’.14 
In regard to contracts that regulate the financial aspects of divorce, the courts referred to a 
number of public policy based objections. Firstly, there was the traditional notion that 
marriage imposed a common law duty upon the couple to live together indefinitely.15  Lord 
Penzance’s oft-quoted definition of marriage specifically refers to marriage as a lifelong 
union16 and it was implicit that the couple would live together. Indeed, at one stage the law 
regarded the husband and wife as one entity for financial and legal reasons.17 Marriage has 
traditionally been afforded a high status within society. It is ‘deeply embedded in the 
religious and social culture of this country.’18 The State endorsed marriage because it ‘creates 
its own little social security system’.19 The theory was the more couples that were able to 
privately regulate themselves; the fewer onuses there would be upon the State to interfere.20 
This in turn would make the couple less burdensome on the State’s resources, which are only 
handed out in a minimalistic, stigmatised and begrudging manner.21 Consequently, it was felt 
that any agreement making ‘provision for the possibility of separation might act as an 
encouragement to separate’.22  This would go directly against the traditional notion of 
marriage. 
A second public policy objection to marital property agreements, was a fear that allowing 
couples to oust the jurisdiction of the court to make orders for financial relief would be 
detrimental to the weaker spouse, and even more so the public as a whole. Lord Atkin 
advocated this approach in Hyman v Hyman,23 holding that the court was granted its statutory 
power to make relief ‘to prevent the wife from being thrown upon the public for support’.24 It 
was therefore not felt to be in the public interest to allow couples to agree contractual terms 
that could directly lead to the State having to subsidise a spouse who was left with 
insufficient financial support following a divorce. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
14 Macleod (n 10) [31]. 
15 ibid [19]. 
16 Hyde v Hyde (1866) LR 1 P & D 130, 133. 
17 Williams & Glyn's Bank v Boland [1979] Ch 312 (CA). 
18 Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21 [46]. 
19 Brenda Hale, ‘Equality and Autonomy in Family Law’ 33 JSW&FL 3, 4. 
20 ibid.  
21 Martha Fineman, The Autonomy Myth (The New Press 2004) 228. 
22 Radmacher (n 6) [31]. 
23 [1929] All ER Rep 245 (HL). 
24 ibid 274. 
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These public policy objections continued to influence judicial decision making up to the turn 
of the 21st century. Mr Justice Wall, in 1999, ruled that it remained the case that a prenuptial 
agreement ‘undermines the concept of marriage as a life-long union’ and so was ‘perceived 
as contrary to public policy’.25 This was reaffirmed in X v X (Y intervening).26 Although his 
thoughts had no application to the actual facts of the case, Mr Justice Munby confirmed that 
‘a contract which purports to deprive the court of a jurisdiction which it would otherwise 
have is contrary to public policy’.27 The traditional public objections to prenuptial agreements 
remained a very real consideration in the early part of the twenty-first century, but, since then, 
much has changed in terms of the judicial attitude towards prenuptial agreements. 
Consequently, the prominence of the traditional public policy objections has quickly 
diminished. 
It is common knowledge that divorce rate have been steadily rising over the last half century. 
According to the Office for National Statistics there were 119,589 divorces in the UK in 
2010.28 This figure was up nearly 6,000 on what it had been in 2009.29 Although the number 
of divorces actually peaked in 1985 when 160,300 couples went through the process,30 the 
overall trend throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first century demonstrates an 
overwhelming increase in divorce rates, particularly given that it was not until 1943 that 
annual divorce numbers reached the ten thousand mark.31 Current estimates are that 45% of 
new marriages will ultimately end in divorce.32  
In light of these figures, it has been suggested that to continue to uphold the traditional public 
policy objections would be ‘anachronistic’33 and it is not overly surprising that the judiciary 
has questioned the significance of the public policy objections to prenuptial agreements.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
25 N v N (Jurisdiction: Prenuptial Agreement) [1999] EWHC Fam 838 [35]. 
26 [2001] EWHC 11 (F). 
27 ibid [81]. 
28 Office for National Statistics, Divorces in England and Wales – 2010 data tables’ (8 December 2011) 
<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-238035> accessed 25 
April 2012. 
29 ibid.  
30 ibid.  
31 ibid.  
32 Office for National Statistics, The Proportion of Marriages Ending in Divorce in Population Trends (2008) 
<http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/population_trends/PT131MarriagesEndingInDivorce.pdf> accessed 28 
March 2012, 35. 
33 Baroness Ruth Deech, ‘What’s a Woman Worth?’ [2009] Fam Law 1140, 1144. 
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Mr Justice Connell was the first to suggest that the objections are ‘of less importance now 
that divorce is so commonplace’.34 His sentiments have since been echoed in a number of 
leading judgments in the area. The impact of the judgment of the Privy Council, handed 
down by Baroness Hale, in Macleod v Macleod was limited by her decision to address only 
the enforceability of postnuptial agreements.35 That said, it was specifically stated that, 
because ‘the old rule’ was ‘founded on the enforceable duty of husband and wife to live 
together’36 which no longer applied, there was no public policy objection to stop a couple 
forming a postnuptial agreement. 37 
Despite reaching this conclusion in relation to a postnuptial agreement, the Privy Council was 
unprepared to make the rational step and declare this as applying equally to prenuptial 
agreements. Instead, they took the view that it was ‘not open to them to reverse the long 
standing rule’38 that regards prenuptial agreements as ‘contrary to public policy’.39 This 
appears illogical because, as will be seen in Chapter 2, there had, prior to this decision, been 
significant judicial momentum towards taking prenuptial agreements into account, although 
in a strict legal sense it was the only decision that could be reached on the facts.   
However, this stance has not proved to be overly problematic, and the decisions in the 
Radmacher dispute have now provided a degree of clarity as to the role of public policy in 
the consideration of prenuptial agreements. Firstly, the judges at Court of Appeal level 
touched on the subject, with Lord Justice Thorpe articulating the view that ‘the language of 
invalidity and public policy is no longer appropriate’40 in the modern day. Lord Justice 
Wilson went on to hold that he knew of ‘no authority for the (continuing) existence’41 of 
public policy rules that would render a prenuptial agreement invalid. In that respect, he did 
not ‘fully understand’42 the decision that the Privy Council had handed down. The message 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
34 M v M (Prenuptial Agreement) [2002] 1 FLR 654 (F) [21]. 
35 Macleod (n 10) [36]. 
36 ibid [38]. 
37 ibid [36]. 
38 ibid [31]. 
39 ibid. 
40 Radmacher (formerly Granatino) v Granatino [2009] EWCA Civ 649 [66]. 
41 ibid [119]. 
42 ibid.  
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was unequivocal. The public policy grounds were regarded as ‘unrealistic, out-dated and out 
of line with international trends’.43  
Following on from this, the majority in the Supreme Court endorsed what the Privy Council 
had done in sweeping away the old public policy objections44 in regards to postnuptial 
agreements. They then asserted that this ‘should not be restricted to post-nuptial 
agreements.’45 The public policy objections were described as ‘archaic notions’.46 Baroness 
Hale was the only judge to qualify this sentiment, expressing that she still felt that it should 
be public policy to continue supporting marriage in this country.47 
For the purposes of this thesis, the key point to emphasise is that now that legislative policy 
has been liberalised, it can no longer be contrary to public policy for couples to conclude 
agreements that avoid them having to submit to the uncertainty of the ancillary relief 
process.48 It has therefore become much more difficult for the courts to dismiss prenuptial 
agreements on the traditional public policy grounds outlined above and, in a sense, protection 
has yielded to autonomy. 
Contractual Autonomy v State Protection 
It is commonplace to hear a prenuptial agreement referred to as a prenuptial contract. Other 
similar terms, for example ‘marital property agreement’ and ‘antenuptial contract’, are also 
widely used, both within the academic literature and the text of judicial reasoning. But the 
lexis of contract in this context is often used in a casual, informal manner, without much 
thought given to the connotations of the terminology used.    
In a strict sense, a contract is an agreement reached with the intention to create legal relations, 
supported by consideration and that the law will enforce.49 Firstly, an offer needs to be 
tendered by one party to another. To constitute an offer there must be a statement of 
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46 ibid [66]. 
47 ibid [159]. 
48 Anne Sanders, ‘Private Autonomy and Marital Property Agreements’ [2010] ICLQ 571, 583. 
49 Hugh G Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts, Volume 1: General Principle (30th edn 2008) [2-001]. 
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‘willingness to enter into a contract on stated terms.’50 There then must be an acceptance of 
that offer in order for an agreement to be formed. This must come in the form of ‘an 
unqualified expression of assent to the terms proposed by the offerer.’51 An offer can be 
withdrawn at any point prior to acceptance without ramifications and is distinguishable from 
an invitation to treat, which is merely ‘an expression of willingness to enter into 
negotiations’.52  
It is not disputed that a prenuptial agreement prima facie fulfils the requirements of a legal 
contract. One spouse will have to make an offer of a prenuptial agreement. The other spouse 
must then return the signed agreement at some point prior to their marriage ceremony. The 
formal requirements of offer and acceptance are clearly satisfied through this set of actions. 
Additionally, there must be an intention to create legal relations between the parties. In the 
past it had been questioned whether such an intention does exist between a married couple,53 
however, the Radmacher ruling extinguished any doubt that had existed by determining that, 
from this point onwards, it will be ‘natural to infer’ that those who enter into a prenuptial 
agreement intend it be legally binding.54  
It is the wider implications and effect on the treatment of a prenuptial agreement as a result of 
it being afforded contractual status that is of greater concern to this thesis. The current 
process of review led by the Law Commission, asks whether ‘legislative reform should 
enable couples effectively to contract out of ancillary relief’.55 Therefore, the focus of the 
Law Commission’s recommendations is likely to be upon how much autonomy Parliament 
should be willing to give to individuals to implement contractual terms in this context. It is 
important to note that technically, as things stand, couples can reach any agreement that they 
see fit, regardless of how unfair the terms may appear. But, in order for the agreement to be 
applied without further investigation, there must be no disagreement when divorce 
materialises.56 This does not necessarily mean that they have created a legally valid contract; 
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51 ibid 35.  
52 ibid 27. 
53 See, eg, Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571. 
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the validity of the contract depends on the court’s preparedness to uphold the agreement that 
they have put in place should there be a dispute.  
It is often not the case that couples are able to come to their own arrangements at the point of 
separation. An application for ancillary relief would not be made if there was an amicable, 
autonomous agreement reached between the couple, although not all ancillary relief 
proceedings come about as a result of irreconcilable disagreements between the parties; it is 
also plausible that some couples simply mutually prefer to submit to the discretion of the 
courts. If legislation is enacted that confers prima facie enforceability on prenuptial 
agreements there must be a procedure in place that the court must adhere to when dealing 
with disagreements.  
There is a spectrum of possible approaches that could be taken when a dispute arises. At one 
extreme is the notion of affording couples full autonomy; that is to view the agreement as 
legally binding, so that the court will only set it aside in circumstances where the traditional 
vitiating factors are triggered.  These cover ‘pathological’57 situations where duress, undue 
influence, misrepresentation, mistake and fraud are involved.  
At the opposite end of the spectrum, a prenuptial agreement could be given little or even no 
consideration by the court, regardless of the circumstances. Instead, the general principles of 
ancillary relief, namely the discretion afforded to the courts under Section 25 Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973, the ‘yardstick of equality’58and the themes of ‘need’, ‘compensation’ and 
‘sharing’, all of which will be outlined in more detail in Chapter 2, would be applied in order 
for the courts to continue to protect vulnerable individuals. The benefit of this approach 
would be to allow the court to retain a strong paternalistic function and therefore continue to 
protect the interests of vulnerable individuals. 
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Jens Scherpe, drawing on the work of Kevin Gray,59 has provided evidence of the contrasting 
approaches by highlighting the ‘pertinent’ distinction between ‘unconscionability of dealings’ 
and ‘unconscionability of outcomes’.60 Scherpe outlines that an approach towards prenuptial 
agreements that is based around the ‘unconscionability of dealings’ very strongly favours the 
protection of autonomy, by scrutinising the factors surrounding the inception of the 
agreement, rather than looking at the substantive fairness of the agreement. However, if 
‘unconscionability of outcomes’ is the main concern, then autonomy is clearly not the 
dominant objective as freely entered into bargains can still be set aside on fairness grounds.61 
Scherpe’s analysis of the framework highlights the difficulty in attempting to regulate 
prenuptial agreements using either a pure protection or a pure autonomy approach and 
buttresses the fact that, for successful regulation of prenuptial agreements to be achieved, a 
position must be found that balances the two principles.  
Historically, one of the most significant functions of ancillary relief was to provide protection 
to vulnerable individuals, who, in the majority of circumstances, were wives. Katherine 
O’Donovan explained that the ‘dependence’ of the financially weaker spouse upon the 
‘wage-earner’ was inevitable under the traditional construct of the family.62 Whilst the 
modern family may see the boundaries between the male breadwinner and female 
homemaker as blurred, many couples continue to ‘adopt specialised roles within the family 
economy.’63 Upon separation, the ‘vulnerabilities’ created by doing so are exposed.64 The 
paternalistic function of ancillary relief would therefore be seen as vital by some to protect 
those whose earning capacity has been reduced as a result of marriage.  
Any fresh legislative provisions regulating prenuptial agreements are unlikely to point the 
court towards affording prenuptial agreements no consideration at all. Such legislation would 
be without value, as judges would retain the wide discretion afforded to them by the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which will be outlined in Chapter 2. However, given that 
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reform of the law is clearly an option being considered, as evidenced by the Law 
Commission’s consultation on Marital Property Agreements, the Government may have to 
work towards ‘achieving the ‘optimum tension’’65 between the two ends of the spectrum. For 
this to occur it must be accepted that a middle ground can be found between the two positions. 
It is necessary for law reform in relation to prenuptial agreements to be seen as creating a 
unique area of the law, rather than merely operating as an instrument of pure autonomy or 
pure protection. 
There is evidence to indicate that the English common law is currently moving towards the 
contractual autonomy end of the spectrum. An examination of just how close to complete 
contractual autonomy it is desirable to reach, will aid in the determination of exactly where 
the optimum tension is to be found.   
Prenuptial agreements are contractually binding throughout continental Europe, as well as in 
the USA, Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand.66 Yet even within these 
countries, ‘the courts have retained full power to scrutinise’67 the terms of any arrangement 
and ‘have the final word’68 on whether to hold the parties to what they have signed. 
Affording couples the autonomy to make financial provisions dealing with future in advance 
of relationship breakdown, and continuing to give the judiciary discretion to go behind the 
terms of a prenuptial agreement, are not, therefore, mutually exclusive.  
In English law there is ‘a considerable reluctance…to detect contracts and transactions in 
very personal affairs’.69 Mr Justice Thorpe made it clear in F v F70 that the statutory rights 
that individuals are afforded by section 25 MCA 1973 ‘cannot be much influenced by 
contractual terms’.71 He was averse to allowing married couples the option to avoid being 
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governed by a statute that was implemented with the intention of having ‘universal 
application’72within England and Wales. 
Nevertheless, there has been a ‘shift in the court’s approach from one inclined to use its wide 
discretion paternalistically to one that is much more laissez-faire and desirous of granting 
autonomy’73 to couples seeking to put in place agreements. By the time that Lord Justice 
Thorpe came to hand down his 2007 judgment in Crossley v Crossley,74 he had begun to 
recognise that the ‘opportunity for the autonomy of the parties’75 had taken on increased 
importance. Similarly, Baroness Hale in Macleod felt that, in relation to post-nuptial 
agreements, it must be ‘assume(d) that each party…is a grown up and able to look after him 
or herself’.76 If this advice is heeded then it stands to reason that individuals should be 
afforded the autonomy to enter into prenuptial agreements as they see fit. In fact, some have 
actively been promulgating the removal of the court’s discretion completely in favour of full 
autonomy,77 but this thesis respectfully suggests that this would be a step too far in light of 
concerns about the exposure of vulnerable parties to risk if the court’s discretion was 
completely removed.  
These concerns emanate, in part, from doubts as to the level of autonomy that an individual 
can actually exercise when they are about to enter into marriage:78 The fear is that vulnerable 
individuals will be willing to sign up to terms that award them significantly less than they 
would be left with if dealings were left in the hands of the judges, as a result of not being able 
to ‘judge the future of their own marriage rationally.’79 This could stem either from a desire 
to appease their partners rather than upsetting them in the build-up to marriage, or the denial 
of the possibility that their relationship could ever break down.  
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It is true that more women than men are worried by the possibility that their partners want a 
prenuptial agreement,80 but this does not necessarily mean that they will not sign one anyway. 
Further, a study in the United States of America showed that, whilst the median response 
correctly identified the nationwide divorce rate of approximately 50%, in relation to their 
own marriages, the respondents felt that there was a 0% chance of the relationship breaking 
down.81 An idealistic and unrealistic approach by individuals towards their own marriages is 
not particularly surprising or blameworthy, but certainly something which must be borne in 
consideration when considering the extent to which couples should be afforded full autonomy 
to make binding prenuptial agreements.   
It is easy to understand why a young couple, marrying for the first time, would want to sweep 
any lingering doubts that they may hold as to the longevity of the marriage that they are 
entering into under the carpet. These couples should be cautious though. Deliberately 
avoiding the issue of a prenuptial agreement does not mean that the relationship is less likely 
to break down; it merely serves to avoid addressing this possibility.82 Similarly, where a 
prenuptial agreement is drawn up, it may be that one party does not afford it the full 
consideration that it deserves, in the false belief that there is no chance of their marriage 
irretrievably breaking down, or to avoid causing unrest in their relationship. The court’s 
discretion to potentially go behind the terms of an agreement is an important tool in such 
instances, as it is the only reliable way of protecting these potentially vulnerable spouses. 
Further criticism of ‘full autonomy’ approaches has come from feminist theorists who have 
suggested that relying too heavily on autonomy is dangerous in the marriage context. This is 
because many individuals, women in particularly, are not acting in a totally individualistic 
manner.83 Rather than trying to maximise output for themselves, they are focussed on the 
consequences for the family as a whole. There is the distinct possibility that one spouse will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
80 William T Abraham, Robert E Cramer, Ana M Fernandez &Eileen Mahler, ‘Infidelity, Race and Gender: An 
Evolutionary Perspective on Asymmetries in Subjective Distress to Violations-of-Trust’ (2001-02) 20(4) 
Current Psychology 337, 344. 
81 Lynn A Baker & Robert E Emery, ‘When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and 
Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage’ (1993) 17(4) Law and Human Behavior 439, 442 & 443. 
82 Franck, (n 79), 253. 
83 Brigitte Clark, ‘Should Greater Prominence Be Given to Pre-Nuptial Contracts in the Law of Ancillary 
Relief?’ [2004] CFLQ 399, 403. 
Regulating Prenuptial Agreements?  Balancing Autonomy and Protection 
 
	  
26	  
attempt to take advantage of the good nature of the other by asking them to sign a contract 
containing provisions to their detriment.  
It has been said that total ‘equilibrium is…a pipe dream in making deals of any kind of 
contracts’.84 Whilst in an ideal world there would never be any pressure upon anyone to sign 
a contract, the reality is that this is a very rare instance.85 It is arguable that even if the court’s 
discretion to go behind prenuptial agreements were to be removed, there would still be 
protection in the form of the standard contract vitiating factors. However, these are not 
intended for widespread use and the concerns over the effects of ‘full autonomy’ approach 
are valid. 
A popularly held contemporary opinion is that the courts have insisted that modern day 
marriage is a partnership.86 Indeed, there is an ‘increasingly akin view’ that marriage has 
been equated to ‘nothing more than a commercial partnership’.87 Cases like Lambert v 
Lambert,88 Foster v Foster89 and Miller; McFarlane90 all talked about marriage in such a way.  
In the late 1990s the idea of a ‘more democratic form of family living’91 evolved from the 
judgments handed down by the Court, reflecting the belief that most people ‘had come to 
regard intimate relationships as partnerships of equals’.92 The traditional labour split, which 
regarded the husband as the breadwinner and the wife the homemaker, was ‘no longer the 
order of the day’.93 Indeed, Lord Justice Thorpe expressly stated that it was ‘unacceptable’94 
for a court to value the contributions of the breadwinner above those of the homemaker, 
whilst Lady Justice Hale ruled that ‘there can be no justification…these days’95 for a 
difference in treatment. The use of the phrase ‘these days’ points directly towards an ‘out 
with the old, in with the new’96 attitude. There is strong empirical evidence that marriage is 
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indeed viewed in the same way as a partnership, as well as providing assurances that the 
courts will continue to provide protection for those who may be in a financially vulnerable 
position because they have functioned in a homemaker capacity. 
The logical and progressive next step would be to allow couples to draw up contractual terms 
to govern the conclusion of the partnership. Indeed, this would extinguish the ‘anomalous 
position’97 that currently sees spouses unable to enter into valid contractual agreements, 
whilst their cohabiting counterparts can.98  It is conceivable that affording parties such levels 
of autonomy will strengthen marriage as an institution. This will occur through encouraging 
those currently wary of entering into matrimony to take the step.99  
However, there are fears as to how this could escalate. Harris, George and Herring have 
raised concern as to how far the autonomy argument will run.100 If it is powerful enough to 
enable individuals to escape from coming under the ancillary relief umbrella, will it run as far 
as allowing couples to contract on personal behaviour? The example given is a clause 
requiring one party to wear a yellow hat in order to avoid a divorce,101 but perhaps more 
worrying would be terms that required manual labour or sexual gratification by one of the 
parties.  
The trio go on to mitigate their assertion by saying that such clauses would of course not be 
allowable under marriage law102 and the Law Commission itself appears to have dealt 
directly with this issue, explicitly stating that it is only exploring the possibility of 
enforceable provisions on financial matters.103 The examples given above regarding manual 
labour and sexual gratification clearly do not regulate the financial side of divorce. Such 
clauses will be severable where it is possible to do so, or, where the term is explicitly part of 
the deal, it will render the whole prenuptial agreement void. 104  
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The High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court all considered the contractual 
status of prenuptial agreements in Radmacher.  Mrs Justice Baron touched on the subject at 
first instance by stating that ‘standard contractual vitiating factors’105 could affect the amount 
of weight given to an agreement. This did not introduce anything revolutionary. The idea that 
contractual factors like mistake, misrepresentation, duress, fraud and undue influence could 
be taken into account by courts was not a new one. Indeed, the Government Green Paper 
‘Supporting Families’ specifically recommended that one of the safeguards that should be put 
in place was that a prenuptial agreement should be set aside if it would not be a valid 
agreement under the law of contract.106  Mrs Justice Baron’s assertion, therefore, whilst not 
ground breaking, did re-affirm the role of contractual principles. 
Upon appeal, Lord Justice Thorpe dealt specifically with the issues of contract and autonomy. 
It is worth repeating in full what he had to say at paragraph [27]; 
‘Due respect for adult autonomy suggests that, subject of course to proper 
safeguards, a carefully fashioned contract should be available as an alternative to 
the stress, anxieties and expense of a submission to the width of the judicial 
discretion.’107 
This was an explicit recognition that prenuptial agreements should be afforded contractual 
status and a degree of sympathy towards those wanting to enforce agreements was apparent. 
Affording individuals the autonomy to enter into agreements was clearly a favourable option. 
This would appear to have been a major factor in leading Lord Justice Thorpe to make the 
above statement. Additionally, he recognised the need to extinguish the ‘rules of law that 
divide us’108 from both Europe and the wider common law world.109  
Naturally, Lord Justice Thorpe did not advocate the recognition of prenuptial agreements as 
contracts on an unqualified basis. Instead there were a number of vitiating factors that he 
outlined. He reasoned that: 
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‘Any provision that seeks to oust the jurisdiction of the court will always be void 
but severable. Any contract will be voidable if breaching proper safeguards or 
vitiated under general principles of contract. Any contract would be subject to the 
review of a judge exercising his duty under s25 if asserted to be manifestly unfair 
to one of the contracting parties.’110 
Whilst the general contractual principles were referenced, it is noteworthy that the notion of 
fairness and the idea that contracts could not seek to oust the jurisdiction of the court were 
also included. The inclusion of these qualifications suggests that the courts are not seeking to 
give prenuptial agreements contractual status in the strictest sense. It was also recognised that 
the law as it stands has ‘left it difficult or impossible to lay down…guidelines as to the 
circumstances in which the interests of private autonomy are to have weight.’111  
Lord Justice Rix asked the pivotal question when he expressly queried whether or not a 
prenuptial agreement should be looked at as if it were a standard binding contract?112 He 
made reference to Baroness Hale, who, in Macleod, had held that ‘we must assume that each 
party to a properly negotiated agreement is a grown up and able to look after’113 themselves, 
placing emphasis on the terms ‘properly negotiated’.114 Lord Justice Rix continued to draw 
the distinction between a prenuptial and a postnuptial agreement,115 which is what Baroness 
Hale had been discussing. However, he allowed the question to remain unanswered.  
The Supreme Court recognised that the majority of jurisdictions afford prenuptial agreements 
contractual status and will hold parties to them unless pre-specified safeguards or criteria are 
not met.116 At the same time, the Supreme Court questioned whether or not it was important 
that nuptial agreements, including prenuptial agreements, had ‘contractual status’,117 since the 
‘value of a contract is that a court will enforce it’.118 They also acknowledged that, under the 
current law, the court couldn’t be bound by a prenuptial agreement, yet it is encouraged to 
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take it into consideration. This is the case whether or not agreements are afforded contractual 
status.119 
The result of this analysis was that the enquiry into whether or not nuptial agreements should 
be afforded contractual status was dismissed as a ‘red herring’120 by the majority of the 
Supreme Court. It was felt that the courts have ‘adopted a more nuanced approach’121 to 
nuptial agreements than they have to regular contracts. Consequently, it is ‘immaterial’122 in 
English ancillary relief whether or not a prenuptial agreement is regarded as a contract. The 
same criteria will be applied by the court in determining the weight to be afforded to the 
agreement regardless its contractual status.123  
The decision of the majority appeared to state that, as things stand, it does not matter whether 
a prenuptial agreement is considered to have contractual status or not. Baroness Hale seems 
to have interpreted the majority’s opinion as making prenuptial agreements contractually 
binding,124 even if it was seemingly irrelevant whether they did so or not. In her dissent she 
expressly disagreed with the ‘mercifully obiter’125 viewpoint that prenuptial agreements are 
contractually valid. Clearly the debate is not over. Whilst the majority have expressed that 
under the current laws of ancillary relief it does not matter whether the starting point is that 
prenuptial agreements are valid contracts or not, it is a topic that will have to be seriously 
considered when entertaining the possibility of law reform.  
The Law Commission has recently proposed that in order for any ‘qualifying nuptial 
agreement’ to be capable of being upheld, the agreement must first be valid under the law of 
contract.126 Contractual validity would therefore become a prerequisite for the creation of a 
binding prenuptial agreement, although it would not be the only safeguard. Parties would 
have autonomy in so far as they could enter into a prenuptial contract, however, it would not 
be the case that the mere finding of a valid contract would serve to oust the jurisdiction of the 
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court. Such an approach is unheard of throughout the rest of Europe and other suitable 
comparators like Australia, the USA and New Zealand.127 It has the potential to leave one 
spouse ‘destitute’128 and, subsequently, much of the discussion in this thesis will be focussed 
upon the checks and balances upon autonomy that the state should provide.   
The conflict of opinions on the matter is stark and a compromise must be found before law 
reform can be properly embarked upon. Only once the true status of prenuptial agreements is 
determined, will any statutory regime be able to be built successfully.  
Using Relational Contract Theory to Bridge the Gap? 
Despite the potential for prenuptial agreements to be viewed as binding contracts in the 
traditional sense, there is still a degree of discomfort with equating a marriage to a 
commercial transaction. The traditional notion is that marriage is a life-long commitment 
based around love, whereas a commercial transaction usually takes place in a business 
context and only governs a short period.129 This view holds contracts as ‘discontinuous with 
our everyday thinking about marriage’.130 However, an alternative theory promulgates that 
‘contracts need no longer be read as creating exclusively commercial obligations’.131 As will 
be outlined, this methodology can prove useful in the prenuptial agreement context.  
Much of the conflict that has arisen surrounding the regulation of prenuptial agreements 
stems from the autonomy versus protection debate, which leads to attempts to shoehorn 
prenuptial agreements into the remit of either contract or family law. This thesis highlights 
the possibility of conceiving prenuptial agreements as having their own unique legal form, 
drawing on relational contract theory in order to give content to the new ,hybrid model. 
As a prerequisite to law reform taking place, there must be a degree of clarity as to the 
concept of the prenuptial agreement that is to be regulated. Further, the extent to which the 
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law should strive to afford individuals autonomy, as opposed to providing a paternalistic 
function, must be determined. By applying relational contract theory to prenuptial agreements, 
it can be shown that there is some value in regarding prenuptial agreements as contracts, 
albeit not in the classically understood commercial meaning of the word.  
Essentially, relational contract theory can be looked upon as an ‘attempt to take into account 
all the surrounding circumstances of relationships’,132 rather than simply looking at a contract 
as a one-off arrangement. The ‘obvious definition’133 of a relational contract is one that 
involves a relationship between the contracting parties rather than a mere exchange of a good 
or  service.134 The ‘substantive core’135 of relational contract theory is based upon the notions 
that, firstly, contracts are ‘fundamentally about cooperative social behaviour’ 136  and, 
secondly, that the ‘predominant form of contracts’ are those which contain ‘significant 
relational elements.’137 
Relational contract theory proposes that ‘agreements are not always transactional 
occasions’.138 The traditional reluctance to afford prenuptial agreements the same status as 
commercial contracts came about in part because a clear distinction between contracts and 
family law agreements was often drawn. At one end of the scale lay the purely commercial 
transaction, which is ‘short-term and requires no personal interaction’,139 while at the other 
was the tacit familial agreement that is not intended to be legally binding. However, if 
relational contract theory can be utilised to build an understanding that the future regulation 
of prenuptial agreements should draw upon values linked to both autonomy and protection, 
then viewing prenuptial agreements as a category of contracts in their own right will become 
more readily acceptable.  
Although academics have been developing the perspective of relational contract theory since 
Ian Macneil’s groundbreaking work in the 1980s, there is ‘no developed body of relational 
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contract law’.140 Classical contract law is ‘implicitly based on a paradigm’ of ‘bargains made 
between strangers…in a perfect market’141 and is ‘focused almost exclusively on a single 
instant in time’.142 This model of contract allows the parties the autonomy to enter into any 
agreement that they see fit, but does not lend itself to application to prenuptial agreements. A 
couple getting married are not strangers. Further, the bargain that they are making is not 
supposed to just cover the moment of inception, in fact, it rarely covers this moment at all. 
Instead, prenuptial agreements attempt to regulate an event that may or may not occur at 
some indefinable point in the future.  
John Wightman, a notable proponent of relational contract theory, believes that the 
‘fundamental inadequacy’ with traditional contract law is that it focuses upon the original 
agreement as the source of obligations.143 Based upon this evaluation, the reluctance to treat 
the prenuptial agreement in a similar manner to a commercial agreement is more than 
understandable. The original terms of the prenuptial agreement will often be wholly 
unreflective of the circumstances that are actually in place when the agreement comes to be 
enforced.  However, that is not to say that prenuptial agreements should have no contractual 
standing, nor should the ability to make autonomous decisions be taken out of the hands of 
couples. The contractual enforceability of prenuptial agreements is not an ‘all or nothing’ 
scenario. Relational contract theory can help justify the new hybrid position that this thesis 
believes prenuptial agreements should take in the future, which will draw on a desire to 
enable couples to reach autonomous decisions, tempered with checks and balances designed 
to ensure that vulnerable individuals continue to have their interests protected.  
By challenging this status quo, Macneil ‘persistently shoved a generation of legal thinkers out 
of the comfortable clarity of classical and neoclassical doctrinal analysis’144 and feminists 
have described his work as a ‘virtual rehabilitation of contract’.145 Macneil explained that a 
contract between ‘totally isolated, utility maximising individuals is, in fact, a ‘war’ rather 
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than a contract.146 He believed that ‘all real life exchange takes place in the context of 
relations more extensive than the exchange itself’.147 In other words, Macneil holds that, to 
paraphrase George Orwell, all contracts are relational, although ‘some contracts…are far 
more relational than others’.148 Discrete contracts, involving one-off transactions, ‘are almost 
as imaginary as unicorns’.149 Instead, all contracts fall at some point along the spectrum 
between classical, discrete contracts and wholly relational ones.  
Relational contract theory is deeply complex and is not based on one single model. One 
commentator described the whole area of academic literature as a swamp that requires 
escaping from.150 Clearly then, from that analogy, it is not a concrete theory and is open to 
manipulation. This does not hinder the application of relational contract theory in the 
prenuptial agreement context. The purpose of proposing a relational contract analysis is to 
bridge the gap between informal agreements between spouses and commercial contracts, 
demonstrating the unique hybrid position that prenuptial agreements occupy between the 
pulls of contract and family law. By establishing that this position is one that law reform 
should look to achieve, it is hoped that some of the tension that has been evidenced to exist 
between autonomy and protection will be alleviated.  
Firstly, relational contract theory entertains ‘the possibility that norms internal to the parties’ 
relationship…will become part of their obligations to each other’,151 even if they are not 
expressly part of the agreement. This point can be easily related to marriage and, in turn, the 
prenuptial agreement. The intended obligations of a marriage cannot be ‘set out completely at 
the beginning’, nor do the commitments made intend to ‘exhaust everything that the parties 
intend to occur during the relationship’.152 In the same manner, a prenuptial agreement is 
unlikely to be able to attempt to foresee every eventuality.  
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Whilst it is more difficult in intimate relationships than it would be in the commercial context 
to imply terms based on general practice, it is not impossible. 153  In many cases, 
circumstances that were unforeseen at the start of a marriage have occurred by the time 
divorce takes place. The most common example would be the birth of children, but there 
could be many other factors, ranging from the more obvious like illness and disability, to 
more unlikely scenarios like fame, an unexpected career change or a lottery win, in which it 
could be equally as applicable. Where pre-nuptial agreement are concerned, unlike for 
commercial transactions, there are not ‘general business practices’ that can be used as a fall 
back position. However, the family courts have considerable expertise and experience of 
dealing with ancillary relief cases. The judges will be able to draw upon a wealth of policies 
and ideas that have previously been articulated by the family courts, within which the notion 
of protection for vulnerable individuals will feature heavily. This will enable them to flesh 
out the interpretation of statutory provisions, in order to determine which terms should be 
implied into the agreement based on the individual circumstances of the case.  
The presence of any of the factors listed above, and the list is far from exhaustive, will often 
trigger change in the course of dealings between the couple. In some instances the couple 
may have foreseen this occurrence, but in many instances, the prenuptial agreement in place 
will not have provided for such a change. By utilising the relational contract in this context, 
the courts’ continued discretion to intervene and protect the interests of vulnerable 
individuals, despite contractual terms already being in place, can be readily justified. In fact, 
the courts’ enduring discretion go behind the terms of the agreement is vital. The parties, to 
their detriment, will often rely upon the changes that may have occurred within 
relationships.154 In such instances, it may not be fair to return to the original agreement.155 In 
this respect, a prenuptial agreement does not align entirely with either the family law 
principle of protection, or the contract law principle of autonomy. Rather, as has already been 
suggested, it is more appropriately viewed as a hybrid relational agreement that draws upon 
features of both of these models.  
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In the marital context, there is always going to be a highly relational connection between the 
spouses. Wightman has outlined a number of models that operate within the ambit of 
relational contract, one of which being the ‘altruistic model’.156 In such a close relationship 
the idea of maximising individual utility becomes more ‘artificial’,157 with the focus instead 
on long-term harmony for the couple and their family. Often, the problems with implying 
contractual terms into intimate relationships are that there is no consideration given for the 
bargain and it is generally presumed that there is no intention to create legal relations. 
Wightman suggests that even in the most highly relational of commercial contracts, ‘there is 
always a foundation of exchange which means that there is no problem in establishing the 
existence of a contract’. 158  The prenuptial agreement can therefore, as an irreducible 
minimum, be utilised to ensure that there are no issues in establishing a foundation of 
exchange in genuinely altruistic relationships. It is from this base that the level of autonomy 
to be afforded must then be determined.  
Relational contract theory ‘demands’ that individuals ‘confront the reality of long-term 
continuing relations’. 159  This can in fact be healthy for a couple and will ‘facilitate 
communication between them.’160 One of their primary concerns will be the ‘preservation of 
the relationship itself’161 and they often seek the best possible outcome for the family as a 
whole, as opposed to striving for individual wealth maximisation. By making it the more 
socially accepted norm for a long-term approach to be taken, there may be a greater degree of 
protection awarded to the vulnerable. The hybridised model of the prenuptial agreement will 
at least make couples consider sitting down and considering potential future changes in 
circumstances. There will be no guarantee that the court will not itself alter the terms of the 
agreement because of a material change of circumstances in order to provide protection for 
one party, but couples will at least give themselves a greater chance of having their autonomy 
upheld.  
A supposed benefit of the relational contract is that it recognises that the parties are able to 
‘utilise their detailed knowledge of their specific situation and…adapt to new information as 
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it becomes available.’ 162  In a prenuptial agreement negotiation, the couple know the 
intricacies of their financial situation better than anyone else and will, theoretically, be best 
placed to make any alterations to the terms of any agreement that need to come about as a 
result of changes in their personal circumstances. This is a clear benefit of allowing 
autonomy to some extent; however, this must be tempered to reflect the fact that both parties 
will not necessarily be working towards the same outcome.  
To a certain extent relational contracts are ‘self-enforcing’163 because both parties have an 
‘incentive not to renege’164 on the terms of the agreement. McLellan made it clear that 
‘contracts to respect, honour, and love would be difficult to specify as performance and 
breach’,165 but if marriage itself is viewed as the relationship, with the prenuptial agreement 
merely governing the terms of exit, then it will still most often be in the interest of the 
spouses and their family to keep the marriage going. At least at the time when the prenuptial 
agreement is entered into, it is only a contingency plan to deal with the financial side of any 
potential future relationship breakdown.  
Naturally, where human beings are afforded autonomy, there is always a danger of 
opportunism. In a relational contract this can be defined as ‘self-interest seeking that 
contradicts the terms of an established relational contract’.166 In the USA, where the Uniform 
Premarital Agreement Act has been adopted in over 27 states, Gail Brod argued in the 1990s 
that premarital agreements discriminated against women on gender grounds, highlighting 
them as a category of potentially vulnerable individuals in need of protection.  She felt that 
the law should be refashioned so that autonomous agreements were only enforceable if the 
vulnerable spouse achieved economic justice and the bargaining process was fair. 167 
Kingdom points out that this attitude preserved the ‘doctrine of contract as commerce’, even 
if it was ‘tempered’ by the notion of justice.168 Therefore, with a successful move away from 
viewing prenuptial agreements as contracts in the traditional commercial sense that can be 
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autonomously entered into, there is the possibility of even stronger protections being in place 
for vulnerable individuals. 
In any case, the danger of opportunism is present in any form of contract entered into. Leckey 
submits that relational contract theory recognises the ‘potential for serious inequality in 
intimate relationships’.169  Autonomy for one party can be a restriction of autonomy for 
another and so the court retaining the discretion to go behind the terms of the prenuptial 
agreement will ensure sufficient protection remains in place for vulnerable individuals, who, 
in this context, have traditionally been women.  
Wightman drew a ‘distinction between agreements for exchange and agreements for use’,170 
with the latter category encompassing contracts that do not fit the traditional commercial 
transaction model of contract. Rather than merely being contracts for exchange of a good or 
service, agreements for use practically govern a longer-term relationship between the parties. 
Within the second category, he explained that both ‘altruism’ and ‘cooperative norms’ would 
feature heavily. 171 Therefore, it is possible that prenuptial agreements would include clauses 
that would ‘undermine’172 the traditional criticisms of contract law, which are seen as 
enabling the male to dominate financially. Instead, the agreements themselves would place 
both parties in favourable position. Guggenheimer was a champion of this theory, suggesting 
if parties are able to autonomously enter into prenuptial agreements, there will be those 
drafted that will favour equality over what she termed ‘feminomics’.173 The prenuptial 
agreement itself in these instances will be the source of protection for vulnerable individuals.  
Relational contract theory has previously been used in company law to gain an understanding 
of how long-term business contracts operate. It has also been suggested that it is used in 
employment law to evidence the ‘broad range of relational interests and contexts present in 
employment relationships’174 that contract law alone could not show.  There is no reason why 
it cannot be used in the family law sphere to highlight the complexities of a contract being 
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implemented between spouses. In fact, Leckey argues that, owing to relational contract 
theory’s ‘sharp awareness of potential problems in private ordering’, 175  by using the 
relational approach, the legislator is placed in a better decision to determine how objective or 
subjective it wants the safeguards that it puts in place to be.176  
Conclusion 
Whilst the autonomy versus protection debate will always continue to cause controversy, it is 
clear that the current trend is a shift towards allowing couples the ability to make autonomous 
decisions. However, this move towards autonomy must be tempered as what one party sees 
an autonomous decision, another may view as a restriction of their autonomy. Resultantly, the 
point has been reached whereby prenuptial agreements are arguably deserving of their own 
hybrid legal status which sits somewhere along the spectrum between autonomy and 
protection. Granting couples full autonomy to enter into agreements would lead to an inherent 
danger that one party would be able to take advantage of another, whether it be through the 
process of reaching an agreement, or in the actual terms of the prenuptial agreement itself. 
This chapter has suggested that by viewing the prenuptial agreement through the relational 
contract theory lens, a much ‘wider set of values to draw upon in understanding a relationship 
as a contract’177 is opened up. Stychin argues that ‘through thinking about contracts in more 
value-open terms…we may be liberated to think about contracts in richer, contractual 
terms’.178 This more liberal attitude towards allowing couples to make autonomous decisions 
regarding the financial consequences of their divorce in advance, makes a hybrid position for 
prenuptial agreements, which sits in between ‘autonomy’ and ‘protection’, more readily 
justifiable. This position will not be cemented. It will continue to operate on a sliding scale, 
dependent upon whether certain criteria surrounding the implementation of a prenuptial 
agreement are met. These will be discussed in detail within Chapter 4 and must continue to 
ensure that elements of both ‘autonomy’ and ‘protection’ are present within the law. 
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Prior to reaching that point though, an outline of the current common law position of England 
and Wales on prenuptial agreements will take place in Chapter 2, followed by a similar 
exercise in relation to the statutory provisions that have been enacted in Australia in Chapter 
3. These chapters will serve to introduce the issues that will be discussed in more detail 
within Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 2: The Key Issues in England and 
Wales 
Having introduced the tension that exists between autonomy and protection in Chapter 1, this 
chapter will outline the law on prenuptial agreements in England and Wales.  To aid in 
achieving this, a brief overview of the wider issues that have arisen in relation to the 
economic aspect of divorce will be given. The general principles of ancillary relief will be 
outlined, prior to embarking upon an exploration of the way in which the court has 
historically dealt with contracts purporting to regulate the financial aspect of marital 
breakdown. Finally, the development of the law specifically in relation to prenuptial 
agreements since the 1990s will be charted. Throughout the course of the chapter, the tension 
between autonomy and protection will be clearly evident within judicial decision-making.   
Dividing ‘Matrimonial Property’ 
One of the most problematic aspects of a divorce is how to divide assets between spouses. 
This is the issue upon which the whole area of ancillary relief and, latterly, prenuptial 
agreements, is constructed. The academic literature published in relation to these two topics 
has developed with a view to solving this issue. 
In jurisdictions that recognise ‘matrimonial property’, its definition is in itself highly 
contentious. There are conflicting opinions as to whether it should include everything that the 
couple have acquired during a marriage, or, whether it should be possible to draw a 
distinction between assets that are familial and assets that are not.1  
Unlike many of its European counterparts, England and Wales does ‘not yet have’2 in place 
any ‘community of property’ regime.  Similar schemes can be traced back to the Soviet 
Union in 1926 and have been widely introduced throughout numerous European states.3 In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
1 Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 [153]. 
2 ibid [151].  
3 Branka Resetar, ‘Matrimonial Property in Europe: A Link Between Sociology and Family Law’ (2008) 12(3) 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law <http://www.ejcl.org/123/art123-4.pdf> accessed 16 December 2011, 1. 
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France, for example, the Napoleonic Code 1804 (Code Napoléon)	  allows couples complete 
freedom to elect to follow one of a number of regimes. These range from a regime which 
keeps the couple’s assets totally separate upon divorce, including those obtained both prior to 
and during the marriage (Séparation de Biens4), to one which regards virtually all of the 
assets to be jointly held and thus divided evenly upon divorce (Communauté Universelle5).  
This regime, and the parallel ones that can be found throughout the continent, ensures almost 
total clarity in regards to the status of assets upon divorce.  Couples are presented with the 
chance to make autonomous choices on whether to protect what they consider to be their own 
personal assets, or to allow them to become matrimonial property.  
Although the starting point in England and Wales is separate property,6 there have still been 
attempts by the judiciary to distinguish between assets that should be regarded as 
‘matrimonial’ and those that individuals should be able to keep as personal.                                          
Lord Denning attempted to define family assets in Wachtel v Wachtel7as: 
….those things which are acquired by one or both of the parties, with the 
intention that there should be continuing provision for them and their children 
during their joint lives, and used for the benefit of the family as a whole.8 
Baroness Hale addressed the issue in detail in her part of the judgment in the conjoined Miller; 
McFarlane decision. She asserted that the family home, its contents, the parties’ earning 
capacities, holiday homes, insurance policies and other family savings would all obviously 
form the ‘fruits of the marital partnership.’9 
The difficulty comes with assets acquired prior to and during the marriage, that one party 
wants to exclude from the so-called ‘matrimonial property’. These could include anything 
from vast business corporations right the way down to small, inherited family heirlooms. 
Baroness Hale was clearly undecided as she engaged upon a difficult balancing act. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
4 Napoleonic Code 1804, Articles 1536-1568. 
5 ibid Article 1526. 
6 Sonia Harris –Short and Joanna Miles, Family Law Text, Cases and Materials (OUP 2nd Edition 2011) 122. 
7 [1973] EWCA Civ 10, [1973] 1 All ER 829. 
8 ibid 836. 
9 Miller; McFarlane (n 1) [154]. 
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Ultimately, Baroness Hale pointed to section 25(2)(d) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
(hereafter the ‘MCA 1973’). This provision expressly obliges the court to consider the 
duration of a marriage, thus ensuring that ‘the source of assets may be taken into account’.10 
In this sense, the courts will continue to attempt to provide the appropriate level of protection 
to individuals who need it. That said, she warned that the importance of this factor will 
‘diminish over time’,11 perhaps as more weight is given to party autonomy. Most importantly, 
she expressly recognised that the starting point in England and Wales remains the ‘premise of 
separate property’,12 within which there is ‘some scope for one…to acquire and retain 
separate property’.13  
Despite this statement to the contrary, others argue that England and Wales has developed a 
common law community of property regime. Judicial decisions have supposedly created an 
environment whereby a ‘deferred community of assets’14 is effectively in place. 15 Since 
Baroness Hale’s ruling was passed down, it has been expressly established in Jones v Jones16 
that it is permissible for spouses to autonomously determine to ‘ring-fence’17 their personal 
assets, which are consequently excluded from any potential future ancillary relief proceedings. 
Even the most ‘modest legislative steps’ in the direction of a community of property regime 
have so far been ‘strenuously resisted.’18 Following the Jones ruling, it is possible that 
individuals have, to a certain extent, the ability to make autonomous decisions to exclude 
assets from divorce proceedings, however, the court is still very conscious of its protective 
function. It therefore seems logical that couples will turn to a prenuptial agreement in order 
circumvent the default property rules of this jurisdiction, perhaps in an attempt to formally 
construct their own personal ‘community of acquests’.19  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
10 ibid [152].  
11 ibid. 
12 ibid [153]. 
13 ibid. 
14 Sandra Verburgt, Simon Bruce & Andreas Kuhne, ‘Marital Agreements: International Lawyers Neglect 
Jurisdictional Developments at their Peril’ [2011] IFL 215, 216. 
15 Stephen Cretney, ‘Community of Property Introduced by Judicial Decision’ [2003] 119 LQR 349. 
16 [2011] EWCA Civ 41. 
17 Tom Phillips and Gary Yan, ‘Keeping Up With the Joneses’ [2011] NLJ 275. 
18 Miller; McFarlane (n 1) [151]. 
19 Law Commission, Marital Property Agreements – A Consultation Paper (Law Com No 198, 2011) [5.57]. 
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The majority of divorces are concerned with reaching ‘fair loss –sharing settlements’ rather 
than ‘divvying up a surplus’,20 yet any surplus assets being protected need not run into the 
millions of pounds for a prenuptial agreement to be worthwhile. An enforceable prenuptial 
agreement could, for example, merely have the effect of unequivocally demonstrating the 
intention for a specific chattel, or land, to remain separate from the pool of marital assets. 
This thesis will highlight the potential issues problems that may arise in doing so. 
The Uncertainty Surrounding Ancillary Relief 
Divorcees undergo a life changing process. In many cases, they will be moving to ‘two 
households instead of one’.21 The fundamental role of ancillary relief is to ensure that, where 
assets allow it, both the husband and the wife have the financial means to support themselves 
and any children that they have. Its purpose is to ensure that a ‘gentle transition’22 can be 
made between joint and single life.  Lord Mance has arguably articulated the most succinct 
mission statement for ancillary relief: 
‘The ultimate objective is to give each party an equal start on the road to 
independent living.’23 
Ancillary relief operates as the default mechanism for resolving any disputes that arise 
between the parties over the reallocation of assets. It should be noted that in the ‘vast 
majority’24 of cases the court is able make a consent order. Here it merely approves an ‘order 
in terms applied for to which the respondents agree’,25 although it has been emphasised that 
the court does not simply ‘rubber stamp’26 any terms placed in front of it.  
This thesis is naturally more concerned with the regulation of disputes that arise between the 
separating parties. A prenuptial agreement is often driven by the desire to circumvent the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
20 Chris Barton, ‘“In Stoke-on-Trent My Lord, They Speak of Little Else”: Radmacher v Granatino’ [2011] Fam 
Law 67, 72. 
21 Wachtel (n 7) 839. 
22 Miller: McFarlane (n 1) [151]. 
23  ibid [144]. 
24 David Hodson, ‘Making, Drafting and Breaking Consent Orders’ (January 2007) 
<http://www.davidhodson.com/assets/documents/consent_orders.pdf> accessed 26 January 2012. 
25 MCA 1973 (UK), s33A (3). 
26 Pounds v Pounds [1994] EWCA Civ 10. 
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default ancillary relief position. Subsequently, it is ‘impossible’ to proceed with any analysis 
without first outlining the laws that couples are seeking to avoid. 27 
As outlined above, ‘English law starts from the principle of separate property during 
marriage’.28 This ‘remains the only matrimonial property regime’29 applicable within this 
jurisdiction. If every marriage broke down amicably, spouses would always be able to 
independently conclude arrangements for the redistribution of assets. Court intervention 
would not be required and the laws regulating ancillary relief would be engaged less 
frequently. The reality is, however, that divorce is a highly emotive process that serves to blur 
objectivity and escalates human desire to further self-interest. Couples often find themselves 
embroiled in disputes as to the reallocation of assets following marital breakdown. In fact, 
some couples will make a joint-decision to ask the courts to settle their affairs, rather than 
even attempting to reach an agreement themselves. Upon the award of the decree absolute, 
signifying the legal completion of the divorce procedure, those not able to independently 
settle their affairs must make an application for ancillary relief.  
Prior to the 1970s, the courts possessed limited power to intervene. The relevant legal 
provisions can now be found in the MCA 1973, which developed as a result of the Law 
Commission’s ‘Report on Financial Provision in Matrimonial Proceedings’,30 chaired by Mr 
Justice Scarman in 1969.  
The MCA 1973 bestows upon the court a considerable amount of power to choose from a 
detailed ‘menu of orders’31 in relation to both personal32 and real property.33 This includes 
orders for both secured and unsecured periodic payments, lump sum payments and transfer of 
property. These powers have significant ramification for those to whom the court applies 
them. For the immediate future at least, any order made will dictate the standard of living that 
the recipient will be able to achieve. As such, the MCA 1973 requires the court to take into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
27 Marital Property Agreements (n 19) [1.15]. 
28 Miller; McFarlane (n 1) 655. 
29 Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 [140]. 
30 Law Commission, Family Law – Report on Financial Provision in Matrimonial Proceedings (Law Com No 
25, 1969). 
31 Marital Property Agreements (n 19) [2.5]. 
32 MCA 1973 (UK), s 25(1)(a)-(f). 
33 ibid s 25(1)(a)-(d). 
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account the ‘standard of living enjoyed by the family’34 prior to the breakdown. Judges must 
‘redistribute family property…as they consider just’, 35  taking into consideration an 
assortment of common law and statutory principles.  
The statute itself provides the first port of call for the judges. The implicit, although not 
explicit, overriding principle is that the outcome should be the fairest possible for all 
concerned,36 as both parties are ‘entitled to a fair share of the available property.’37  Providing 
an appropriate level of protection to the parties as individuals is seemingly an important 
consideration. Regrettably, this in itself does not ensure certainty. Fairness is a subjective 
principle that, ‘like beauty, lies in the eyes of the beholder’.38 Resultantly, the discretion that 
is left in the hands of judges to determine ancillary relief under section 25 MCA 1973 has, 
instead of providing certainty, generated a ‘judicial lottery’39 that the spouses must enter.  
A significant amount of litigation has concerned the wording of section 25(1) MCA 1973, 
which instructs a judge to take into account ‘all the circumstances’ of the case when 
considering making an award for ancillary relief. First consideration is afforded to the welfare 
of any minor children, and any order made will not affect, override or preclude in any way 
any child maintenance award made under the Children Act 1989. Furthermore, the courts 
must at least consider a clean break between the divorcees.40 Section 25(2)(a)-(f) MCA 1973 
contains a non-exhaustive list of factors that the court may take into account. These include 
income, age, familial contributions, pre-breakdown standard of living, conduct (now 
irrelevant unless ‘gross or obvious’41) and financial need.  
The application of the provision has been significantly developed by the courts, with anything 
that could be termed as reform in the area having ‘fallen by default to the judiciary’.42 Prior to 
the decision in White v White43 it had become ‘entrenched’ practice that the wife had her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
34 ibid s 25(1)(c).  
35 Jonathan Herring, Family Law (4th edn OUP 2009) 185. 
36 White v White [2000] UKHL 54 [23]. 
37 Miller; McFarlane (n 1) [9]. 
38 White (n 36) [1]. 
39 Sarah Anticoni, ‘Resolution News Pre-marital Agreements’ [2005] Fam Law 313, 313. 
40 MCA 1973 (UK), s25A(1). 
41 Wachtel (n 7) 835. 
42 Rebecca Bailey Harris, ‘Dividing the Assets on Family Breakdown: The Content of Fairness’ (2001) 54(1) 
Current Legal Problems 533, 535.  
43 White (n 36). 
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‘reasonable requirements met’ and ‘the husband got the rest.’ 44  Then the ‘great leap 
forward’45 occurred in White, when Lord Nicholls introduced the ‘yardstick of equality’46 
principle. The outcome ‘marked a sea change’ in the way assets were divided upon divorce.47 
Lord Nicholls emphasised that, whilst this was not a presumption of equality under another 
guise,48 only ‘good reason’ should see a departure from equal division of property.49  
Whilst this is prima facie a workable approach, there will often be insufficient assets to 
ensure equality, whilst simultaneously meeting the needs of the applicants and their 
children.50 The court’s solution for this incidence is to only apply the yardstick approach 
when there are surplus assets after needs (as discussed below) have been satisfied.51 Thus, 
applications are seemingly handled differently where there are more substantial levels of 
assets involved. In Miller; McFarlane, for example, continual reference was made to the ‘big 
money’52 nature of the case. In doing so, the court was making it clear that there are different 
considerations to be taken into account in such circumstances.  
Supplementary to the yardstick of equality the three rationales of ‘need’, ‘compensation’ and 
‘sharing’ have evolved. These themes recur throughout the common law, although only ‘need’ 
expressly appears within the wording of section 25 MCA 1973. 
There has been predictable confusion as to which of these three strands take precedence,53 
however, it appears that ‘need’ is the ‘most common rationale’54 promulgated by the court 
and is addressed first.55  This is based on the reason that ‘mutual dependence’ within the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
44Miller; McFarlane (n 1) [135].  
45 Miller; McFarlane (n 1) [134]. 
46 White (n 36)  [25].  
47 Marital Property Agreements (n 19) [2.50].  
48 Although as close to home as in Scotland such a presumption does exist under the Family Law (Scotland) Act 
1985, s 10. 
49 White (n 36) [25]. 
50 Herring, (n 35) 237. 
51 Lambert v Lambert [2002] EWCA Civ 1685.  
52 Miller: McFarlane (n 1) [28], [55] & [146]. 
53 Elizabeth Cooke, ‘Miller/McFarlane: Law in Search of Discrimination’ [2007] CFLQ 98. 
54 Miller; McFarlane (n 1) [138]. 
55 Emma Hitchings, ‘Everyday Cases in the Post-White Era’ (2008) 38 Fam Law 873, 876.  
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marriage ‘begets mutual obligations of support’.56 As a consequence, the parties have 
developed needs from within the relationship itself.57  
Often in cases involving vast sums of capital, ‘need’ is not a relevant consideration. The 
courts have been required to deal with assets exceeding £50 million58 and, in reaction to this, 
have also developed a new principle of ‘reasonable requirement’.59 This is a ‘more extensive 
concept’60 than mere financial ‘need.’ It appears that ‘if you marry a captain of industry, you 
become one yourself for all time’.61 ‘Reasonable requirement’ has therefore not been strictly 
limited to essentials.  For example, in Gojkovic v Gojkovic (No 1)62 an award of £1 million 
was made to fund a business launch. Reasonable requirements may also be augmented over 
time to coincide with an increase in earnings.63 The court has thus managed to avoid 
unnecessarily couching an award in terms of ‘need’, when it is clear that ‘need’ is in fact 
irrelevant to the circumstances of the case.  
Lord Nicholls discussed the notion of ‘compensation’ in Miller; McFarlane. He reasoned that 
if as a result of the marriage, one party had been ‘advantaged at the expense of the other’,64 
then it would be ‘extraordinary’65 if an order for ‘compensation’ could not be made. The 
‘compensation’ principle is only applicable to couples who have significant assets and thus is 
rendered ‘totemic’66 in relation to the majority of society. This principle further buttresses the 
notion that the laws in relation to ancillary relief vary depending on the amount of money 
being contested.   
The principle of ‘compensation’ is contentious. It has been argued that there has been ‘no 
parliamentary approval for its consideration’67 as a factor, nor is there any direct reference to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
56 Miller; McFarlane (n 1) [11]. 
57 ibid [169]. 
58 Charman v Charman (no 4) [2007] EWCA Civ 503. 
59 See, eg, O’D v O’D [1975] 3 WLR 308; Page v Page (1981) 2 FLR 198 (CA).    
60 White (n 36) [31]. 
61 Baroness Ruth Deech, ‘What’s a Woman Worth?’ [2009] Fam Law 1140, 1140. 
62 [1990] 1 FLR 140 (CA) 
63 Hvorostovsky v Hvorostovsky [2009] EWCA Civ 791 
64 Miller; McFarlane (n 1) [32]. 
65 ibid. 
66 Jon Robins, ‘Landmark Divorce Ruling Strengthens Women’s Financial Case’ The Guardian (London, 28 
May 2006) < http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2006/may/28/divorce.observercashsection> accessed 18 April 
2012. 
67 Miller; McFarlane (n 1) as per Jeremy Posnansky QC & Stephen Trowell for Mr McFarlane. 
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it within the wording of the MCA 1973. Yet, despite these criticisms of the principle, the 
judiciary seem to have widely accepted ‘compensation’ as a factor worthy of consideration. 
Lord Nicholls stated in Miller; McFarlane that ‘compensation’ was ‘aimed at redressing any 
significant prospective economic disparity’68 between the divorcing couple that came about 
as a result of their marriage. 69  More recently, the Supreme Court’s consideration of 
compensation in Radmacher proved that the principle is an ‘indispensable’ factor.70  
It is important to bear in mind the possibility of two analogous streams of law being created 
in relation to prenuptial agreements – one for the so called ‘big money’71 cases and the other 
for the everyday prenuptial agreement. It is arguable that the law regarding prenuptial 
agreements may develop in a similar vein if the status quo is maintained and this possibility 
may be a factor to take into account when evaluating potential avenues for reform.   
In 2010, Sir Mark Potter enunciated the popular belief that London had become the ‘divorce 
capital of the world’.72 This tag referred to the uncertainty surrounding the laws on ancillary 
relief within England and Wales, which has purportedly led to the English courts becoming 
an attractive venue for divorce, particularly for those economically weaker spouses who seek 
a more generous award than they would receive in another jurisdiction.73 This suggests that 
the law has potentially gone too far in providing protection for individuals. The Supreme 
Court has arguably reinforced this status in Agbaje v Akinnoye-Agbaje,74 when it made an 
order for ancillary relief in the knowledge that Nigerian law would have left the applicant 
penniless.75 This appeared to highlight the opportunities for foreign litigants in a position to 
forum shop, with England and Wales providing a potentially fruitful alternative for many 
divorcees. Enforceable prenuptial agreements could redress the imbalance between autonomy 
and protection that appears to have manifested itself in this jurisdiction. 
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69 ibid.  
70 Jens M Scherpe, ‘Fairness, Freedom and Foreign Elements – Marital Agreements in England and Wales after 
Radmacher v Granatino’ [2011] CFLQ 513, 521. 
71 Miller; McFarlane (n 1) [28]. 
72 Charman No4 (n 58) [116]. 
73 Laura Brown and Nicola Fisher, ‘The Scramble to Secure Jurisdiction on Divorce – Could a Prenuptial 
Agreement Assist?’ [2009] PCB 221, 223. 
74 [2010] UKSC 12. 
75 Editorial, ‘Ruling Confirms London as Divorce Pay-out Capital’ The Independent (London, 10 March 2010) 
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Speaking in relation to the provisions contained within MCA 1973 that deal with ancillary 
relief, Potter went on to communicate the necessity for ‘modernisation in the light’76 of a 
society in which ‘matrimonial practice has changed out of all recognition’77 over the course 
of the last fifty years.  
Against the backdrop of these criticisms, it should be noted that as the MCA 1973 approaches 
its fortieth anniversary, it remains in many respects highly effective. It continues to leave a 
large amount of discretion in the hands of judges, which in turn enables ancillary relief to 
remain reactive in nature. For the vast majority of couples, ancillary relief works well and 
will continue to do so. Introducing a much more rigid statutory structure to ancillary relief in 
response to the criticisms outlined above, would not necessarily be helpful to couples and 
would potentially severely restrict the ability of the judiciary to exercise discretion when 
making financial orders.  
Focus on Prenuptial Agreements as a Vehicle for Reform 
The Law Commission initially resisted the calls for a comprehensive review of ancillary 
relief to redress the continued uncertainty facing couples, despite support for it to do so by 
the Family Justice Review.78 Instead, prenuptial agreements were chosen as a vehicle for 
reform. The Law Commission’s consultation paper ‘Marital Property Agreements’79 was 
initially due for publication prior to the Supreme Court ruling in Radmacher, however, the 
Commission chose to postpone this until after that decision had been passed down.80 The 
paper’s main purpose was to gather opinion on the ‘status and enforceability’81 of marital 
property agreements.  
A period of consultation followed the paper’s eventual publication in January 2011, with 
interested parties invited to make submissions. The final report will be released during 
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79 Marital Property Agreements (n 19). 
80 ibid [1.4]. 
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2013.82 It is widely anticipated that this document could contain a set of recommendations, 
opening up possible avenues that the Government could explore for statutory regulation of 
prenuptial agreements. The Law Commission had originally planned to publish its final 
report in 2012; the delay in publication of the final report is in order to enable reviews of the 
principle of ‘need’ and the idea of ‘non-matrimonial property’, both of which were discussed 
above, to be undertaken. A supplementary consultation paper, ‘Matrimonial Property, Needs 
& Agreements’,83 was published in September 2012, with submissions invited up until 
December 2012. It has been stressed that the purpose of these reviews is not to bring about 
wholesale reform of the area, but instead to effectuate clarity to an area that is uncertain,84 
and thus provide more stable foundations on which the law of prenuptial agreements can be 
built.  
Supporting Families and the Six Safeguards 
The Government first recognised the potential value of prenuptial agreements regulating the 
financial aspect of marriage breakdown in its 1998 Green Paper ‘Supporting Families’.85 This 
paper highlighted the protection and practical support intended to be given to help meet the 
needs of families and prenuptial agreements themselves were actively promulgated.86 The 
Government had clearly given careful consideration to the advantages of enabling couples to 
make ‘written agreements’87 that would regulate their financial affairs upon divorce. The 
thinking was that such a move would give couples ‘more choice’88 and encourage them to 
‘take more responsibility for ordering their own lives’,89 specifically by forcing them ‘to face 
the reality of what can happen if things go wrong.’90 
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At no point did the Government propose allowing couples to enter into unqualified prenuptial 
agreements. Instead, a set of six statutory safeguards was promulgated. The Government 
stated that if any of the criteria set out within any of the safeguards were activated the 
prenuptial agreement would be rendered unenforceable. Many of the common law cases that 
have been decided since 1998 make reference to at least some of the six safeguards outlined. 
Agreements would not be enforceable if: 
1) A child of the family existed, irrespective of whether the child was alive at the 
point when the agreement was made. 
2) The agreement would be unenforceable under the general law of contract 
(including any attempt to place an obligation upon a third party without prior 
consent). 
3) Either or both parties to the contract had not received independent legal 
advice. 
4) The court considers that the agreement would cause significant injustice to 
either party or any child. 
5) Either or both parties have failed to make full disclosure of assets/property to 
the other. 
6) The agreement was made fewer than 21 days prior to the wedding.91 
 
Despite this, the judiciary expressed ‘reservations about whether the law should strive to 
encourage’92 prenuptial agreements and were only prepared to give them ‘slightly…greater 
prominence’.93 
No subsequent action was taken as a result of this paper, either through amendments to the 
existing MCA 1973, or through introducing further fresh legislation. As a result there was 
criticism levelled at the ‘stubborn refusal to adapt the law to new conditions’.94 Quentin 
Davis proposed a private members bill in 2007 that was rejected,95 and so it remains the case 
that there is no explicit statutory recognition for prenuptial agreements in England and Wales. 
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Nevertheless, the 1998 paper was pivotal in sparking the debate on prenuptial agreements 
into life. Some of these safeguards will act as useful points of reference in the detailed 
comparative analysis of the specific elements of the law that will take place within Chapter 4. 
Historical Attitudes to Contracts Seeking to Oust the Court’s Discretion 
The current legal position of prenuptial agreements must be garnered from the common law. 
As a relatively modern idea, prenuptial agreements themselves are not directly referenced in 
much of the historic case law.  In relation to contracts that purport to regulate the financial 
consequences of marital breakdown, the traditional position was engrained in Hyman v 
Hyman.96 In determining the validity of a separation agreement, Lord Hailsham and Lord 
Aitken were adamant that the court’s statutory discretion to make financial provisions that it 
felt were ‘just’97 in the circumstances could not be bartered away.98 This conclusion drew on 
previous judgments passed down in Morall v Morall99 and Bishop v Bishop: Judkins v 
Judkins,100  
Lord Hailsham concluded that the court’s statutory discretion to make financial provisions 
upon divorce was necessary not only in the ‘interests of the wife, but also the public’,101 
while Lord Aitken added that the purpose of the statute was to ‘prevent’ either party from 
‘being thrown upon public support’.102 Resultantly, financial agreements seeking to oust the 
jurisdiction of the court were considered void as a matter of public policy.  
Half a century later the Hyman authority was still regarded as ‘common ground’.103 The law 
in relation to financial agreements could be viewed by taking one of two ‘diametrically 
opposite’104 stances, each of which occupies one extreme end of the spectrum. At one end sat 
the traditional notion that the courts hold an ‘absolute right to go behind any agreement’.105 
At the other there was the idea that where there is a contract or agreement between two 
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parties, ‘effect must be given to it’.106 This is precisely the tension between contractual 
autonomy and state protection that was introduced in Chapter 1 and is central to this thesis. 
During the 1970s, the courts began to afford leverage to the enforceability of contracts that 
sought to oust their discretionary powers to make orders for ancillary relief. Following 
Wright v Wright107 and Brockwell v Brockwell,108 a separation agreement was upheld in 
Edgar v Edgar because the applicant had ‘failed to show sufficient grounds to justify…going 
behind the arrangement’.109 In this instance, the sanctity of contract principle prevailed and 
the court asserted that a ‘freely negotiated bargain…cannot be lightly ignored’.110  Lord 
Justice Ormrod ruled that the wife had entered the agreement ‘with a full appreciation’111 that 
she could have bargained for a more substantial settlement and so he had ‘no alternative’112 
but to uphold the agreement.  
Separation agreements, or ‘Edgar Agreements’ as they are colloquially known, are 
distinguishable from prenuptial agreements as they are executed after a marriage has 
irretrievably broken down. Despite this fact, their enforceability highlights the court’s 
willingness to waive its discretionary power, except where there are ‘clear and compelling 
reasons’113 for it not to do so. The judiciary in Edgar, for the very first time, displayed a 
readiness to afford a significant level of autonomy those attempting to determine the financial 
consequences of their divorce by circumventing the MCA 1973.  
Some academic commentary suggests that it is inevitable that prenuptial agreements will be 
treated in law in an identical fashion to separation agreements.114 This is yet to materialise, 
although the view is reflected in the way that prenuptial agreements have been 
commercialised. Harvey Nicholls offer prenuptial agreements as standard with their wedding 
packages;115 if this appears to suggest exclusivity, the website of iconic British retailer 
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WHSmith now offers for sale a ‘Prenuptial Agreement eKit’. Prenuptial agreements are being 
sold to the public in a manner that suggests they are treated as prima facie enforceable by the 
law. Whilst this is not yet the position of in law, the availability of these agreements 
reflective of a rapidly changing societal attitude. 
Prenuptial Agreements – the Early Years 
In order to properly analyse the law as it stands, the steps that have preceded the current 
position need to be understood. Historically, the courts have been ‘exceedingly wary’116 of 
prenuptial agreements. This cautious approach has transposed itself onto British society. Paul 
McCartney’s was ordered to pay Heather Mills £24 million following their divorce.117 This 
surely rendered him immune from being labelled unromantic for suggesting a prenuptial 
agreement, but despite this, McCartney categorically refused to have one drawn up prior to 
wedding Nancy Shevell.118 Similarly, Prince William was ‘adamant’119 that no prenuptial 
agreement be executed prior to his marriage to Kate Middleton in 2011; despite fears as to the 
potential financial consequences should the marriage flounder.  This was in stark contrast to 
the marriage of Swedish Crown Princess Victoria and Daniel Westling, where the existence 
of a prenuptial agreement provided evidence that they are becoming ‘increasingly fashionable 
in the royal houses of Europe’,120 although it is noted that these are jurisdictions where a 
community of property system has been established.  
Mr Justice Thorpe reflected this wariness in his judgment in F v F,121 categorically declaring 
that prenuptial agreements were of ‘very limited significance’122 within this jurisdiction. He 
opined that Parliament had created the MCA 1973 with the intention of it having ‘universal 
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application’,123 thus concluding that it would be unjust to allow individuals the autonomy to 
elect whether or not they are prepared to submit to its remit.  
Unbeknown to the judge at the time, this was the first of what has proven to be a series of 
judicial decisions that have shaped the law on prenuptial agreements. In N v N,124 Mr Justice 
Wall refused to depart from the historical line that prenuptial agreements were ‘contrary to 
public policy’, 125 although he conceded that an agreement might hold ‘evidential weight’126 
where the terms are relevant. This followed a previous decision in S v S127 and Mr Justice 
Munby in took a similar stance X v X.128 These decisions hinted at a shift away from the 
traditional position. 
In M v M,129 the need to guarantee the sanctity of marriage as a matter of public policy was 
rendered significantly less important because divorce had become ‘commonplace’.130 It was 
determined that, albeit in a first instance decision, as a minimum, the existence of a prenuptial 
agreement should be acknowledged, whether it be as part of ‘all the circumstances of the 
case’131 or as an aspect of the conduct of the parties. This would enable the court to decipher 
what weight the agreement should be given in order to achieve a just outcome.132  
Momentum had clearly gathered in favour of prenuptial agreements. In 2003 Mr Roger 
Hayward-Smith QC advanced this trend in K v K,133 distilling sixteen questions that he felt 
summarised the issues that had plagued previous judges. 134  Although some of these 
questions were specific to the facts of the case being determined, they can roughly be 
grouped together under the headings of time limits, independent legal advice, full and frank 
disclosure and substantive fairness, which will form the basis for the analysis to take place 
within Chapter 4. Hayward-Smith’s ruling that the agreement should be taken into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
123 ibid. 
124 (Jurisdiction: Prenuptial Agreement) [1999] EWHC Fam 838.  
125 ibid 844. 
126 ibid 844. 
127 (Divorce: Staying Proceedings) [1997] 2 FLR 100 (F). 
128 (Y and Z Intervening) [2001] EWHC 11 (F). 
129 (Prenuptial Agreement) [2002] 1 FLR 654 (F). 
130 ibid [21]. 
131 MCA 1973 (UK), s25(1). 
132 M v M  (n 130) [21]. 
133 (Ancillary Relief: Prenuptial Agreement) [2003] 1 FLR 120 (F). 
134 ibid 131. 
Regulating Prenuptial Agreements?  Balancing Autonomy and Protection 
 
	  
57	  
consideration as part of all the circumstances of the case under section 25 MCA 1973 and, 
furthermore, the agreement constituted conduct that would be inequitable to disregard under 
section 25(2)(g) MCA 1973,135 felt distinctly like a judicial attempt at opening the use of 
prenuptial agreements up to a wider demographic.   
The Current Position of the Law 
This momentum continued with a trio of recent judgments, opening with Crossley v 
Crossley,136 encompassing Baroness Hale’s Privy Council ruling in Macleod v Macleod137 
and culminating in the Supreme Court decision in Radmacher v Granatino.138  
Lord Justice Thorpe was again required to engage with prenuptial agreements when he gave 
the lead ruling in Crossley. The dispute arose between a wealthy, middle-aged couple. Both 
had been married previously and brought a number of children into the marriage. Their 
prenuptial agreement stated that, in the event of divorce, both parties would ‘walk away from 
the marriage with whatever they had brought into it’.139  
Upon divorce, Mrs Crossley sought a higher award than the prenuptial agreement prescribed, 
relying on the court exercising its protective functions, despite possessing assets totalling 
around £18 million herself. Mr Crossley contended that taking into consideration all the 
circumstances of the case, the agreement should be upheld. 
At first instance, Mr Justice Bennett concurred with Mr Crossley, requesting that Mrs 
Crossley explain why the prenuptial agreement should not be regarded as serving a ‘knockout 
blow’.140 Upon appeal, Lord Justice Thorpe concurred, stating that there was a ‘very strong 
case’141 that Mrs Crossley should receive no further financial award. Evidential weight was 
given to the marriage’s short duration, the parties’ pre-marital wealth and the absence of 
children in forming part of all the circumstances to be taken into account under section 25 
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MCA 1973.142 Had these factors varied, it has been argued that a different conclusion may 
have been reached.143 
The appellate court also upheld the notion that the applicant should ‘show cause’144 for 
departing from the agreement. This principle has not found favour in subsequent rulings. Had 
it done so, it would have placed a heavy burden upon those seeking to avoid the terms of a 
prenuptial agreement and would have placed strong emphasis on autonomy. Quite what 
‘show(ing) cause’ to set an agreement aside would have entailed remains unknown, but it is 
almost certain that this burden of proof would have reduced protection afforded to 
economically weaker spouses.  
Almost in mitigation of his decision, Lord Justice Thorpe pointed described the case as ‘quite 
exceptional’,145 stressing that each decision in the future should remain ‘fact dependant’.146 
This disclaimer is unsurprising; it would have been misguided for a judge to make a 
declaration that prenuptial agreements were presumptively dispositive. Whilst he appeared to 
have favoured autonomy over protection in this instance, the judge clarified that this should 
not necessarily be the general approach.  
The lexis used by Lord Justice Thorpe was the semantic opposite to that which he had used a 
decade earlier. He labelled the case as the ‘paradigm’147 example of where a prenuptial 
agreement is a factor of ‘magnetic importance’.148 Public policy objections to prenuptial 
agreements had existed for centuries, yet between 1995 and 2007 judicial attitudes were 
completely reversed, with unprecedented support for upholding prenuptial agreements.  
The ruling, despite coming with the strong qualification that each case was ‘fact 
dependant’,149 made it a virtual certainty that a prenuptial agreement will be taken into 
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account as part of all of the circumstances of the case under section 25(1) MCA 1973. 150 
Thus, even in the absence of reform, the common law has evolved to allow that prenuptial 
agreements will at least be afforded some weight. Lord Justice Thorpe attached greater 
weight to a prenuptial agreement than any member of the judiciary had done previously. 
Whilst the position of the law in England and Wales was not actively changed, as of course 
prenuptial agreements were not in themselves binding upon the courts, the decision served to 
develop the law in this area.151 But caution has been expressed from some quarters regarding 
the status of the decision as a ‘trailblazer’.152 It certainly could not be regarded as serving to 
wash away the section 25 MCA 1973 ‘line of sand’153 as a starting point for the courts.  
The judiciary had previously been prepared to use their discretion to take prenuptial 
agreements into account; however, this was the clearest indication to date that they would 
favour guidance in the form of statutory provisions. 
The Privy Council ruling in Macleod almost exactly a year later, displayed a significantly 
more hesitant approach to prenuptial agreements.  The judgment, which was widely 
anticipated,154 but ultimately did nothing to directly enhance the standing of prenuptial 
agreements, concerned an American couple that relocated to the Isle of Wight. Both had been 
married previously, but neither had children prior to the five sons they had together. There 
was ‘considerable’ 155 financial distance between them, with the husband having ‘substantial 
wealth’156 of around ten million dollars, amassed from a range of business and property 
interests, while the wife had no significant assets.  
A clear statement as to the position of prenuptial agreements was desirable, however, 
somewhat anticlimactically, Baroness Hale determined that the case was not concerned with 
the ‘validity and effect’157 of a prenuptial agreement.  Instead, it was the postnuptial 
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agreement that had been signed following the marriage that she decided to uphold. She 
regarded this as ‘very different’158 from the prenuptial agreement. The key point that led 
Baroness Hale to draw this distinction was that once a couple are married ‘a prenuptial 
agreement is no longer the price which one party may extract’159 from the other for their 
willingness to marry.  She felt then that postnuptial agreement is likely to be reached more 
autonomously, with a lesser degree of pressure. 
Baroness Hale indicated that the traditional public policy rules, which frowned upon 
agreements that regulated any future separation of a married couple, were based on the 
‘enforceable duty of the husband and wife to live together’.160 She felt that the fact that 
society no longer viewed spouses as having this duty, coupled with the fact that the 
‘reasoning which led to the rule has now disappeared’,161 meant that the time had come for 
the ‘rule itself’162 to be displaced. Resultantly, it was concluded that it would be illogical to 
deny spouses the freedom to make ‘agreements for the eventuality of a future separation’.163  
In relation to prenuptial agreements, Baroness Hale made her reasoning crystal clear. She 
showed an awareness of the recognition that prenuptial agreements are afforded within other 
jurisdictions, however, she then pointed out that in the majority of circumstances this had 
come about through ‘legislation…(that) gives careful thought to the necessary safeguards’164 
that needed to be put in place. Baroness Hale felt that it was ‘not open’ to the court to 
‘reverse the long-standing rule’165 that regarded prenuptial agreements as contrary to public 
policy. Finally, if there was any lingering doubt as to what she considered to be the 
appropriate next step in terms of the development of the law, it was extinguished when she 
expressly stated that ‘the validity and effect of…(prenuptial) agreements is more appropriate 
to legislative rather than judicial development.’166 
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Baroness Hale’s reluctance to deal with prenuptial agreements is synonymous with the courts’ 
enduring fear of overstepping their role as statutory interpreters. Despite this, her position 
was still somewhat puzzling given the momentum shift in favour of the enforcement of 
prenuptial agreements in certain circumstances, which had already been gathering pace at 
common law. It was unlikely to have been considered to be excessively controversial for 
Baroness Hale to have discussed the merits of the prenuptial agreement that was originally 
signed.  
It is arguable that Baroness Hale made a conscious decision to steer clear of such a 
contentious subject matter. In reality, by upholding a postnuptial agreement, the court in 
Macleod may have unwittingly opened the back door for prenuptial agreements. It follows 
that legal practitioners will advise couples to follow up a prenuptial agreement with a 
postnuptial one in order to make the agreement Macleod-compatible.167 If this is done, then 
their autonomous decision to enter into both agreements is likely to provide strong weight for 
the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement. 
Despite endeavouring to make the language more succinct, the decision to deal with 
prenuptial and postnuptial agreements as separate entities only served to increase confusion. 
Baroness Hale goes on to accept a degree of ‘blame’168 for creating the ‘mess’169 surrounding 
prenuptial agreements. In doing so, she recognised that the ‘wider legal community’ was left 
‘disappointed’170 by the judgment that she handed down. It should not be forgotten however, 
that even if she had treated the parties as completely autonomous ‘grown ups’171 by making 
their prenuptial agreement prima facie binding, uncertainty would not have been eradicated 
totally. The court would still have retained its discretion to set aside any agreement as it saw 
fit. What it did serve to achieve was to make prenuptial agreements more expensive to 
implement, with couples now potentially incurring two sets of legal costs in order to fulfil the 
requirements of both obtaining independent legal advice on two separate occasions. 
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The case law in relation to prenuptial agreements came to a crescendo in 2010, when the 
most authoritative ruling to date in the UK was passed down by the Supreme Court. The 
dispute, which took place between Nicholas Granatino, a French National, and Katrin 
Radmacher, a German national, is widely regarded as the ‘landmark’ case that shifted 
England and Wales ‘much closer to the law and practice of many other countries’. 172  Prior to 
a detailed analysis of the ruling, it is important to understand how the decision came about. 
The couple married in 1998 in England and the marriage lasted for 8 years.173 They had two 
daughters. A prenuptial agreement, clause 3 of which precluded either party from making any 
claim for ancillary relief upon divorce, had been drawn up upon the insistence of Radmacher, 
aided by significant pressure from her father. The agreement was signed prior to the marriage 
in Germany.174 Radmacher’s legal adviser witnessed the signing, although it later emerged 
that he had been unhappy about the fact that Granatino had not received a translated copy of 
the agreement.175 The agreement contained a choice of laws clause, stating that all of the 
effects of their marriage would be governed under German law.176 
Upon divorce, Granatino turned to the laws of England and Wales, petitioning for ancillary 
relief in London. He sought orders for both periodical payments and a lump sum.177 
Radmacher was a woman of ‘great riches’.178 Her wealth, which exceeded £50 million, 
largely came about as a result of familial inheritance. In her response to Granatino’s petition, 
she pointed to the existence of the prenuptial agreement and stated that he had signed the 
document willingly; that there would have been no marriage had the agreement not been 
signed; that her father would not have signed over to her many of her current assets without 
the prenuptial being in place; that there was no matrimonial property to speak of; and, finally, 
that she held the role as the primary carer for the children.179 
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At the time when the prenuptial agreement had been signed Granatino was working for JP 
Morgan & Co, earning around £120,000 per year. This figure had doubled by 2001.180 When 
the parties divorced, he was undertaking a research doctorate at Oxford University and his 
earnings had significantly decreased. 
Granatino’s petition was based upon ‘need’. He made it clear that he was not seeking a 
percentage share of Radmacher’s assets, which he recognised as familial rather than 
matrimonial.181 He contended that the prenuptial agreement should be set aside upon the 
grounds that he had not received independent legal advice; Radmacher had not made full 
disclosure of her assets; no provision was made foreseeing the birth of the daughters; and that, 
in allowing for no claim by either party upon the divorce, the agreement itself was manifestly 
unfair. 182 A number of the safeguards recommended by the Government in the 1998 
‘Supporting Families’ report183 featured heavily in the submissions of both spouses.  
At first instance, Mrs Justice Baron acknowledged that she was ruling upon a ‘hot topic’.184 
In expressing grave reservations regarding the prenuptial agreement in this case, she also 
made significant references to the ‘Supporting Families’ safeguards, asserting that the 
agreement in question fell foul of almost all of these.185 In concurring with each of 
Granatino’s submissions, Mrs Justice Baron showed concern that the agreement left no 
prospect of financial assistance for either party in instances of real ‘need’.186 Clearly, the 
judge had the court’s protective function in mind.  
In relation to the foreign aspect of the agreement, the judge felt that, whilst there were ‘no 
doubts’187 as to the validity of the agreement under German and, indirectly, French law,188 in 
England and Wales the court ‘applies its own law irrespective of the domicile of the 
parties.’189 The judge conceded that to completely ignore the nationalities of the parties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
180 Radmacher (n 29) [14]. 
181 NG v KR (n 179) [8]. 
182 ibid. 
183 Supporting Families (n 85) [4.23]. 
184 NG v KR (n 179) [36]. 
185 ibid [36]-[38]. 
186 ibid [38]. 
187 ibid [77]. 
188 ibid [78]. 
189 Lord Collins and others (ed) Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (14th Edition Sweet and 
Maxwell, 2008) [18-207]. 
Regulating Prenuptial Agreements?  Balancing Autonomy and Protection 
 
	  
64	  
would have been ‘unfair and unjust’,190 however, she remained firm in maintaining that any 
enforceability of the prenuptial would arise from a ‘court order and not from the agreement 
itself.’191  
Mrs Justice Baron’s conclusion was that ‘from an English perspective the agreement was 
flawed’192and ‘tainted’.193 It therefore could not be given full effect. It was acknowledged 
that Granatino had ‘understood the underlying premise’194 of the agreement when he entered 
into it. Subsequently, the award would be reflective of that ‘to a degree’195 and totalled £5.56 
million.  
Radmacher appealed against the award, claiming that it was not clear exactly how the 
agreement had been taken into consideration at all. Granatino launched a counter appeal, in 
which he sought an increased sum that would enable him to purchase property in Monaco 
where the children would be relocating with Radmacher. This counter appeal does nothing to 
dismiss the notion that prenuptial agreements are the preserve of the ‘super rich’.196 Clearly a 
high of affluence is involved when one party is contesting a multi-million pound award on 
the basis that it does not allow them to purchase property in one of the world’s most 
exclusive principalities.  
In the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Thorpe acknowledged that any reform of the area should 
be left in the hands of Parliament.197 However, he recognised that a ‘carefully fashioned’198 
agreement was a viable ‘alternative to the stress, anxieties and expense of a submission to the 
width of judicial discretion’.199 To a certain extent there was a degree of sympathy from the 
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judiciary towards those who endure divorce, coupled with a ‘forensic discomfort’200 caused 
by the ‘lack of clarity…under our present law.’201 
Throughout the preceding common law, it had appeared that the ‘journey towards prenuptial 
agreements should be mapped against’202 the safeguards found in ‘Supporting Families’, 
however, the Court of Appeal did not follow this pattern in finding that the prenuptial 
agreement should have been given decisive weight.203 The £2.35 million maintenance award 
was recalculated so that Granatino was only considered in his role as father to the two 
girls.204 Furthermore, the award made for housing established a trust that would revert back to 
Radmacher when the children reached the age of majority.205  
Lord Justice Rix pointed out that Granatino had been given ‘ample opportunity’206 to seek 
independent legal advice. Granatino’s background served as evidence that he was sufficiently 
aware that he could have requested full financial detail, but showed ‘no interest’207 in doing 
so. Additionally, there was nothing to suggest that even if Granatino had received 
independent legal advice he would not have signed the agreement.208 
The birth of the two daughters was ruled not to have any effect on the weight afforded to the 
prenuptial agreement, as the agreement did ‘not purport to’209 affect, and could not in any 
case have effected under English law, any obligation for either spouse to support the children 
or claim financial provision under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989.  
The Court of Appeal dismissed the fact that the prenuptial agreement precluded claims in 
times of real ‘need’ as irrelevant. Without the agreement in place, there would have been no 
marriage. Resultantly, no right to claim was lost.210 This was relatively uncontroversial on the 
facts of this case. It was difficult to imagine Granatino falling upon times of real ‘need’. 
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Whilst his daughters remained minors, he would lead a similarly extravagant lifestyle to them. 
After this time, his personal earning capacity would enable him to live in relative comfort.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the distinction drawn between the different types of agreement in 
Macleod was dismissed as a ‘red herring’. 211 Lord Justice Wilson, expressed doubts as to 
whether such a sharp distinction was required.212 The Supreme Court dismissed Granatino’s 
final appeal and the majority expressly concurred on this point, immediately quashing the 
notion that prenuptial and postnuptial agreements should be viewed as fundamentally 
different. The opening paragraph of the judgment incorporated the umbrella term ‘nuptial 
agreements’.213 Courts in the future must follow this line of reasoning, unless legislation is 
introduced to the contrary, or the Supreme Court decides to reverse its decision. 
The majority of the Supreme Court found that the fact than an agreement was binding in a 
foreign jurisdiction simply made it ‘crystal clear’214 that the agreement was intended to create 
legal relations. The English Court’s insistence on applying English law irrespective of any 
foreign connections of the parties ‘continues to cause irritation’215 for those who would see 
their agreements upheld elsewhere.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, it was also determined that in the future, it would be ‘natural to 
infer’216 that those who enter into prenuptial agreements intend them to be legally binding. 
This means that couples can no longer rely on the fact they had been advised that agreements 
were not binding in England and Wales in order to avoid a prenuptial agreement.217 
Subsequently, much doubt as to prenuptial agreements being treated like any other contract 
has been alleviated in this context.  
The overriding principles of fairness, and the three strands of ‘need’, ‘compensation’ and 
‘sharing’ emanating from ancillary relief, were regarded as providing the framework for 
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determining the weight to be attached to prenuptial agreements.218 Once ‘nuptial agreement’ 
became an inclusive term, it logically followed that prenuptial agreements should only be set 
aside if holding the parties to the agreement would be unfair, as alluded to in Macleod. Whilst 
they were reluctant to circumscribe a set of factors that would ‘fetter the flexibility’219 of the 
court in the future, the majority reiterated that an agreement should not prejudice the 
reasonable requirements of any child of the family.220 In addition, the preclusion of unfettered 
exercises judicial discretion in the future221 provided strength to the position of ‘autonomy’.  
Commenting on the possibility of a prenuptial agreement that leaves one party in a situation 
of real ‘need’, the majority of the Supreme Court asserted that such an agreement would be 
likely to be regarded as unfair.222 This perhaps served to reinforce the notion that a prenuptial 
agreement is not a worthwhile exercise for couples with limited assets, but also evidences 
that the judiciary have not completely relinquished their protective role in favour of allowing 
couples to come to ‘autonomous’ decisions.  They also reaffirmed that the devotion of one 
party to the marriage, which left the other party free to accumulate wealth, should not go 
uncompensated.223  
The majority in the Supreme Court were ‘much more ready to attribute appropriate and, in 
the right cases, decisive weight to an agreement as part of all the circumstances of the 
case.’224 It seems that, while the six statutory safeguards that the court at first instance had 
been keen to adhere to were regarded by the Supreme Court as important, they were not ‘the 
be-all and end-all’.225 
Lady Hale, in her dissent, expressed concern that the test for fairness laid out by the majority 
came dangerously close to making prenuptial agreements presumptively dispositive. She felt 
that this could be classed as going beyond ‘the permissible bounds of interpretation’.226 To 
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avoid this ‘impermissible judicial gloss’,227 Lady Hale forwarded her own test. She opined 
that, provided that the agreement was entered into with a full understanding of its 
implications, the court should look at whether it would be fair to hold the parties to their 
agreement in the current circumstances.228  
This stance could have arisen from the reservations that Lady Hale harboured over the make-
up of the court. She felt that the decision was ill suited to a court made up of eight men and 
one woman.229 Interestingly, Lord Mance, who preferred the majority position, felt that the 
starting point for the test of fairness was irrelevant. He asserted that once all the facts are put 
before the court, the outcome would be the same regardless of the starting point,230 and that 
the difference between the tests was purely semantic. Ordinarily this might be true, but it is 
arguable that Lady Hale’s test would provide more protection for economically weaker 
spouses with more affluent partners, who theoretically could be relatively unprotected when 
the court is determining whether the terms of an agreement should be enforced. It would 
arguably be significantly easier for the court to depart from the terms of an agreement that it 
felt were unfair using the test formulated by Lady Hale. 
The majority acquiesced that at first instance Mrs Justice Baron had erred in finding the 
agreement ‘tainted’,231 and that it was ‘not apparent’232 how the award made reflected the 
existence of the prenuptial agreement. The conclusion reached was that to depart from the 
prenuptial agreement would be ‘unfair’.233 Once more Lady Hale articulated a slightly 
differing stance. Whilst she agreed that not enough weight had been given to the agreement at 
first instance, she felt that the Court of Appeal had gone too far in completely dismissing the 
needs of Granatino and treating him like an ‘unmarried parent’. 234 She emphasised that 
‘marriage still counts for something’ in England and Wales and it must ‘continue to do so.’235 
Therefore she would at least have given consideration to Granatino’s needs once the children 
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had reached adulthood.236 This stance was reflective of a deep-rooted willingness to uphold 
marriage as a traditional institution within family law. Had this been the majority opinion, it 
would have weakened the position of prenuptial agreements for those protecting substantial 
assets, who may resultantly have been left paying financial awards that were significantly 
greater than those that their prenuptial agreements prescribed.  
Future Regulation of Prenuptial Agreements 
Throughout the second half of this chapter, a clear shift in judicial attitude, from ‘entrenched 
caution, bordering on hostility, to a growing acceptance’,237 has been highlighted. The 
Supreme Court has received plaudits for handing down a ‘clear, fair and certain’ 238 decision, 
but a note of caution must go with this. It has been ‘widely and wrongly’239 inferred that 
Radmacher was authority for the ‘general enforceability’240 of prenuptial agreements. It is 
important to emphasise that prenuptial agreements are still not legally binding.241 Upon this 
point the Supreme Court could not have been clearer. The principle that the court determines 
the appropriate award of ancillary relief when a marriage comes to an end is embodied within 
the legislation. 242  
What can be concluded is that prenuptial agreements will be afforded decisive weight 
provided that the court does not feel that they are unfair. The fairness test of the majority, 
which gives effect to an agreement that is freely entered into provided that each party is fully 
aware of its implications, unless in the circumstances it would be unfair to hold the parties to 
it,243 purports to be equally applicable regardless of the value of assets involved. However, in 
light of the express statement that the court will ‘not go so far’244 as to allow a prenuptial 
agreement to be decisive in a situation that left one of the parties in real ‘need’, it could be 
inferred that a prenuptial agreement is less likely to be upheld in the case involving ordinary 
levels of assets.  
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Once again, the ‘direct relevance’ of the decision is therefore potentially ‘limited to a handful 
of…people’.245 It seems probable that any prenuptial agreement will be set aside where the 
capital involved is limited. As the focus in the majority of divorces is on reaching a ‘fair loss-
sharing settlement’ as opposed to ‘divvying-up a surplus’,246 then the potential is there for 
agreements to be set aside frequently. Unless a surplus of assets is anticipated, it seems that 
the inception of a prenuptial agreement will not be vindicated.  
Regardless, the law has reached a position in England and Wales whereby it is virtually 
certain that a prenuptial agreement will be taken into consideration by the court and afforded 
some weight. How much weight an agreement is given, will very much depend on the 
circumstances of the case, but it is clear that courts are ‘increasingly open to concluding that 
the…agreement…outweighs other factors.247 Radmacher translated literally from German to 
English means wheel maker. There are those believe that the decision could prompt 
Parliament, aided by the Law Commission, into inventing statute that could be as important 
as the wheel.248 Whilst this is no doubt hyperbolised, in the family law context it is not far 
from the truth. 
This remains the position of the law in England and Wales today. To date there have been 
only two cases on prenuptial agreements brought before the courts post-Radmacher. In 
November 2011, Mr Justice Moor applied the majority judgment in Radmacher in Z v Z,249 
rejecting arguments that ‘it would not be fair to uphold the Agreement in so far as it excludes 
sharing’.250 The following month, Mr Justice Charles ruled in V v V, 251 that the Supreme 
Court decision in Radmacher had necessitated ‘a significant change to the approach to be 
adopted…to the impact of (prenuptial) agreements’.252 Consequently, the court significantly 
reduced the award made to the wife because the agreement was a ‘powerful’ and ‘important’ 
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factor to be taken into account when assessing both departure from the ‘sharing’ principle and 
the overall effect of the agreement on the award.253  
The position outlined in Radmacher will be followed until such a time comes where there is 
statutory intervention, or the Supreme Court decides to overturn its own ruling. However, 
these decisions do serve to highlight how unusual the facts of Radmacher were. Whilst there 
is not much dissent as to the validity of the legal test that Radmacher established, there are 
those who feel that the financial result in the case was wrong and that Granatino could be 
considered ‘unlucky’;254 although this does not alter the legal position that was reached.  
As was outlined much earlier in the chapter, the Law Commission is nearing the completion 
of its review on marital property agreements.  Ultimately, the key question asked by the paper 
is: 
Should pre-nuptial and post-nuptial agreements continue to be enforced by the 
courts at their discretion…within ancillary relief proceedings?255 
It is believed that, following Radmacher, the law has been taken as close as it is possible to 
do so towards enforceable prenuptial agreements within the current legal framework.256 If the 
Commission determines that the answer to this question is in the negative, then focus will 
turn to how legislative reform will be implemented. This thesis will seek to provide some 
guidance on this issue within Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 3: The Key Issues in Australia 
Family Law in Australia 
This chapter will focus upon the law in Australia. Owing to the Commonwealth’s former 
status as a dominion of the British Empire, which it gained in 1907, much of the historical 
common law is identical to that of England and Wales. It was only with the passing of the 
Australia Act 1986 that Australia became fully independent, and the option for Australian 
cases to be heard at the Privy Council in London was finally removed.  
The Australian equivalent to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (hereafter the ‘MCA 1973’) is 
the Family Law Act 1975 (hereafter the ‘FLA 1975’). This was enacted in order to replace 
the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959. Prior to this period, the traditional public policy objections 
to prenuptial agreements, as delineated by judges in England and Wales, were equally 
applicable in Australia and the balancing act to be undertaken between autonomy and 
protection was also a prevalent point of contention. 
The FLA 1975 made a number of significant changes to family law in Australia. Firstly, no-
fault divorce was introduced. Section 48 enables a marriage to be dissolved if one party is 
able to show that the parties have been separated for 12 months1 and the marriage has 
irretrievably broken down.2  
Secondly, with the FLA 1975’s inception came the simultaneous establishment of the Family 
Court of Australia. This move was seen as a ‘bold experiment’,3 justified by the theory that 
where family law issues are decided by more generalist courts, family law tends to be the first 
area affected by budget cuts and, perhaps more importantly, the quality of the judgments 
handed down suffers.4 The Family Court of Australia has jurisdiction across all Australian 
states, with the exception of Western Australia, which established its own court, the Family 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
1 FLA 1975 (AUS), s48 (2). 
2 ibid s48(1). 
3 Alastair Nicholson & Margaret Harrison, ‘Family Law and the Family Court of Australia: Experience of the 
First 25 Years’ (2000) 24 Melb U L Rev 756, 760. 
4 ibid 761. 
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Court of Western Australia, with the passing of the Family Court Act (WA) 1975. Cases that 
are appealed from the Family Court of Australia are passed onto the Full Court of the Family 
Court of Australia and then, finally, onto to the High Court of Australia if necessary.  It 
should be noted that, following the establishment of the Federal Magistrates Court of 
Australia in 1999, many of the cases brought under the FLA 1975 are heard before this court 
at first instance.5 
The Financial Regulation of Divorce 
The provisions regulating the financial aspect of divorce can be found within Part VIII of the 
FLA 1975. As far as the reallocation of property is concerned, section 79 FLA 1975 gives the 
court a broad discretion to alter the property rights of the parties as it sees ‘appropriate’,6 in 
order to achieve a ‘just and equitable’7 outcome. The wide discretion afforded to the courts in 
England and Wales under the MCA 1973 serves as a suitable comparator. Sections 79(4)(a)-
(g) FLA 1975 enable the courts to take a broad range of circumstances into account when 
reaching a decision. These factors include, but are not limited to: 
i) Direct and indirect financial contributions to the acquisition, conservation or 
improvement of property8   
ii) Any other direct or indirect contribution to the acquisition, conservation or 
improvement of property,9 and  
iii) Any contribution made to the welfare of the marriage.10  
 
Spousal maintenance is dealt with under section 74 FLA 1975, with a broad list of factors 
that the court can consider outlined under section 75(2) FLA 1975. These include, but are not 
limited to, age, health, capacity to work, income, responsibilities towards others, duration of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
5 Federal Magistrates Court of Australia < http://www.fmc.gov.au/services/html/family.html> accessed 15 
February 2012. 
6 FLA 1975 (AUS), s79(1). 
7 ibid s79(2). 
8 ibid s79(4)(a). 
9 ibid s79(4)(b). 
10 ibid s79(4)(c).  
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marriage and who is the primary carer for any children of the marriage.11 Once more, clear 
similarities can be seen between the discretion afforded to Australian judges under these 
provisions, and that that is afforded to judges in England and Wales by section 25 MCA 1973. 
Part VIII FLA 1975 has remained ‘virtually unchanged since its inception’.12 Inevitably, 
criticism has been levelled towards certain aspects of the provisions, particularly regarding 
the lack of weight allegedly afforded by judges towards non-financial contributions and 
various section 75(2) FLA 1975 factors.13 While this thesis will not discuss these critiques in 
detail, it is worth noting that the Australian Government has not yet amended these 
provisions. 
A rebuttable presumption of equal sharing was given careful consideration during the 1990s. 
The Second Parliamentary Joint Select Committee recommended it in 199214 and the 
Attorney General concurred in 1999, outlining two proposals of possible reform options,15 
both of which received a ‘generally negative’16 response. Chief Justice Nicholson, a senior 
judge in the Australian Family Court, commented that, while he recognised that deficiencies 
existed within the current law, he felt that these should be addressed using well thought-out 
amendments rather than a ‘grandiose and dangerous program of reform’. 17 Subsequently, 
these suggestions were dropped18 and wholesale reform of the ancillary relief principles has 
not yet taken place.  
This did not stop the Australian Government turning their attention to enforceable prenuptial 
agreements.  Prior to the introduction of the amendments to the FLA 1975, which will be 
outlined below, the only type of financial agreement that was binding upon the courts was a 
maintenance agreement, entered into under section 87 FLA 1975. This agreement had to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
11 ibid s75(2)(a)-(q). 
12 Nicholson & Harrison, (n 3) 774. 
13 ibid 775. 
14 Joint Select Committee, The Family Law Act 1975: Aspects of Its Operation and Interpretation (Canberra, 
AGPS, 1992) [1224]. 
15 Stephen Bourke, ‘Property and Family Law – Options for Change’ (Attorney-General’s Department, 
Commonwealth, Discussion Paper 1999) [5].  
16 Nicholson & Harrison, (n 3) 776. 
17 Alastair Nicholson, ‘Proposed Changes to Property Matters Under the Family Law Act’, 20 May 1999 (Bar of 
Association of NSW, Sydney) 1 – 18, 10.  
18 Daryl Williams, ‘Shaping Law for the Future’ (1999) <http://law.gov.au/ministers/attorney-
general/articles/PressClub.html>.  
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created after the couple had separated, and the court retained the power to either approve, or 
refuse to approve, the agreement.19 Although section 86 FLA 1975 appeared to allow couples 
to register maintenance agreements with the court before they had separated,20 the case law 
suggests that the courts did not feel bound by this provision.21  
While prenuptial agreements were not statutorily recognised, it was generally accepted that 
they ‘at the very least had evidentiary value’22 in any divorce proceedings that followed their 
inception. Emphasis was placed on the fact that they were merely a relevant factor (as 
opposed to being a decisive one) in determining how the court would exercise its discretion.23 
In the unreported case of Re Dzieczko24 the court ruled that the weight attached to a 
prenuptial agreement would be dependent on: 
‘the particular circumstances of the case including the nature and content of the 
agreement, the circumstances in which it was entered by the parties and the extent 
to which its terms have been carried out by either of them.’25 
Belinda Fehlberg and Bruce Smyth gave an excellent summary of the state of the law in 
Australia prior to the amendments to the FLA 1975 coming into place. They stated that: 
‘If a couple has made an agreement at any stage in their relationship prior to 
separation, the court may consider that agreement when making orders dividing 
property and/or spousal maintenance. However, the court is not obliged to follow 
the agreement…’26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
19 FLA 1975 (Aus), s87(3). 
20 ibid s86(1). 
21 See, eg, Re Sykes (1978) 4 Fam LR 55; Re Candlish and Pratt (1980) 6 Fam LR 75. 
22 Geoff Wilson, ‘Intolerable Cruelty Downunder’ (2006)1 IAML 
<http://www.iaml.org/iaml_law_journal/back_issues/volume_1/intolerable_cruelty_downunder/index.html> 
accessed 17 February 2012. 
23 Belinda Fehlberg & Bruce Smyth, ‘Binding Pre-Nuptial Agreements in Australia: The First Year’ (2002) Int 
JLPF 127, 127. 
24 [1992] (Fam Ct of A, 30 April 1992, Appeal No 125 of 1991, No PA 1405 of 1990, Strauss, Lindenmayer and 
McCall JJ, unreported). 
25 ibid [39]. 
26 Belinda Fehlberg & Bruce Smyth, ‘Pre-Nuptial Agreements for Australia: Why Not? (2000) 14 Australian 
Journal of Family Law 80, 81. 
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Prima facie, the position that the law had reached in Australia by the end of the twentieth 
century appears to be synonymous with the position that the law in England and Wales has 
recently arrived at following Radmacher v Granatino.27 There was certainly already evidence 
of judicial will to afford couples the autonomy to reach their own arrangements and it is the 
way in which the Australian law has developed in the subsequent decade that is of greatest 
interest to this thesis. This will be scrutinised closely both within the remainder of this 
chapter and also in Chapter 4, where some of the individual issues raised in this chapter will 
be explored in greater depth.  
The Introduction of Statutory Prenuptial Agreements 
The Family Law Amendment Act 2000 introduced a new Part VIIIA into the provisions of 
the FLA 1975. The changes came about following ‘a lengthy period of public debate’28 as to 
whether prenuptial agreements should be enforceable. The result was that financial 
agreements, whether in the form of a prenuptial agreement entered into prior to the start of 
the marriage,29 a postnuptial agreement entered into during the marriage,30 or a separation 
agreement entered into following a divorce order, 31  became statutorily recognised in 
Australia.  This was the third attempt to regulate prenuptial agreements, following the failed 
efforts of both the Australian Law Reform Commission in 198732and the Joint Select 
Committee in 1992.33 The move was taken in order to ‘bring the Act into line with prevailing 
community attitudes and needs’34 and afforded couples significant autonomy to enter into 
agreements.  
This amended version of the FLA 1975 was succeeded by the Family Law Amendment Act 
2003, which in turn was followed by the Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial 
Matters and Other Measures) Act 2008. The 2008 Act introduced provisions for financial 
agreements made between non-married couples, which were in turn amended by the Federal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
27 [2010] UKSC 42. 
28 Patrick Parkinson, ‘Setting Aside Financial Agreements’ (2001) 15 Australian Journal of Family Law 26, 26. 
29 FLA 1975 (Aus), s 90B. 
30 ibid s 90C. 
31 ibid s 90D. 
32 Australian Law Reform Commission, Matrimonial Property (Report No 39 1987). 
33 Joint Select Committee (n 14). 
34 Second Reading Speech, Mr Williams, House of Representatives, Hansard 22 September 1999, 10151, 10152.  
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Justice System Amendment (Efficiency Measures) Act (No1) 2009 (hereafter ‘the FJSAA 
2009’).  
With the inception of the new Part VIIA, any lingering public policy arguments relating to 
the objection that agreements foresaw and encouraged the breakdown of marriage were 
finally dismissed in Australia. Instead, an approach allowing ‘couples to be able to plan in an 
orderly fashion for an almost 50% chance’35 of divorce was favoured.  This change came 
about despite the fact that there was ‘very little’36 empirical evidence as to the attitudes of 
Australians towards prenuptial agreements, with it even being suggested that there was no 
‘widespread community support for the(ir) enforceability’37. The fact remains that, for over a 
decade now, couples have been afforded the autonomy to enter into prenuptial agreements 
that are recognised as ousting the jurisdiction of the Australian courts to make orders for 
financial relief, provided that certain conditions, designed to enable to court the continue 
providing protection to those who need it, are met. 
Section 90B, 90C and 90D FLA 1975 - Forming a Financial Agreement  
The starting point for an enforceable prenuptial agreement is that the couple must have 
reached an agreement governing their finances. Only then will the court examine whether that 
agreement is binding and precludes the court from applying Part VIII FLA 1975. 38 Section 
90B FLA 1975 indicates what is necessary in order for a prenuptial agreement to be formed, 
with section 90C and 90D doing the same for a postnuptial and separation agreements 
respectively.  
Section 90B(2) FLA 1975 states that the agreement will be a prenuptial agreement if it deals 
with: 
a) How, in the event of the breakdown of the marriage, all or any of the property 
or financial resources of either or both of the spouse parties at the time when 
the agreement is made, or at a later time and before divorce is to be dealt with; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
35 John Wade, ‘Marriage and Cohabitation Contracts’ (2011) 17(2) The National Legal Eagle. 
36 Fehlberg & Smyth, ‘Why Not?’ (n 26) 93. 
37 Reg Graycar, ‘Law Reform by Frozen Chook: Family Law Reform for the New Millennium’ (2000) 24 Melb 
U L Rev 736, 749. 
38 See, eg: Fevia & Carmel - Fevia [2009] FamCA 816 [128]; Senior & Anderson [2011] FamCAFC 129 [26] 
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b) The maintenance of either of the spouse parties: 
- During the marriage; or 
- After divorce; or 
- Both during the marriage and after divorce. 
 
This indicates that a prenuptial agreement is essentially the same concept within both the UK 
and Australia.  
The Family Court of Australia in Fevia & Carmel-Fevia39 considered the issue of whether 
there was a financial agreement in place. The wealthy husband and his wife, a woman of 
modest means, had negotiated a prenuptial agreement prior to their wedding and signed it, 
with her solicitor present, in the period immediately preceding the marriage. The husband 
claimed that he gave his wife an 18-page annexure listing his property and business interests. 
His wife counterclaimed that the annexure had not formed part of the original agreement. Mr 
Justice Murphy accepted the wife’s evidence on this matter.40 The judge stated that the first 
issue to be determined by the courts in such claims was whether there was in fact an 
agreement in place. Under the terms of the FLA 1975, there was no such thing as a prima 
facie binding financial agreement. Initially, it must be established that there was a financial 
agreement and then, once that hurdle is surmounted, the court will look at whether the 
agreement is to be considered binding.41  
The husband submitted that because the agreement itself contained a reference to the 
annexure, he had implied authority to insert it into the agreement.42 Further, he alleged that 
the annexure did not alter the legal effect of the document; the terms of the document that 
was signed reflected the agreement that the parties had reached during negotiations.43 
Mr Justice Murphy accepted that a ‘clear and central purpose’44 of the agreement was to 
exclude Part VIII.  Therefore, ‘axiomatically, an express purpose of the agreement’45 must 
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40 ibid [46]. 
41 ibid [126]. 
42 ibid [132]-[135]. 
43 ibid [143]. 
44 ibid [150]. 
45 ibid [150]. 
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have been to specify the property to which it applied. However, he determined that this 
should not necessarily be the end of the inquiry into their mutual intentions.46 Ultimately, the 
judge held that, even looking at the annexure ‘as liberally and reasonably as possible’,47 it 
was to be regarded as a material alteration to the document that the wife had signed. As a 
result, there was no ‘valid, enforceable and effective agreement’48 between the parties, 
meaning there could be no financial agreement under section 90B FLA 1975.49  
In Senior & Anderson50 the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia was also asked to 
determine a dispute that had arisen on this issue. The couple had signed a document that was 
headed ‘section 90C Financial Agreement’, which implied that it was a postnuptial agreement. 
What the agreement should have been headed was ‘section 90D Financial Agreement’, as it 
was actually a separation agreement entered into after their marriage had irretrievably broken 
down. There were also errors that had been made in regards to the attached certificate of 
independent legal advice. This issue will be revisited later.  
At first instance the judge had ordered that all the errors should simply be rectified51 as they 
were not fatal to the binding nature of the agreement. While the wife’s appeal against this 
decision was ultimately successful, in relation to the erroneous references to section 90C FLA 
1975 the judges agreed with the trial judge. 
Mr Justice Strickland reinforced the idea that there was no such thing as a prima facie binding 
financial agreement. The first step was for a financial agreement to be established. Only then 
would the court go on to look at whether they could be bound by it.52 It was held that ‘the 
agreement was clearly an agreement, and once the section 90C/D error was rectified it was a 
financial agreement’.53 It was made clear that this power of rectification came not from the 
body of the statute, but from the laws of equity,54 which section 90KA FLA 1975 enables the 
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48 ibid [163]. 
49 ibid [164]. 
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51 ibid [9]. 
52 ibid [88]. 
53 ibid [130]. 
54 ibid [132]. 
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court to use. On this rectification the judges were unanimous, with both Mr Justice May and 
Mr Justice Murphy approving.55 
The Family Court of Australia was again faced with a similar issue in Sullivan & Sullivan.56 
The husband had presented the wife with a prenuptial agreement shortly before the wedding. 
She had then signed the agreement prior to the marriage. The husband then signed the 
agreement after the wedding had taken place. The agreement referred to section 90B FLA 
1975 which outlines the requirements for a prenuptial agreement. The wife submitted that it 
should have contained references to section 90C FLA 1975 as a postnuptial agreement.  
Counsel for the husband accepted that in this sense the agreement was indeed ‘erroneous’,57 
but went on to argue that it was ‘completely immaterial to the substantive provisions of the 
agreement’.58 Further, it was submitted that this error did not affect the ‘common intention’59 
of the parties to enter into the agreement. Counsel for the wife on the other hand suggested 
that, unlike in Senior & Anderson, the mistake was not a mutual one and so there was ‘no 
common intention to enter into a section 90C FLA 1975 agreement’.60 
In this instance, it was ruled that there was not even an agreement in place between the 
parties.61 The husband had given the wife an invitation to treat when he had given her the 
agreement.62By signing the agreement and handing it back to him the wife had made an 
offer,63 which was to be properly read as an offer of a prenuptial agreement that had to be 
accepted prior to their marriage.64 The husband did not sign the agreement until after the 
marriage had taken place. Therefore the wife’s offer had not been accepted and so there was 
no agreement in place between the parties.  
Subsequently, it was not necessary for the court to determine whether sections 90B and 90C 
FLA 1975 were applicable in this case. The court did note that an agreement couldn’t come 
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under both headings. As such it is necessary that financial agreements be expressed under a 
single section. Additionally, the financial agreement must fulfil the requirements of the 
section under which it is made.65 In the circumstances of this case there could have been no 
rectification as the two agreements would have been ‘materially different’.66 The husband 
submitted that the rules of equity could, as enabled under section 90KA FLA 1975, be used 
as a remedy, however, the judge was not persuaded by this reasoning, pointing out that the 
equitable remedy of rectification did not bring about an agreement when in fact the parties 
had not concluded one. 67 Therefore, on the facts there was no financial agreement found 
between the parties under either section 90B or section 90C of the FLA 1975. 68 
The judges in these instances were continuing to exercise the court’s discretion in order to 
provide appropriate protection for the spouse. While theoretically the FLA 1975 afforded 
couples significant autonomy, the judiciary were clearly mindful of the need to continue to 
exercise a protective function. It would appear that because of the level of autonomy that 
couples in Australia are provided with to conclude agreements, the courts have strictly upheld 
the need to fulfil the statutory requirements in order for an agreement to be formed, with the 
exception of where there has been a mutual mistake. This is clear evidence of the judiciary 
continuing to perform its protective function.  Should the next step in England and Wales be 
statutory recognition of prenuptial agreements, Parliament would need to carefully specify 
exactly what constitutes an agreement. Under the current common law regime this issue has 
not given rise to a noticeable amount of controversy; it is generally accepted that an 
agreement made prior to a marriage, purporting to govern the financial aspect of any future 
divorce proceedings, is a prenuptial agreement.  The litigation has largely concerned the level 
of weight that the court should attach to the agreement.  
However, any statute that is enacted, because of the increased level of autonomy that it seems 
most likely to provide couples with, will have to provide a set of clearly defined requirements 
for a prenuptial agreement, and indeed any other type of financial agreement that it may 
attempt to regulate. Thought must be given to whether the formation of a prenuptial 
agreement becomes a preliminary hurdle to be overcome, as is the case in Australia, or 
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whether the definition merely provides guidance for couples as to the types of things that they 
can include, with the court’s focus in any dispute whether the agreement in question is 
binding. The Supreme Court has clearly expressed that in the future it will be ‘natural to 
infer’69 that when a couple enter into a prenuptial agreement it will be assumed that it is 
intended to be legally binding. This would appear to set the bar relatively low for parties 
establishing that a prenuptial agreement is in place. The Law Commission has indicated its 
preference for a mixed approach, drawing a distinction between qualifying nuptial 
agreements, which satisfy a specific set of prerequisites, and agreements that do not satisfy 
such requirements and therefore continue to be merely looked at as part of all the 
circumstances of the case.70 Parliament, in its role as the maker of law, must determine the 
extent to which it will be necessary for prenuptial agreements to satisfy specific prerequisites.  
Section 90G - When a Prenuptial Agreement Will Bind the Courts  
Once it has been established that there is a prenuptial agreement in place between the parties, 
Australian courts turn to determining whether the terms are binding upon them. The relevant 
provisions here can be found under section 90G FLA 1975. This section has been subject to a 
number of amendments over the years. These have been ‘met with varying degrees of 
applause, alarm, surprise, uncertainty, bewilderment, and a general consensus that this will 
not be the last lot of amendments’.71 Section 90G FLA 1975, in its current format, outlines 
that: 
1) Subject to subsection (1A), a financial agreement is binding on the parties to 
the agreement if, and only if: 
 
a) The agreement is signed by all the parties; and 
 
b) Before signing the agreement, each spouse party was provided with 
independent legal advice from a legal practitioner about the effect of the 
agreement on the rights of that party and about the advantages and 
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disadvantages, at the time that the advice was provided, to that party of 
making the agreement; and 
 
c)  Either before or after signing the agreement, each spouse party was 
provided with a signed statement by the legal practitioner stating that the 
advice referred to in paragraph (b) was provided to that party (whether or 
not the statement is annexed to the agreement); and 
 (ca) a copy of the statement referred to in paragraph (c) that was provided    
to a spouse party or to a legal practitioner for the other spouse party; and 
d) The agreement has not been terminated and has not been set aside by a 
court. 
 
The current wording of this provision is much changed from that of section 90G as the 
Family Law Amendment Act 2000 first introduced it. Indeed, each of the subsequent 
amendments to the FLA 1975 has seen changes made to section 90G, although the most 
dramatic came under the FJSAA 2009.  
The Strict Interpretation of Section 90G FLA 1975  
The interpretation of section 90G FLA 1975 is the perhaps most hotly contested area of the 
law of prenuptial agreements in Australia. The general requirements for the parties to have 
received independent legal advice prior to the inception of the agreement,72 for the agreement 
to be in writing and for it to be signed by all parties,73 mirror a number of the safeguards that 
have been discussed throughout the debate on enforceable prenuptial agreements in England 
and Wales. These will be looked at in more detail within Chapter 4. For now, the question to 
be determined is just how strictly the requirements of section 90G must be adhered to in order 
for the prenuptial agreement to be considered binding. In establishing an answer to this 
question a large amount of litigation has been generated.   
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The Full Court of the Family Court of Australia, in the case of Black & Black,74 gave a 
landmark ruling on this matter in 2008. The prenuptial agreement that the couple had signed 
stated that their assets should be split equally. They agreed that the husband would sell his 
house, put the proceeds into a pool of assets and then this would then be used to purchase a 
joint property. At the time of marriage the wife was awaiting an insurance pay out which she 
would then add to the pool. When this eventually came it was much smaller than had 
originally been anticipated. Subsequently, the husband sought an 80/20 split in his favour. 
The husband wanted the requirements of section 90G to be strictly adhered to. He pointed to 
a number of flaws in the agreement, whilst the wife wanted the court to construe the relevant 
legislation purposively.75There were conflicting preceding authorities for the court to take 
into account when reaching their decision. In J v J76 Mrs Justice Collier had preferred a strict 
interpretation of the wording of the statute. He placed great weight on the use of the words ‘if 
and only if’,77 ultimately holding that ‘something approaching full compliance…is not 
enough’.78 By way of contrast, Mr Justice O’Ryan had held in ASIC and Rich & Anor79 that 
the ‘requirements of s90G are not stringent.’80  
The trial judge in Black & Black had preferred this less strict interpretation, stating that the 
terms of the Act did not ‘create a regime of strict compliance’81 and emphasising the court’s 
duty to ‘give purpose to the legislation’.82 This approach was followed in the rulings handed 
down in Ruzic & Ruzic83 and Stoddard & Stoddard.84 
However, the judges of the Full Court reversed this decision,85 and expressed caution that 
‘care must be taken’86 when interpreting a statute that has the effect of ousting the court’s 
jurisdiction. It was also recognised that the legislature were wary of the fact that long-
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standing public policy objections had existed restricting the use of marital contracts. They felt 
that the ‘compromise reached’87 by the statute was to allow parties to oust the court’s 
jurisdiction, but ‘only if certain stringent requirements were met’. 88 
The three judges categorically stated that ‘strict compliance with the statutory requirements is 
necessary to oust the court’s jurisdiction to make adjustive orders under section 79 (FLA 
1975)’.89 Section 90G(1) FLA 1975 states that an agreement can be binding ‘only if’ the 
provisions are adhered to. The courts appear to have given heavy weight to this terminology. 
The level of autonomy afforded to couples was therefore tempered by a strict set of 
prerequisites.  
Because the decision in Black & Black was a decision of the Full Court, it was heavily 
influential on subsequent cases that came before the Family Court. In Fevia & Fevia there 
were questions raised at to how the principles of equity, as prescribed under section 90KA 
FLA 1975, would intersect with the application of section 90G FLA 1975.90 Mr Justice 
Murphy affirmed that the only way that parties can exclude the provisions of Part VIII FLA 
1975 is through compliance with section 90G FLA 197591 and thus concluded that the 
equitable doctrine of ‘estoppel has no operation to section 90G’.92 Reinforcing the strict 
stance was in reality the only conclusion that Mr Justice Murphy was able to reach following 
on from the decision in Black & Black. 
In Gardiner & Baker93 Federal Magistrate Coakes reinforced the strict compliance test once 
again. The husband had submitted that, although he had not used the exact lexis prescribed by 
section 90G of the statute, the words that he had included in the financial agreement 
amounted to the same thing and so the strict compliance test need not be used.94The judge 
ignored the husband’s plea, holding that it was not open to him to depart from the strict 
compliance test and, further, even if it had been open to him to do so he would not have 
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done.95 The lack of a ‘statement…in the agreement, in the form prescribed by section 
90G(1)(b)’96 FLA 1975 was enough for the judge to hold that the agreement should be set 
aside. 
The significance of the Black & Black ruling should not be underestimated. The number of 
agreements that could potentially have been affected will never be known, but it is unlikely 
that the figure would have been insignificant. Many couples could have found themselves in 
a situation whereby they had invested significant time and money into drawing up what they 
believed to be an autonomous and binding prenuptial agreement, only for it to be set-aside 
because it does not fulfil the exact requirements of Section 90G FLA 1975. The decision was 
therefore critiqued as a ‘very dark’97 day for legal practitioners, in the absence of any future 
‘substantive and retrospective legislative intervention’.98  
However, legislative change did follow in the form of the latest amendments to the FLA 1975. 
The FJSAA 2009 drastically changed the wording of section 90G 1975. Most notably it 
removed the requirement that the terms of the independent legal advice be included within 
the body of the financial agreement itself, although it is still recommended that this be 
annexed to the agreement in order to minimise potential future disputes.99 The next question 
to address therefore is what effect, if any, did these amendments have in terms of lowering 
the strict compliance hurdle that the court had set out in Black & Black? 
It was suggested by the judges in Kostres & Kostres 100 that the amendment was purposely 
‘designed to overcome the effect’101 of the strict compliance test that placed strong emphasis 
on the protective functions of the courts.  This was issue also dealt with in more depth in 
Senior & Anderson, with the court here also asked to rule on errors made by the solicitors as 
to the names that they used on their clients’ certificates of independent legal advice. 
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Mr Justice May gave a dissenting opinion. He felt that the court couldn’t turn to the equitable 
principles under section 90KA FLA 1975 in this instance.102However, the amendments 
introduced under a new section 90G(1A) FLA 1975 did appear to allow the court to enforce 
agreements that fell short of meeting the requirements of Section 90G(1) if it felt it would be 
equitable to do so. A financial agreement will now be binding upon the parties even if any of 
the requirements a section 90G(1)(b), (c) or (ca) are not met provided that; 
Section 90G(1A) 
… 
(c) A court is satisfied that it would be unjust and inequitable if the agreement  
were not binding on the spouse parties to the agreement (disregarding any 
changes in circumstances from the time the agreement was made); and 
(d) The court makes an order under subsection (1B) declaring that the 
agreement is binding on the parties to the agreement; and 
(e) The agreement has not been terminated and has not been set aside by a 
court. 
Prima facie the introduction of this section into the statute directly addresses the strict 
compliance test. Mr Justice May felt that the facts in this case were a ‘good example of 
Parliament’s intention not to allow technical faults’103 to be used by parties to set aside 
agreements, after all; the mistake in this instance was down to an error by the solicitors rather 
than the couple themselves.  
In contrast, Mr Justice Strickland did not ‘consider that rectification is available to a court so 
as to ‘correct’ non-compliance’104 with any of the requirements under section 90G FLA 1975. 
In holding that the requirements under this section are in a ‘quite distinct category’105 from 
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any issues in determining whether there is a financial agreement in place, the ‘if, and only if’ 
test was held to be mandatory.106 This seemingly suggested that he was continuing to apply 
the Black & Black test, despite the Government amendments. 
However, in regards to section 90G(1A) Mr Justice Strickland held that, whilst these 
provisions did not allow for mistakes to be rectified, they instead made an agreement binding 
despite its deficiencies.107 He held that the purpose of the introduction of these provisions 
was to determine whether it would be unjust and inequitable, in the circumstances, for an 
agreement to be set aside because of a failure to meet a technical requirement.108 The court 
therefore accepted the relaxation of the strict test; although in this particular instance Mr 
Justice Strickland was unconvinced that sufficient argument had been heard to determine this 
issue and so he remitted the case back to the trial judge.109 
Mr Justice Murphy agreed with Mr Justice Strickland’s decision to revert the case back to the 
court of first instance. Additionally, he commented on the amending Act’s retrospective 
effect. Firstly, he accepted that the amendments were not ‘clear and unambiguous’.110 It was 
his view that the plain meaning of the amendments was not obvious from the wording of the 
Act alone.111 Therefore, he felt it necessary to qualify the broad retrospective application of 
the provisions in order to avoid a sudden influx of litigants.112 This is exactly what he did by 
pointing out that agreements that have already been set aside by the court, and have been 
replaced by a financial award, are not affected by the retrospective legislation.113  
The Family Court in Sullivan & Sullivan reached a similar conclusion. Mr Justice Young, 
who had been the judge at first instance in Senior & Anderson, followed what the Full Court 
had ruled on the matter. He held that even if an agreement has been rectified to reflect the 
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common intention of the parties to make a financial agreement, the advice provided to each 
spouse and the certificates proving this advice could not be rectified themselves.114  
Resultantly, whilst the courts have remained reluctant to move away from the idea that the 
requirements in section 90G FLA 1975 must be strictly adhered to, following the introduction 
of section 90G (1A) under the FJSAA 2009, it is now clearly intended that it should not be so 
easy for autonomy to be disregarded and agreements set aside on mere technicalities.  It is a 
delicate balancing act that the Government have been trying to undertake. On the one hand 
there is a desire to protect couples against pressure to rush into agreements without following 
the appropriate processes. Subsequently, they continue to strictly regulate how agreements 
are formed. On the other, they are wary of the emotional and the financial difficulty that 
couples drawing up a prenuptial agreement can encounter, and do not want carefully 
negotiated, autonomous agreements to be able to be set aside easily.  
This is of course the same balancing exercise that the courts in England and Wales have been 
grappling with through the common law. Should the UK Government choose to introduce 
statutory regulation of prenuptial agreements, they would be well advised to take into account 
the problems that have been encountered in Australia. Initially, the courts interpreted the 
Australian Government as desiring strict compliance with section 90G FLA 1975 in order to 
enable a prenuptial agreement to oust the court’s jurisdiction to make an order for financial 
relief under section 79 FLA 1975.  This interpretation strongly emphasised the protective 
functions of the statute, however, the Government have since reacted to the strict application 
of the statute emanating from Black by amending the provisions to make it easier for courts to 
avoid setting agreements aside, suggesting that it is the actual intention of the parties to 
autonomously enter into prenuptial agreements that is afforded greater weight.  
This illustrates a useful lesson that can be learned when discussions are taking place about the 
regulation of prenuptial agreements within this jurisdiction. The judiciary, who will be tasked 
with ensuring that any legislative changes are applied in practical situations, would welcome 
specific guidance on how strictly the courts should interpret any provisions outlining the 
formal requirements that a prenuptial agreement needs to meet. 
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Section 90K - Setting aside a Prenuptial Agreement 
In addition to being able to set aside an agreement on the grounds that it does not satisfy the 
requirements of section 90G FLA 1975, or does not constitute a financial agreement under 
the section 90B, C or D FLA 1975 heading, section 90K FLA 1975 gives the court a fairly 
wide discretion to set aside a prenuptial agreement if it satisfied that any of the following 
circumstances has occurred: 
Section 90K(1) 
a) The agreement was obtained by fraud; or 
(aa) a party to the agreement entered into the agreement: 
i) For the purpose, or for purposes that included the purpose, of defrauding or 
defeating  a creditor or creditors of the party; or 
ii) With reckless disregard of the interest of a creditor or creditors of the party; 
or 
(ab) a party to the agreement entered into the agreement: 
i) For the purpose, or for purposes that included the purpose of defrauding 
another person who is a party to a de facto relationship with a spouse party; or 
ii) … 
iii) With reckless disregard of those interests of that other person; or  
b) The agreement is void, voidable or unenforceable; or 
c) In the circumstances that have arisen since the agreement was made it is 
impracticable for the agreement or a part of the agreement to be carried out; 
or 
d) Since making the agreement, a material change in circumstances has 
occurred…(a child)…and, as a result of the change, the child or, if the 
applicant has caring responsibility for the child, a party to the agreement will 
suffer hardship if the court does not set the agreement aside; or 
e) In respect the making of a financial agreement – a party to the agreement 
engaged in conduct that was, in all the circumstances, unconscionable. 
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Clearly, the provisions within this section cover a broad range of circumstances, juxtaposing 
general principles of contract law, such as fraud and unconscionability, with more family-
related issues, for example a material change of circumstances. A number of the protective 
safeguards discussed in the previous chapter in relation to England and Wales are also visible 
within this section of the statute.  
The full effect of this section of the provisions is not yet known. Two leading Australian 
academics have suggested that autonomy is now strongly favoured and, subsequently, that 
couples are now most likely to be held to the terms of their agreement, ‘even if the outcome 
is patently unfair’.115 However, this is difficult to say with any certainty as in certain respects 
the regulations are still in their infancy. For example, there has not yet been a case brought 
before the courts involving a material change in circumstances under section 90K(d).116 
That said there are examples of agreements that have been set aside by the Australian courts 
on a number of the other grounds found in section 90K. Blackmore & Webber,117 a case 
determined by Federal Magistrate Bender in the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia, 
highlighted a number of the key issues. The husband was Australian, whilst the wife, who 
was at the time of proceedings living with her new partner, had been born in Thailand, but 
had moved to Australia in 2001. She contended that the prenuptial agreement that they had 
entered into be set aside. Her claim was based on a number of assertions. These included that 
the agreement was obtained by fraud (section 90K(1)(a)), the agreement was void, voidable 
or unenforceable due to duress (section 90K(1)(b)) and that the husband had engaged in 
unconscionable conduct (section 90K(1)(e)).118   
The first of these issues to be dealt with was the claim to have the agreement set aside on the 
grounds of fraud under section 90K(1)(a) FLA 1975. The magistrate was ‘satisfied’ that any 
non-disclosure of assets ‘was not a deliberate omission perpetrated by the husband’,119 
however, he then went on to point to the judgment of Federal Magistrate Alotobelli in 
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Stoddard & Stoddard, who had stated that  ‘fraud has a broader meaning’ and ‘may be 
constituted by omission – ie. non-disclosure of a material matter’ in the context of prenuptial 
agreements.120 His Honour noted that it was the husband’s solicitors who had drawn up the 
agreement, without any input from a legal advisor to the wife.121 It was also accepted that the 
husband had given his solicitor a full list of his assets and it had been the solicitor’s decision 
to omit some of these from the final agreement.122 Ultimately, despite these factors, the 
wife’s interests were protected through the determination that the agreement should be set-
aside on the basis it was ‘obtained by fraud, arising from the non-disclosure of material 
information.’123 
Of course, once the financial agreement had been set aside on the grounds of fraud there was 
no onus upon the magistrate to explore the remaining grounds in detail. Nevertheless, he 
acknowledged the considerable time devoted to them during the hearing and so considered 
them briefly,124 although it should be noted that his comments were merely obiter statements. 
Turning first to duress, Federal Magistrate Bender acknowledged the words of Federal 
Magistrate Ryan in SH & DH, 125  when he stated that the court must ‘examine the 
circumstances of each case, the circumstances surrounding the alleged duress and the 
resolution of the proceedings.’126 It was the husband who had informed the wife that he 
wanted an agreement to confirm that she would make no claim upon his property. The wife’s 
counsel submitted that she had argued that this was unnecessary, but that he was adamant that 
one should be drawn up. Subsequently, the husband claimed that she had reluctantly agreed 
to sign an agreement.127  
The agreement was not then discussed again until 5 days prior to the wedding, at which point 
the husband asserted that if the agreement was not signed then the wedding would be 
cancelled.128 It was accepted that the period prior to this had been an ‘unhappy’ one for the 
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couple, with the wife suffering depression and the husband showing symptoms of what was 
later diagnosed as cancer.129 The wife confirmed that two days later she had agreed to sign 
the agreement. When she was taken to the solicitor initially she had refused to sign the 
agreement, however, an hour later, after the husband had reconfirmed that the marriage 
would not take place without the agreement in place, she agreed to sign it.130 
The wife consistently insisted that she had no choice but to sign the agreement. In particular, 
she was ‘humiliated by the thought’ that she would return to her family ‘pregnant, unmarried 
and without the father of her child’.131 The combination of the proximity between the 
agreement being presented to the wife and the marriage, the fact that she was pregnant and 
that her family expected her to return to Thailand a married woman, and, finally, that the 
husband was aware at all times that the wife did not want to sign the agreement and so the 
pressure placed upon the wife was ‘illegitimate’,132 meant the agreement was signed under 
duress and would have been set aside under section 90K(1)(b) had it not already been set 
aside under section 90K(1)(a).133  Once more the court reinforced its determination to 
providing a protective function.  
Finally, Federal Magistrate Bender considered whether unconscionability, a doctrine not 
recognised in this context in England and Wales, was present. For this to occur there must be 
two factors, as laid out by Mr Justice Dean in Commonwealth Bank of Australia Limited v 
Amadio & Anor.134 Firstly, one party to a transaction must be ‘under a special disability in 
dealing with the other party.’ 135  Then it must be established that the disability was 
‘sufficiently evident to the stronger party to make it prima facie unfair or ‘uncontentious’ to 
carry out the bargain.’136 
In the current circumstances, it was held that there was ‘no doubt’ that the wife had a ‘special 
disability’ in relation to the husband.137 Her command of the English language would not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
129 ibid [73] & [74]. 
130 ibid [77]. 
131 ibid [80]. 
132 ibid [106]. 
133 ibid [107]. 
134 (1983) 151 CLR 447. 
135 ibid 474.  
136 ibid.  
137 Blackmore (n 117) [117]. 
Regulating Prenuptial Agreements?  Balancing Autonomy and Protection 
 
	  
94	  
have been as well developed as it was at the time of the trial, she was pregnant, faced with 
deportation should she not be married and her family were situated in Thailand meaning they 
were unable to provide her with close support.138 In addition to this, she was totally reliant 
upon him in terms of accommodation, food and financial support.139 The culmination of these 
factors lead to the determination of her ‘special disability’ and it was determined that the 
husband was aware of this and took unconscionable advantage of it.140 Consequently, it was 
held once more than the agreement would also have been set-aside on unconscionability 
grounds under section 90K(1)(e). 141  Clearly, this case demonstrates that although the 
provisions prima facie afforded couples significant autonomy to enter into agreements, a 
fairly wide range of grounds on which an agreement could be set aside continues to exist.  
A number of the issues discussed in Blackmore & Webber also arose in Tsarouhi & 
Tsarouhi.142 Following a 20-year marriage, it was ‘common ground’ that the wife had forged 
the husband’s signature on a number of occasions in order to withdraw money from their 
joint account.143 Federal Magistrate Riley declared that the financial agreement in place 
between the couple was entered into under duress. This was because the husband knew that 
the wife had only agreed to enter the agreement because she thought this would prevent 
criminal prosecution against her for withdrawing the money. 144 However, the charges had 
already been laid upon the wife prior to the signing of the agreement and there was ‘nothing 
to suggest that the wife understood, or the husband believed the wife understood that the 
police would not halt the prosecution.’145 Consequently, it was determined that the agreement 
had been entered into under duress and should be set-aside under section 90K(1)(b).146 
Unconscionability was also addressed by the court. The wife’s fear of prosecution and her 
limited education combined to leave her at a special disadvantage relative to the husband.147 
Federal Magistrate Riley felt that her limited education led her to neglect to seek legal advice 
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on the effect of the document and that she ‘simply assumed that if she signed the agreement, 
the prosecution would not proceed.’148 The final question to be asked therefore was whether 
or not the husband knew, or ought to have known, of the existence of the special 
disadvantage.  On the available evidence it was determined that the husband knew of the 
wife’s fear of prosecution, he knew that she believed signing the agreement would halt the 
prosecution and, finally, that he knew that this would not actually be the case.149 Finally, the 
judge noted that the clean hands defence would not have been applicable in this instance as 
the wife’s deception did not ‘have an immediate and necessary relation to the agreement’.150 
Resultantly, unconscionability was also determined to be another ground under which the 
prenuptial agreement could be set aside using section 90(1)(e).151 
These decisions clearly demonstrate that the Australian court will be prepared to set aside 
financial agreements on any of the protective grounds found under section 90K(1) FLA 1975. 
While it is therefore true that there is potentially still much litigation to come on the grounds 
outlined in this provision, it is already clear that the courts will readily set aside financial 
agreements where there is evidence of the presences of one of the section 90K(1) factors. 
Strong checks upon individual autonomy subsequently continue to exist in order to 
appropriately protect individuals, particularly those that the courts feel are at a ‘special 
disability’ in relation to their spouses.  
There is no mention in the statute of a time frame for such applications to be brought. Despite 
this the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia has considered the issue and determined that 
action must be brought within a ‘reasonable time’152. A 12 month period was ruled not to fall 
within a ‘reasonable time’, however, these comments were obiter and should not be relied 
upon, as the case was dealing with difficult issues as to when exactly the applicant did and 
didn’t have mental capacity to enter into an agreement.  
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Finally, section 90F(1) and (1A) FLA 1975 ensure that the court will not enforce a prenuptial 
agreement when the terms of it will cause one of the parties to become reliant upon the state 
for financial aid.  
Conclusion 
Through the introduction of Part VIIIA FLA 1975, Australia has developed its law in relation 
to prenuptial agreements beyond the position in England and Wales. A fairly comprehensive 
statutory framework has evolved and it is arguable that a parallel set of provisions is what the 
MCA 1973 lacks. 
From the overview of the Australian law that has been given it is plain to see that a prenuptial 
agreement cannot be entered into lightly. This is, of course, a deliberate ploy to stop parties 
scribbling down terms on a napkin and later trying to rely upon them in court. Interestingly, 
practitioners have suggested that there is a noticeable increase in tension when the lawyers 
have to go into the details of potential agreements in order to attempt to meet the statutory 
requirements of the FLA 1975.153  
Once the lawyers have explained the entire list of exceptions and circumstances in which a 
prenuptial agreement can be set aside, many clients may simply ask ‘what’s the point’154 in 
having an agreement? It has been demonstrated that it is possible for prenuptial agreements to 
be avoided in Australia, with the courts demonstrating a strong willingness to continue to 
provide appropriate protection for individuals; however, this should not necessarily lead to 
the conclusion that they are easy to avoid. The legislation was introduced with the specific 
intention of allowing couples to be able to achieve autonomously drawn up prenuptial 
agreements that will be adhered to by the courts. Therefore while avoidance is clearly 
possible, it is likely to be both a ‘costly and risky’ process.155 Although the cases mentioned 
above demonstrate occasions on which agreements will be set aside in order to provide 
protection for one spouse, this is not an exercise that the court will undertake lightly. 
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Of course the common law in relation to prenuptial agreements in Australia has developed 
from the statute itself. The opposite is true in England and Wales, with any Government 
deciding to legislate in the area in the future having the benefit of a decade of litigation to 
take into consideration. Between the courts in England and Wales and the Australian family 
courts, many of the more contentious issues have been litigated. Chapter 4 of this thesis will 
be dedicated to examining these points of contention in the context of England and Wales.  
Chapters 2 and 3 have served to introduce the current laws regulating prenuptial agreements 
within both jurisdictions, while also highlighting the areas where conflict can be found 
between autonomy and protection. The overarching aim of this thesis is to provide guidance 
as to potential future avenues for reform, bearing in mind the need to strike a balance 
between autonomy and protection. Chapter 4 will therefore scrutinise the substantive 
elements that make up the current law within this jurisdiction and Australia with this aim in 
mind. By undertaking such an analysis, it highlights the potential for the Government in this 
jurisdiction to look at how the law in Australia has evolved and learn from the various 
amendments introduced. 
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Chapter 4: Drawing Comparisons Between the 
Jurisdictions 
Having outlined the current laws in both jurisdictions, attention now turns to legal issues that 
have arisen in relation to the practical regulation of prenuptial agreements. The issues 
explored within this chapter are reflective of some of the key points of contention within both 
Australia and England and Wales. This analysis will take place in chronological order, 
starting with the issues surrounding the actual signing of the agreement, before moving on to 
explore the potential procedural requirements for an agreement to be properly formed; 
namely independent legal advice and full and frank disclosure, and then finally looking the 
extent to which the court should continue to be able to monitor substantive fairness of the 
agreement, with particular focus being placed on the financial ‘need’ of the parties. All of this 
discussion will bear in mind the overarching theme of this thesis, namely striking a balance 
between affording individuals the autonomy to enter into financial agreements and continuing 
to provide appropriate protection to those who need it. 
 
Within the discussion of each issue, the relevant points of law will be discussed in relation to 
both jurisdictions separately. This will enable conclusions to be drawn as to preferable 
strategies for reform, including discussion as to the desirability and extent of Government 
intervention required on each issue.  
 
The Australian legal framework has developed over more than a decade. A number of 
statutory amendments have been passed and numerous cases have been contested in the 
Australian family courts. Subsequently, many of the current points of contention in England 
and Wales have already been litigated and, subsequently, resolved in Australia. There is 
much that this jurisdiction can learn from the experiences of their Australian counterparts.  
 
This comparative analysis is necessary in order to understand which elements of the law work 
well, as well as the areas in which there is room for improvement in this jurisdiction. 
Informed conclusions can then be drawn as to the potential direction that the reform of the 
law in England and Wales could take. It is hoped that by doing so, some guidance can be 
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gleaned as to how the law should strive to strike an appropriate balance between autonomy 
and protection.  
 
i) The Signing of the Agreement 
One issue to be explored is whether there should be any time parameters that serve to 
invalidate an agreement executed within a certain number of days of the wedding. To date, 
this issue has not been particularly contentious in either of the jurisdictions explored within 
this thesis; however, it is included here because it has featured in previous narrative on 
prenuptial agreements and therefore it would be prudent to discuss its effects.  
 
Introducing time parameters potentially serves a protective function, in so far as it may 
prevent agreements being presented to a vulnerable spouse within close proximity of the 
wedding with the expectation that they will sign immediately. Its inclusion in future statute 
would therefore be an attempt to alleviate the pressure placed upon parties to sign an 
agreement prior to the wedding.1 It is also useful to consider the fact that standard contracts 
can be vitiated in cases where the court feels that the agreement was entered into under duress 
or undue influence. Therefore, as an alternative to expressly including a specific provision on 
the matter, the courts when looking for these vitiating factors could consider the timing of the 
agreement. 
 
In England and Wales, statutory time periods are on the law reform agenda, with a number of 
different figures proposed. The Law Commission in 1998 proposed that an agreement should 
be invalid if it is not completed 21 days prior to the wedding.2 The Centre for Social Justice 
recommended a 28-day time period, 3 while Resolution have given their support to a 42-day 
time limit.4 Evidently, the idea of using a time limit as a protective measure is a popular one. 
Indeed, ‘best practice’ in this jurisdiction is to ensure that any agreement is concluded at least 
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21 days prior to a marriage taking place. 5 Although there is little in the way of explicit 
reference to any time limit in the courts, ‘their Lordships did indicate that such gaps were 
helpful’6 in the Supreme Court when passing down judgment in Radmacher v Granatino.7  
 
Some have argued that the imposition of a statutory time period is ‘arbitrary’.8 It would 
simply be a figure determined, by the legislator, with no real factual grounding or formulaic 
calculation for its deduction.  Therefore the major criticism of the imposition of a time limit 
is that it would simply serve to shift the pressure rather than neutralising it.9 Whereas 
ordinarily pressure would be created in the days immediately preceding the wedding itself, a 
statutory time limit would mean that the pressure is ‘simply transferred to the deadline’10 that 
has been artificially created. On this basis it would seem that such a clause would not 
necessarily be an effective safeguard of the interests of the vulnerable.  
 
In Australia, the Family Law Act 1975 (hereafter the ‘FLA 1975’) is silent in regards to a 
statutory time limit, with no guidance offered as to the time period prior to a marriage in 
which a prenuptial agreement must be engaged. Given the number of amendments that have 
been made to Part VIIIA, it is clear that implementing a statutory time limit is not on the 
agenda.  
 
Obviously, it is not desirable for prenuptial agreements to be forced upon a party shortly 
before a wedding takes place.11 But by the same token, a prenuptial agreement is a complex 
instrument and protracted negotiations are often required before terms are agreed upon. It 
must considered that it may not be possible to conclude an agreement more than a short 
period before marriage.12  
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A time limit is not included within the legislation of the majority of other common law 
jurisdictions.13 The Law Commission has recently explicitly stated that it does not feel that 
the introduction of a time limit would ‘provide any useful protection’,14 instead preferring to 
recognise that contract law doctrines such as duress and undue influence will provide the 
necessary shield in these cases.15 The introduction of such a clause could even become a 
litigation generator itself, with the scope for couples to argue that the imposition of the 
statutory time frame should not be applied to their particular set of circumstances. A more 
unlikely, but nevertheless plausible, scenario would be a disagreement as to the exact date 
that a prenuptial agreement was finalised.  
 
This area is one in which a large amount of discretion should be left in the hands of the 
courts. In relation to marital property agreements, judges have considered the issues of 
duress, undue influence and even the time period prior to the marriage at which an agreement 
was signed. This often takes place as part of their assessment of all the circumstances of the 
case, which they are required to take under section 25(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
(hereafter the ‘MCA 1973’). 
 
For example, in NA v MA,16 undue influence was the reason why a post-nuptial agreement 
was set aside. Lord Nicholls, in RBS v Etridge,17 stated that;  
 
If the intention was produced by an unacceptable means, the law will not permit 
the transaction to stand. The means used is regarded as an exercise of improper or 
'undue' influence, and hence unacceptable, whenever the consent thus procured 
ought not fairly to be treated as the expression of a person's free will.18 
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This is a prime example of the definition used for undue influence in civil cases. The 
objective of ensuring ‘that the influence of one person over another is not abused’19 is 
synonymous with what the courts are trying to achieve when they consider these matters in 
relation to marital property agreements.   
 
In NA, the wife had been caught having an affair, but wanted to save her marriage. The 
husband insisted that she signed a post-nuptial agreement in order to do so.20  Mrs Justice 
Baron ultimately determined that the husband had put the wife	   ‘under continuing, 
unacceptable and undue pressure.’21 Subsequently, the post-nuptial agreement was set aside.  
 
Clearly, the judiciary have been exercising common sense in this context in order to continue 
to provide a protective function. Issues surrounding the timing of a prenuptial agreement’s 
signing will always be taken into consideration by judges. If proposed legislation is to say 
anything at all on the subject, it should simply formalise the idea that undue influence, duress 
and time periods will be relevant considerations, rather than directly imposing an arbitrary 
time figure. Of course, by including no clause with a time limit, a greater amount of 
autonomy is being afforded to the parties, however, this will not jeopardise the courts’ 
protective function. If anything it will do the opposite, as one spouse will not be able to argue 
that the agreement should be upheld simply because it was signed within the statutorily 
prescribed time frame.  
  
ii)  Independent Legal Advice 
Independent legal advice is the first substantive aspect of the prenuptial agreement to be 
examined. The inclusion of any requirement for independent legal advice would once more 
aim to ensure that spouses are provided with appropriate protection, in addition to facilitating 
autonomous decisions indirectly. If specific guidance is to be given as to the exact 
requirements of a binding prenuptial agreement, then parties can do everything possible to 
ensure that their autonomous agreements fulfil such criteria.   
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There are two questions that need to be addressed. Firstly, whether it should be the case that 
any statute implemented in England and Wales will contain a provision making independent 
legal advice a pre-requisite for a prenuptial agreement to be upheld and, secondly whether the 
courts should, even if independent legal advice is not expressly required by statute, continue 
to look for its presence as a determining factor on whether an agreement should be upheld.  
 
The Government in England and Wales has previously recommended that a prenuptial 
agreement should not be binding ‘where one or both of the couple did not receive 
independent legal advice before entering in to the agreement.’22 The motivation for this 
approach is that if both parties have received separate legal advice on the terms of the 
agreement, then there is less scope for one party to manipulate the agreement in their favour. 
In this respect, independent legal advice is regarded by some as ‘fundamental to the basic 
concepts of English culture of fairness and justice’ within the family law sphere.23 Protection 
is very much at the forefront of thinking in this context. 
 
The judiciary have shown clear support for the requirement of independent legal advice. It 
has been held to be an ‘important factor’24 for the court to take into account when considering 
the weight that it will attach to a prenuptial agreement. In 1999, the judges of the Family 
Division outlined that, in their opinion, it was ‘clear’ that ‘separate legal advice on each 
side’25 should be prerequisite if a prenuptial agreement was to have any effect in law. Such a 
strong statement in favour of independent legal advice no doubt came from the judiciary 
because of their awareness of their protective function.  
 
Furthermore, they assumed that state funding would be made available to ensure that this 
requirement was complied with. To date there has been nothing to indicate that this is on the 
agenda.26 This issue will become important to the demographic of people that a prenuptial 
agreement will become available to. If state funding did become available, a prenuptial 
agreement would suddenly be a much more viable proposition for many more couples than is 
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currently the case. However, in the current economic climate it is fair to suggest that 
providing such funding is not a priority.  
 
Decisions in England and Wales have frequently made reference to the necessity of 
independent legal advice. In Edgar v Edgar,27 the leading authority on separation agreements, 
the importance of the parties receiving ‘competent legal advice’28 was cited. Similarly, the 
judiciary in J v V29 ruled that the agreement in question fell ‘at every fence’30 for reasons that 
included a lack of independent legal advice.  
 
Reportedly, practitioners have also clearly recognised the importance of this factor. Legal 
counsel in K v K31 for example, advised their client that independent legal advice would 
‘maximise the influence such an agreement might have on a judge’. 32  It has been 
recommended that practitioners representing the wealthier of the two spouses should advise 
their clients to fund the other party’s legal advice to prevent costs being a restrictive factor 
and to ensure that all parties receive the same standard of advice.33 Subsequently, the 
likelihood of any issues surrounding access to independent legal advice rising in a later 
dispute is minimised.  
 
The issue was discussed in depth at all three judicial levels of the Radmacher dispute. At first 
instance, one of the major factors in Mrs Justice Baron’s finding that the agreement was 
‘flawed’34 was that Granatino had ‘not had independent legal advice about the ramifications 
of the deal’.35 In fact, it was felt that he had not even had a ‘realistic opportunity to take 
proper independent legal advice’.36 A German notary had advised Granatino, but the judge 
observed that the same notary had also taken instructions from, and advised, Radmacher and 
her family. Whilst Mrs Justice Baron made it clear that she was not suggesting that the notary 
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had performed his role dishonestly, she asserted that, a result of this factor, the prenuptial 
agreement was ‘one-sided’ and ‘demonstrably not neutral.’37 
 
The requirement for independent legal advice was upheld stringently at first instance. The 
judgment appeared to ‘underline that an English court will not accept anything less’.38 This 
was the case despite the fact that the agreement was reached in Germany, where it is not 
necessary for couples entering into a prenuptial agreement to receive independent legal 
advice. Mrs Justice Baron’s decision was ‘interesting’39 in that her ruling essentially meant 
that, from an English viewpoint, German couples would rarely obtain proper legal advice.40 
This would potentially have affected any number of cases where an agreement was formed 
outside of England and Wales.  
 
Whereas previously the judiciary had considered independent legal advice to be a ‘crucial 
aspect of a fair prenuptial agreement’,41 at both Court of Appeal and Supreme Court level 
Mrs Justice Baron’s strict adherence to the requirement of independent legal advice was 
departed from, in favour of giving more weight to the autonomous decision of the parties to 
enter into the agreement.  In the Court of Appeal, it was still accepted that in the majority of 
cases it would be ‘necessary and…desirable’ 42  for all the parties to have received 
independent legal advice prior to entering into a prenuptial agreement. The reasoning for this 
was simple. The existence of such advice is ‘often the only, and always the simplest’43 
method of showing that a party entered into the agreement knowingly.  
  
However, the lack of independent legal advice was not regarded as fatal to the prenuptial 
agreement in question. It was held that if Granatino had wanted to seek independent legal 
advice he had had ample opportunity to do so. In fact, he had turned down the chance of 
receiving a translated copy of the agreement.44 The court held that the ‘fluidity’45 of the law 
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as it stands in England and Wales, enabled them to apply what they termed to be a ‘common 
sense’46 approach to the prenuptial agreement. Clearly, the appellate court was less concerned 
with providing Granatino with protection and more interested in the autonomy of the couple.   
 
The Supreme Court concurred on this point, holding that the husband had a number of 
opportunities to seek independent legal advice but chose not to do so.47 It was reiterated that 
‘sound legal advice is…desirable’,48 but it was also felt that it was more important that ‘each 
party should have all the information…material’49to their decision. Again a common sense 
approach towards independent legal advice appears to have been taken. The current position 
in England and Wales appears to be that the absence of independent legal advice will not in 
itself automatically lead to a prenuptial agreement being discarded by the court.  
 
This approach has not come without its criticism. Some feel that it is ‘surprising that 
violations of such basic safeguards…can be ignored because the court considers that, on the 
facts, it was probably not material’50 to the circumstances of the case. There are ‘many who 
would say…that it is essential to fairness that independent legal advice should be required’51 
regardless of the context. This would be in order to both protect the economically weaker 
party and justify the acts of the economically stronger party.52 Nevertheless, this is not the 
route that the judiciary have chosen to take. Parliament must now determine whether or not it 
will depart from this approach.  
 
As in England and Wales, the necessity of independent legal advice is also a prominent theme 
in the regulation of prenuptial agreements in Australia. It is regarded to be the ‘main 
safeguard offered to deal with the lack of ‘control’ and ‘choice’’53 that the parties to a 
prenuptial agreement may have. The requirements under the initial amendments to the FLA 
1975 in 2000 were stringent. Section 90G FLA 1975, as it was prior to the amendments made 
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in 2009, required a financial agreement to contain a statement that each party had received 
advice from a legal practitioner, on matters including the effect of the financial agreement on 
their rights54 and the financial advantages and disadvantages of making the agreement.55 
Furthermore, there was a requirement that a signed certificate stating that this advice had 
been given be annexed to the agreement.56 It was clear that, although the law was enabling 
couples to exercise autonomy by entering prenuptial agreements, protection was still very 
much a priority, as demonstrated by the implementation of very stringent independent legal 
advice requirements.  
 
The strict requirements applied in Australia led to a fear that solicitors may be reluctant to 
give advice on prenuptial agreements and sign statements to that effect, in case their clients 
brought a negligence action against them at a later date.57 These fears featured ‘prominently 
during the first year’58 after the inception of the provisions. There was also debate as to 
whether, in giving independent legal advice, practitioners would be overstepping their role by 
giving financial rather than legal advice.59 Whilst the fear of client action against solicitors 
did not materialise in reality, the strict compliance test that emanated from the ruling in Black 
& Black did nothing to alleviate the doubts of practitioners. It was clear that the operation of 
the clauses requiring independent legal advice were strictly adhered to in Australia. 
 
The wording of the original section 90G FLA 1975 in relation to independent legal advice 
came under close scrutiny from, and was strictly adhered to by, the judiciary. The inception 
of the Federal Justice System Amendment (Efficiency Measures) Act (No1) 2009 amended 
section 90G(1) FLA 1975 in relation to independent legal advice so that it now reads: 
 
(b) before signing the agreement, each spouse party was provided with 
independent legal advice from a legal practitioner about the effect of the 
agreement on the rights of that party and about the advantages and disadvantages, 
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at the time that the advice was provided, to that party of making the agreement; 
and 
 
(c) either before or after signing the agreement, each spouse party was provided 
with a signed statement by the legal practitioner stating that the advice referred to 
in paragraph (b) was provided to that party (whether or not the statement is 
annexed to the agreement); and 
 
(ca) a copy of the statement referred to in paragraph (c) that was provided to a 
spouse party is given to the other spouse party or to a legal practitioner for the 
other spouse party; 
 
These amendments were specifically targeted at dealing with the problems brought about by 
the strict compliance test. The biggest change that this amendment brought about was the 
removal of the requirement for the statement of independent legal advice to be annexed as 
part of the agreement. That said, it is still recommended practice to include such a statement 
within the body of the prenuptial agreement to avoid the possibility of future litigation.60 It is 
evident that the new requirements are not as stringent and do not provide such a heavy burden 
upon legal practitioners as previously. In fact, the court now has the option of holding an 
agreement to be binding even if the required legal advice is not given; provided that it feels 
that it would be ‘unjust and inequitable’61 to not uphold the agreement.62 This is ‘strikingly 
similar’63 to the approach that the UK courts took in Radmacher. It certainly suggests a 
greater emphasis being placed upon the autonomy of parties to enter into agreements, 
although a large amount of protection is still afforded to those who are in need of it.  
 
Unlike with the previously discussed issue of the mandatory pre-marriage time limit for 
signing an agreement, independent legal advice cannot be dismissed as being adequately 
dealt with by the discretion of the judges. It seems clear that legislative guidance should be 
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given on independent legal advice in order to ‘strike a balance between (state) control…and 
allowing for private ordering and negotiation’.64  
 
Indeed, both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court alluded to as much in their 
respective Radmacher rulings. The Court of Appeal foresaw an absolute requirement of 
independent legal advice ‘in every case, irrespective of…surrounding circumstances’65 if a 
prenuptial agreement is ever to be presumptively dispositive, whilst the Supreme Court 
asserted that ‘black and white rules’66 are necessary if statute is to be forthcoming.  
 
The lexical choices, by the Supreme Court particularly, suggest that once statutory provisions 
are introduced the matter should be clear cut; an agreement either fulfils the requirement of 
independent legal advice, or it falls short of doing so, in which case it can be set aside. 
Should this approach be enacted, judges would presumably lose the discretion that they 
currently have under section 25 MCA 1973. 
 
Any statutory provision regulating prenuptial agreements would need to contain a set of 
requirements that must be fulfilled. The Government will have to determine whether it wishes 
to take a strict formulaic checklist approach, or whether it will insert a clause that leaves the 
discretion in the hands of the court to continue to take a more flexible approach, similar to the 
one that the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court chose to take in Radmacher.  
 
The Australian Government has had the opportunity to introduce a set of amendments, allow 
them to develop and be contested in the family courts, and then refine the provisions in order 
to deal with the issues and conflicts that have arisen. As has been outlined, the Australians 
started off by taking the strict approach to the requirement of independent legal advice, but 
have since relaxed their stance. 
 
This can provide a real lesson to the legislator in this country. Independent legal advice is a 
vital tool in protecting the interests of those entering into prenuptial agreements, particularly 
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the more vulnerable spouses. It is ‘perhaps unsurprising’67 that the Law Commission has 
recommended that ‘one of the pre-requisites for entering into a qualifying nuptial agreement 
should be that the parties have taken legal advice’.68  
 
Through the hybrid lens discussed in Chapter 1, it becomes much easier to accept that there is 
a middle ground, that on the one hand provides for mandatory independent legal advice, 
whilst on the other continues to allow judges to exercise their discretion. This would not be 
so readily acceptable if continuing desire to categorise the prenuptial agreement as wholly a 
‘family law’ or a ‘contract law’ instrument existed. The tension between autonomy and 
protection can be relaxed here by acknowledging that prenuptial agreements require a 
bespoke approach of their own. Black and white rules governing independent legal advice are 
not necessary. Instead, individuals can be afforded autonomy to conclude agreements, but 
with a strong and clearly visible protective measure in place that makes it necessary to 
receive independent legal advice, save for in circumstances where a judge feels compelled to 
uphold an agreement even without the presence of such advice.  
 
It is also important that careful consideration is given to exactly what will be mandatory for 
couples.  The level of independent legal advice that should be required is currently 
undetermined.69 The Law Commission has pointed out that it is not the norm for the law to 
insist on individuals taking legal advice.70 It is also the case that there may be resistance to 
any clause ‘because there is a natural reluctance to pay money to lawyers’,71 particularly in 
the current financial climate. For this reason, any requirement for independent legal advice 
must clearly state exactly what is required of the parties in order to satisfy the criteria. 
 
Initially, in Australia, there was technically only a requirement that there was a certificate 
stating that the legal advice had been received, not that it had actually been given.72 Now 
though section 90G(1)(b) FLA 1975 offers guidance on the advice to be given, with a 
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requirement that both the ‘advantages and disadvantages’ of entering into the agreement be 
communicated. The Law Commission promulgated a similar approach by suggesting that the 
advice ‘cannot be formalistic’ and ‘must involve an element of evaluation’.73 More needs to 
be required of practitioners than to simply making their clients aware of the law. They must 
offer clients advice on the effects of entering into a prenuptial agreement in their 
circumstances. The Government should give serious consideration to adopting the wording of 
section 90G(1)(b) FLA 1975 or developing a similar provision, in order to facilitate the 
appropriate balance between autonomy and protection. 
 
In terms of the liability of practitioners, Patrick Parkinson, one of the leading experts in 
Australia, has suggested that ‘it is enough that advice was given’74 to the clients. The Law 
Commission concurred by expressing a reluctance to ‘open the door to disputes as to 
whether...advice has in fact been taken.’75 Statute can only ensure that the parties have 
received independent legal advice. ‘Clients will not always listen’76 to the advice of their 
solicitors and if the law required them to do so, this would be a severe restriction upon 
individual autonomy. Therefore, if a prenuptial agreement stated that both parties had 
received independent legal advice, the courts would have to take this at face value, rather 
than undertaking a substantive investigation into the advice given.  
 
However, as will be argued later within this chapter, in order to continue to provide 
appropriate protection to individuals, independent legal advice must continue to function 
alongside the courts’ methods of substantively assessing fairness.77 The limits of legal advice 
in ensuring functional autonomy are such that a prenuptial agreement should never be 
enforced purely because both parties have received independent legal advice. Such a move 
would potentially jeopardise the protective function of the law.  
 
Taking all of the above into account, this thesis leans towards the position reached at 
common law level in England and Wales and suggests that within the body of any future 
statutory regulation of prenuptial agreements a clause relating to independent legal advice 
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would be a worthwhile inclusion. The Law Commission itself has made clear that it strongly 
advocates the inclusion of mandatory independent legal advice in order for parties to be able 
to enter into qualifying nuptial agreements. 78 
 
Legal advice that is both independent and competent may be an effective means of removing 
inequalities in bargaining power,79 provided that there is still a substantive safety net in place 
that looks at the actual content of the agreement. The requirement for independent legal 
advice is in this sense only a threshold that couples must meet. It is extremely uncommon for 
the law to require individuals to take legal advice. In many cases, it is encouraged and it is 
often the prudent thing to do, but to make it mandatory is a fairly extreme step.80 However, in 
this context, it is an element that the judiciary already looks for when determining the extent 
to which they will exercise their discretion under section 25 MCA 1973. Making independent 
legal advice mandatory will serve to continue to ensure that, as far as is possible to do so, 
prenuptial agreements are entered into autonomously, with a full-understanding of the legal 
implications and without one spouse being able to pressurise the other spouse into signing 
disadvantageous terms. 
 
That said in order to continue to provide appropriate levels of protection to individuals, the 
presence of independent legal advice will not make a prenuptial agreement de facto binding. 
It would instead be the case that its absence would mean that an agreement is certain to be set 
aside. 
 
Those charged with the task of reform will have to determine whether there can be any 
extenuating circumstances that will mean that the requirement for independent legal advice 
can be waived. The Law Commission has suggested that an exception be made in situations 
where it is just one party trying to protect an asset from the other. In such instances, only the 
party seeking protection will be required to have taken independent legal advice.81 This is 
logical, but no mention is made of instances where financial constraints have prevented 
couples from seeking independent legal advice. This thesis suggests that in order to continue 
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to preserve the fine balance between autonomy and protection, the requirement for mandatory 
independent legal advice should not be easily departed from.  
 
 
iii)  Full and Frank Disclosure 
The next issue to be considered is the extent to which the parties to a prenuptial agreement 
are required to disclose their assets to each other. The debate on this requirement is centred 
on two main issues, namely, ensuring that all parties fully understand the implications of 
agreement that they are entering into, thus making their decisions as truly autonomous as 
possible, and, furthermore, providing appropriate protection to individuals by safeguarding 
equal bargaining power between the parties.  
 
This issue presents a ‘difficulty unique to nuptial agreements.’82 There is a significant degree 
of ‘uncertainty as to how full…disclosure needs to be’83in order for the appropriate balance 
between autonomy and protection to be struck. If it is accepted that there must be some 
disclosure of assets, it must be determined whether statute should demand that full and frank 
disclosure of all assets take place, or, alternatively, whether simply an awareness of the 
estimated value of the other spouse is enough to enable an autonomous decision to enter into 
an agreement to be upheld. 
 
The Law Commission recommended in 1998 that an agreement be disregarded if one, or both 
parties failed to make full disclosure of assets and property prior to the agreement being 
made.84 The requirement has since been addressed by the judiciary in a series of cases that 
have come before them. In F v F85, Mr Justice Thorpe referred to ‘the duty of full and frank 
disclosure’86 in the context of financial orders, noting that the court had the ‘power to ensure 
compliance’87 with this duty. This suggested a stringent adherence to the requirement of full 
and frank disclosure. Contrastingly, in K v K, it was held that the lack of financial disclosure 
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was not fatal to the agreement. This was because the husband had not ‘exploit[ed] his 
dominant financial position.’88 There was some disclosure of assets by the husband in this 
instance, but the ‘decision not to press for values’89 was the wife’s. The general awareness of 
the husband’s wealth was deemed to be sufficient protection in this instance.  
 
In Crossley v Crossley90 an ‘important plank’91 of the argument submitted by the wife for 
setting aside the prenuptial agreement was the fact that full disclosure had not been made. 
However, once more the agreement was upheld despite this factor. Therefore, prior to the 
Radmacher dispute, there was uncertainty as to the level of financial disclosure that the 
courts required parties to make, although the courts were hinting that they would not use a 
lack of full and frank disclosure to strike down an autonomously reached agreement lightly.  
 
Katrin Radmacher made no financial disclosure to Nicholas Granatino. Mrs Justice Baron felt 
that this was a ‘deliberate’ ploy ‘to keep her asset base secret’.92 It was accepted that the 
absence of disclosure would not have effected agreement under German law, however, under 
English law it was relevant; ‘without full knowledge of the assets it is impossible…to make a 
fully informed decision’.93 The lack of full disclosure was one of the reasons why the 
prenuptial agreement was not upheld at first instance.94 The decision appeared to indicate a 
return to the position that full and frank disclosure was absolutely necessary in order to 
protect individuals. Accordingly, practitioners were advised to give ‘very careful thought’95 
to the possibility of a successful challenge to an agreement because of a lack of disclosure.  
 
As with independent legal advice, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court went on to reveal 
further complexities. Lord Justice Thorpe asserted that, rather than just a mere lack of 
disclosure, a ‘causative element’ was required; 96 it was necessary for the court to find that 
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had ‘accurate mutual disclosure been made’97 there was a chance the agreement would not 
have been entered into. As a result, Granatino’s awareness of his ex-wife’s wealth, combined 
with his lack of enquiry as to the actual figures, meant that the lack of disclosure was not fatal 
to the agreement.98 
 
The majority in the Supreme Court concurred on this point. The most important factor was 
held to be that the parties had ‘all the information…material’99 to their decision. If a party 
was ‘indifferent to (the) detailed particulars of the other party’s assets’,100 as Granatino had 
been, then the agreement should not be afforded reduced weight because of a lack of 
disclosure. This was followed in Z v Z,101 where it was held that there was ‘no need for 
disclosure as both parties’102 were aware of each other’s financial arrangements. Clearly, the 
courts favoured upholding autonomy where circumstances dictated that they were able to. 
This is how the appellate courts appeared to have treated Granatino, with the insinuation that 
he was neither vulnerable, nor in need of their protection.  
 
The law in England and Wales has reached a position whereby full and frank disclosure is 
‘not necessarily mandatory’, but should be ‘recommended very strongly’.103 The lack of 
disclosure will ‘not be fatal’104 in circumstances where the challenging party is deemed to 
have had an understanding of the implications of entering into a prenuptial agreement.105 This 
suggests that a ‘millionaire’s defence can be deployed’106 by any wealthy party seeking to 
have their autonomy upheld, by simply pointing to the fact that the less well-off spouse knew 
of their approximate wealth and therefore it did not matter that the exact details were not 
exposed.  
 
Recent decisions display judicial willingness to take a common sense approach when dealing 
with full and frank disclosure. When it comes to law reform the choice is similar to the one 
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discussed with regard to independent legal advice. The question is whether the Government 
should continue to allow the court the discretion that it is currently afforded, or whether to 
make full and frank disclosure mandatory? 
 
In Australia, Section 90K(1)(a) FLA 1975 enables a court to set aside a financial agreement 
on the grounds of fraud. Non-disclosure of a material matter is included under this provision. 
Whilst there is no express reference made to financial disclosure in the requirements for a 
financial agreement, ‘it is implicit…that the parties make full and frank disclosure’107 of their 
property and assets to each other. This is a similar position to that to which the common law 
has led in England and Wales. 
  
The idea of full and frank disclosure in financial cases is not a new one in Australia. The case 
of Weir & Weir108 is often referred to when this topic is deliberated. Here it was held that if 
‘deliberate non-disclosure’109 could be established, then the ‘Court should not be unduly 
cautious’110 about finding in favour of the challenger. It was then reaffirmed in Kannis & 
Kannis111 that ‘the duty to disclose is absolute’.112 Other cases where the courts of Australia 
have determined that full and frank disclosure is a requirement in this context include Suiker 
& Suiker,113 Morrison & Morrison114 and Malpass v Mayson.115 In fact, in Suiker the Full 
Court went as far as saying that the requirement of full and frank disclosure is necessary to 
fulfil the ‘fundamental aims’116 of the financial provisions of section 79 FLA 1975. It is 
unquestionable that full and frank disclosure is therefore utilised in Australia in order to 
provide the appropriate level of protection to spouses.  
 
This notion was reiterated by the implementation of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Aus) that 
notably require a party to a financial case to make full and frank disclosure to the other 
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party.117 This includes the party’s earnings,118 interest in property,119 income earned by a 
legal entity fully or partially controlled by a party 120  and the party’s other financial 
resources. 121  Additionally, both of the parties and any practitioners involved had a 
responsibility to promote compliance with the duty of disclosure.122  
 
There have been occasions where non-disclosure of assets has been sufficient for a financial 
agreement to be set aside. The case of Blackmore & Webber123 is one such example. Here the 
agreement was set aside pursuant to the fraud provisions of section 90K(1)(a) FLA 1975. 
This was despite the fact that the judge acknowledged that the ‘exclusion of certain assets and 
liabilities’124 from the agreement had been the decision of the solicitor and not the husband. 
This followed on from Federal Magistrate Altobelli holding in Stoddard & Stoddard125 that, 
for the purposes of Part VIIIA FLA 1975, ‘fraud may be constituted by omission’.126 There is 
therefore clear precedent for courts setting aside agreements because of a lack of full and 
frank disclosure indirectly under the fraud heading, in order to provide appropriate protection 
for individuals. 
 
The law here appears to have reached a crossroads. It could be concluded that ‘it is not 
satisfactory to pay lip-service to the duty to make disclosure’127 in Australia when dealing 
with financial arrangements. However, it has been reiterated that the FLA 1975 does not 
make it mandatory for an annex detailing the financial circumstances of each party to be 
attached to a prenuptial agreement.128 In this respect, it is suggestible that the law in 
Australia, like in England and Wales, has not quite managed to achieve clarity when it comes 
to requirements for full and frank disclosure.  
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That said, it is explicit, because of the presence of section 90K(1)(a) FLA 1975, that the court 
holds the discretion to set aside agreements where there is a lack of material full financial 
disclosure. A logical conclusion from this would be that the court holds an implicit discretion 
to ‘find that a particular non-disclosure was immaterial’.129  
 
The thesis suggests that the issue of full and frank financial disclosure cannot be dealt with in 
an absolutist manner. Through full disclosure the parties can avoid having their agreement set 
aside on a mere technicality, however, it would arguably be too great an intrusion of privacy 
to make full and frank disclosure an absolute requirement. Conversely, it would also be 
dangerous to completely disregard it because of its function in providing protection to 
individuals. A position must be established that ensures that any future statutory legislation 
has optimum effect and carefully balances the two issues. Both parties will not have the same 
objectives and a lack of disclosure does not always mean that one party has taken advantage 
of the other. Therefore a hybrid position on full and frank disclosure is permissible, and 
indeed necessary, in order to facilitate the balance between autonomy and protection.  
Making financial disclosure can be ‘time-consuming, costly and give rise to major 
disputes’130 between the parties. In the current financial climate, it seems illogical to insist 
that couples go through an expensive legal process to disclose assets when they are both 
content with what they are signing. Indeed, the courts in both jurisdictions have already 
demonstrated that they use common sense, working on the basis that disclosure is a factor in 
deciding the weight to be afforded to an agreement, but it isn’t in all cases decisive.131 
 
There are still those who argue that full and frank financial disclosure is necessary ‘in order 
to ensure transparency’,132 however, it is respectfully suggested that those who remain 
generally more suspicious of prenuptial agreements hold this view. In particular, they are 
likely to be worried about the welfare of the economically weaker spouses who are 
traditionally women. It is of course vital that these interests are strongly protected, but there 
are other mediums through which this can achieved. These include the requirement for 
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independent legal advice that has already been discussed, as well as the fairness and needs 
based safeguards that will be discussed below.  
 
That is not to dismiss the requirement for financial disclosure all together. A study of 
practitioners undertaken by Emma Hitchings has found that there is a range of approaches 
that practitioners take towards disclosure.133 This range, however, did not come about as a 
result of a lack of understanding as to the meaning of full and frank disclosure, but because 
the practitioners took into account what was appropriate having regard to all the 
circumstances.134 This common sense approach is precisely what is required here and in this 
respect the autonomous decisions of the parties should be respected where it is possible to do 
so, without exploiting vulnerable parties. 
 
The appellate courts in Radmacher echoed the sentiment that it would be ridiculous for a 
prenuptial agreement between a multi-millionaire and their spouse, entered into with full 
understanding of its implications, to be set aside because a detailed breakdown of all the 
accounts, properties and investments was not given by one spouse to the other.  Similarly, the 
increased legal costs of detailing their exact financial arrangements may well discourage 
those who are less affluent from entering into an agreement, against a backdrop of mandatory 
independent legal advice.  
 
Disclosure will be necessary to some extent, but statute could prevent asset hiding by 
introducing a clause that renders an agreement void on the grounds of fraud where there is a 
material lack of disclosure. This would avoid requiring a detailed breakdown of all assets 
within the body of autonomously reached agreements, but would continue to provide 
protection in a similar manner to that which is found in Australia in section 90K(1)(a) FLA 
1975. 
 
The Law Commission has concurred by suggesting that a prenuptial agreement should not be 
enforceable unless there is material full and frank disclosure.135 The operative word here is 
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material. ‘In the majority of cases…general disclosures’136 will be important, but it will not 
be vital in every case. This is the position that the common law in this country has reached 
over the past decade and it is suggested by this thesis that any fresh statutory legislation 
entrenches this stance. 
 
It is useful at this point to note that there is already a statute already in place that provides 
some protection for spouses whose partner may have attempted to exclude assets from a 
financial relief order. Section 37 was inserted into the MCA 1973 as a measure to stop one 
party from moving or hiding their assets specifically to prevent them forming part of an order 
for financial relief. The effect of the provision is two-fold. Firstly, it is preventative. It allows 
a Court to appropriately protect spouses by stopping the stronger spouse disposing assets to 
their detriment, provided that this is only being done ‘with the intention of defeating a claim 
for financial relief’. 137 Secondly, it can act as a restorative measure by undoing any 
disposition of assets that has already taken place.138 If it makes such an order, the Court is 
entitled to ‘give such consequential directions as it thinks fit.’139 
 
Despite prima facie being a strong protective measure, it would appear that an order under 
section 37 MCA 1973 is not one in which a court will readily engage. For example, in Field v 
Field140 the wife’s application for an injunction under section 37(2) MCA 1973 was rejected 
because it could not be established that the husband was about to dispose of the pension fund 
from which she was trying to claim the payment of a lump sum order. Mr Justice Wilson 
stated that the ‘carte blanche’ power to make an order ‘conferred upon the court by the 
section is illusory’.141 A heavy burden therefore appears to be placed upon the party seeking 
the injunction to show that it was the intention of the other party to dispose of the asset in 
question. The protective qualities of this provision are therefore questionable. 
 
However, there is clearly already some statutory protection in place that spouses can attempt 
to use if they fear that they are not going to get an award that reflects the reality of their 
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financial situation. Perhaps in some instances, an order under this section could be useful in a 
prenuptial agreement context. For example, if the agreement provides one spouse with either 
specific assets that their partner has attempted, or is attempting, to relinquish ownership of 
before the terms of the agreement are enforced, then an order preventing such a disposition 
will be helpful. Additionally, if a prenuptial agreement ascribes a pre-determined percentage 
of the total assets to one of the spouses, then such an order could be used to prevent or undo 
any attempt to reduce this pool.  
 
The issue of self-help remedies to non-disclosure in a more general financial relief context 
arose in the 2010 Court of Appeal decision in Imerman v Imerman.142 In this dispute Mrs 
Imerman’s main point of contention was that her husband should not be able to ‘escape his 
true liability by concealing his assets’.143 Further, she suggested that ‘feared dishonesty 
justifies self-help, even where that self-help is unlawful.’144 In this instance, the unlawful 
self-help amounted to her brothers, who shared an office with Mr Imerman, obtaining files 
belonging to Mr Imerman from a joint work server, which they then passed on to Mrs 
Imerman and her lawyers.   
 
It should be noted that both parties to financial relief proceedings are already required to 
‘make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to the other party and the court’.145 This 
disclosure is however, not required until Form E, which is part of the ancillary relief claim, 
has actually been lodged.146 This does not aid those who sign a prenuptial agreement because 
of course this will be drawn up long before Form E becomes a consideration.  
 
A number of decisions handed down on cases concerning self-help have referred to what are 
commonly known as the Hildebrand147 rules. This is so despite the fact that the actual case 
appears to give ‘no authority for the so-called…rules’148 that have subsequently evolved from 
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it. The Hildebrand rules were summarised by Lord Justice Ward in White v Withers LLP and 
Dearle149 and this passage is worthy of inclusion in full here: 
 
The family courts will not penalise the taking, copying and immediate return of 
documents but do not sanction the use of any force to obtain the documents, or 
the interception of documents or the retention of documents nor I would add, 
though it is not a feature of this case, the removal of any hard disk recording 
documents electronically. The evidence contained in the documents, even those 
wrongfully taken will be admitted in evidence because there is an overarching 
duty on the parties to give full and frank disclosure.150 
 
A number of decisions can be seen to portray this definition as accurate. Mr Justice Wilson in 
T v T151 held it ‘reasonable’ that the wife searched the dustbin and copy documents that were 
in the house, but ‘unacceptable’ and ‘reprehensible’ for her to use force, keep original 
documents and intercept mail.152 However, in Imerman itself the Hildebrand rules ‘as we 
knew them’ were ‘washed away’.153 Lord Neuberger placed emphasis upon the fact that the 
rules are ‘authority only as to the time when copies obtained unlawfully or clandestinely 
should be disclosed to a spouse.’ 154 In other words, it could not be used to justify the 
procurement of documents prior to the inception of financial relief proceedings. It seems 
unlikely, therefore, that spouses who are trying to ascertain the full extent of their partners’ 
financial assets prior to entering into a prenuptial agreement could rely upon these rules to 
justify any investigations they may decide to undertake.  
 
As a further deterrent, claims for unlawful actions against those procuring such information 
have also been considered. In addition to potentially tortious and criminal liability, the law of 
confidence is also a possible source of action that must be taken into account. This legal 
doctrine is closely tied to the laws on privacy that have developed following the passing of 
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the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter the ‘HRA’), which incorporated elements the 
European Convention on Human Rights 1952 (hereafter ‘the Convention’) into domestic law. 
 
Lord Neuberger certainly showed that he believed the two to be synonymous by stating that 
‘to follow that intentionally obtaining such information, secretly and knowing that the 
claimant reasonably expects it to be private, is itself a breach of confidence’,155 although he 
did go on to also point out that the misuse of private information was not absolutely required 
in order for there to be a breach of confidence found.156 The submission by the wife that the 
husband could not hold a right of confidence against her over information that, if they were 
not married, he would have enjoyed, was dismissed as being ‘simply unsustainable’.157 It was 
held to be ‘implicit’ from the wording of article 8 of the Convention that spouse’s private life, 
separate from their family life, was to be protected.158 
 
Ultimately, ‘once it is determined that the document is properly to be regarded as confidential 
to one spouse but not to the other, the relationship has no further relevance in relation to the 
remedy for breach of that confidentiality.’159 Given this is the situation when financial relief 
proceedings are already underway, it would be impossible for couples seeking full and frank 
disclosure to circumvent the effects of section 8 of the Convention to ensure that such 
disclosure was achieved.  
 
In fact, the possibility that, should any new statute introduce a provision requiring full and 
frank disclosure, there may be claims brought against the state for interfering with an 
individual’s private life must also be considered. It is certainly plausible that an individual 
could seek a declaration of incompatibility under section 3(1) HRA 1998 in relation to any 
clause forcing them to make full and frank disclosure.  
 
The general consensus is that, as a result of the Imerman decision, the approach to ancillary 
relief cases has switched from one where the parties were required to disclose their assets, to 
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one where one spouse is able to withhold some information from the other. 160  The 
Hildebrand rules have been reduced to little more than an ‘urban myth’.161 This has ‘caused 
shock waves, panic and confusion’162 amongst practitioners, who are now uncertain as to 
exactly how they should be advising their clients when it comes to obtaining documents in 
situations where full and frank disclosure has not been made.  Whilst some have argued that 
the Court of Appeal essentially used a ‘sledgehammer to crack a nut’,163 it is unlikely that, in 
the prenuptial agreement context, the more vulnerable spouse will able to utilise these rules to 
ensure full and frank disclosure is made.   
 
It possible to suggest that the statutory provisions dealing with full and frank disclosure in 
Australia have only served to move the law to an analogous position to that which has 
evolved out of the common law in England and Wales. The argument set out above suggests 
that the requirement of full and frank disclosure, whilst being important, is perhaps not as 
vital as ensuring that each party to an agreement has received independent legal advice. 
 
Historically, the courts have taken a tough line on those who deliberately try to conceal their 
assets from a financial relief case. Lord Justice Ward in Aragchinchi v Aragchinchi164 held 
that where one spouse had been untruthful about the full extent of his means, ‘it is open to the 
court to find that beneath the false presentations are undisclosed assets and to make an order 
on that basis’.165 Lord Justice Wilson then made the point in Mahon v Mahon166 that, because 
of how adept the family courts have become at recognising all kinds of innovative methods of 
deception, ‘the strategy, designed dishonestly to reduce…financial exposure to the other 
party, usually instead leads to an enlargement of it.’167 Protection is therefore clearly at the 
forefront of the minds of the judiciary when determining this issue. 
 
There is no reason to believe the courts will not continue to take such a tough line on failure 
to disclose when it is asked to determine the validity of a prenuptial agreement. In fact, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
160 Andrew Meehan, ‘Imerman: Cards off the Table?’ [2010] Fam Law 944, 953. 
161 Leonora Onaran, ‘Hildebrand Documents: The Warp and Weft of Ancillary Relief Litigation’ [2010] Fam 
Law 1303, 1303. 
162 Meehan, ‘Cards Off the Table’ (n 160) 945.  
163 Onaran, (n 161) 1304. 
164 [1997] EWCA Civ 1091. 
165 ibid 1095.  
166 [2008] EWCA Civ 901. 
167 ibid [6]. 
Regulating Prenuptial Agreements?  Balancing Autonomy and Protection 
 
	  
125	  
most likely scenario is that should such a dispute arise with the law as it stands, then the court 
would not look favourably on such a deliberate deceit. Subsequently, this thesis suggests that 
any future statutory proposal governing prenuptial agreements should not contain an absolute 
requirement of full and frank disclosure. Instead, it is preferable to continue leave to the 
discretion with the judiciary to determine, on a case-by-case basis, the level of disclosure it 
deems necessary.  
 
If full and frank disclosure is to be found anywhere within the new statute, then, as is the case 
in Australia, it should be that a material lack of disclosure will potentially be a way of setting 
an agreement aside at the point of exit, rather than being one of the preliminary entry 
requirements that places a check upon the parties’ ability to enter autonomous agreements. 
This approach would leave parties continuing to face a degree of uncertainty, however, this 
thesis suggests that this is in fact a positive, as it will place responsibility upon the parties to 
put significant effort into carefully wording their agreements.  
 
 
iv)   Fairness  
Attention must turn to how the courts are to continue to provide appropriate levels of 
protection for individuals by monitoring the substantive fairness of prenuptial agreements in 
the future. This issue is one that judges have constantly had to grapple with when determining 
ancillary relief claims. Given the relational nature of marriage, it is unsurprising that the 
courts have always sought to try and produce fair outcomes between the parties, taking into 
account the subjectivities of their relationship. The issue to be determined is the extent to 
which couples should be able to autonomously insert binding contractual terms that make 
awards that would not be considered a fair split of assets.  
 
Within the fairness heading, the area with the greatest resonance to the debate is financial 
need. As outlined in Chapter 2, the current method of ensuring fairness in an ancillary relief 
context is drawn from the existence of section 25 MCA 1973, the landmark House of Lords 
ruling in White v White,168which introduced the ‘yardstick of equality’,169 and the three 
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strands of ‘need’, ‘compensation’ and ‘sharing’. If statutory prenuptial agreements are 
introduced then couples will explicitly be able to contract out of the sharing principle. The 
issue to be addressed within this section will be the extent to which the courts should be able 
to continue to use its protective function to ensure that financial needs are met. If statutory 
prenuptial agreements are introduced, this will be the vehicle by which courts can ultimately 
ensure that the appropriate balance is struck between the autonomy and protective interests of 
the parties.   
 
In England and Wales, section 25 MCA 1973 explicitly instructs judges to take financial need 
into consideration.170 Additionally, Supporting Families recommended that judges enforce 
fairness by ensuring that the needs of each party are met. 171 This is one certain way in which 
the interests of the vulnerable can be protected. It has been suggested that the majority of 
divorces are ‘factually…rather than legally complex’.172 More often than not, there is simply 
not enough capital to allow both parties to buy new houses. In such instances, the focus must 
be on financial need.173 However, as was outlined in Chapter 2, that is not to say that need 
has been restricted to merely ensuring that parties are able to keep themselves above the 
breadline.  In F v F, the court held that in determining the reasonable needs of the wife, it 
must not ‘avoid’ applying ‘scales that would seem generous to ordinary people’.174 The 
standard of living that the family had previously enjoyed was to be used as ‘the yardstick 
against which the wife’s needs must be measured’.175 In enacting fresh statutory legislation, 
Parliament will have to determine whether it will be possible to autonomously agree to a 
lower standard of ‘need’ being met, or whether the court will still be able to make more 
generous awards despite the existence of a prenuptial agreement.  
 
As with independent legal advice and full and frank disclosure, financial ‘need’ was 
discussed in detail at all three levels of the Radmacher dispute. Granatino’s legal counsel 
highlighted that the prenuptial agreement made no financial provision for either of them in 
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the event of divorce.176 He contended that the agreement should be set aside because it did 
not make contingencies for the parties if they were left in a situation of ‘need’ and therefore 
left him potentially unprotected. 
 
Mrs Justice Baron concurred with this line of argument. Resultantly, she undertook an 
evaluation of the various factors that could affect the needs-based order in this instance. 
Although Granatino had made the choice to leave his career in the city in order to pursue a 
doctorate, his needs were not significantly reduced by his ‘investment skills’.177 It was 
understood that Granatino had made a novel discovery that would potentially be of interest to 
pharmaceutical companies, however, this was ‘incapable of quantification’178 and so again 
could not be taken into consideration. Additionally, the judge felt compelled to ensure that 
her order would cover the debt that Granatino had incurred in bringing initial proceedings 
contesting residence of the couple’s children.179 
 
Attention then turned towards the lifestyle that the parties had led. Radmacher contested that 
Granatino had made a conscious choice not to exploit his earning capacity. She argued that he 
had chosen the life of an academic and, resultantly, he should be held to the autonomously 
entered prenuptial agreement and accustom himself to the lifestyle of an academic.180 Mrs 
Justice Baron determined that Granatino’s current financial position was not a litigation tactic 
and felt that the wife would have continued funding their lifestyle had the couple remained 
married.181 This was deemed to be influential in the assessment of Granatino’s needs.182 Mrs 
Justice Baron also felt that Radmacher’s ‘supposed parsimony’183 was a deliberate ploy with 
Granatino’s needs based claim in mind and therefore concluded that Granatino’s claim should 
be based upon ‘his needs as judged against the lifestyle that the parties lived’.184 This 
followed the approach the court would have taken in a regular ancillary relief claim. Mrs 
Justice Baron clearly felt that the need to provide protection to Granatino’s needs was greater 
than the necessity to hold the parties to their autonomously entered agreement.   
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The total award prescribed to Granatino ‘balanced the need to produce a result which takes 
into account the prenuptial agreement, the wife’s extensive fortune and the husband’s 
entitlement under English law’. The wife’s resources in this case were vast; however, the 
judge limited the husband’s claim to merely his needs.185 Importantly, it should be recognised 
that ‘need’ in this instance was not limited to ensuring that Granatino did not become a 
financial burden on the state. Rather, the court was more concerned with ensuring that 
Granatino was able to continue to enable his daughters to live in the lifestyle that they had 
become accustomed to. This is primarily what led Mrs Justice Baron to a needs based award 
that most would regard as extremely generous given the existence of the prenuptial 
agreement.  
 
The Court of Appeal had serious reservations about the level of award made and gave a much 
greater weighting to the autonomous decision of the parties to enter the prenuptial agreement. 
It articulated that it was ‘difficult’186 to see how the judge had ‘applied any real discount’187 
to the husband’s claim because of the existence of the prenuptial agreement. Lord Justice Rix 
categorically stated that in the circumstances there was ‘no case for making’188 a financial 
support order ‘for the whole of his lifetime’.189 Instead, it was felt that the financial award 
that Radmacher was to receive should ‘merely reflect his continuing parent obligations…not 
his own long term needs.’190 In any case, the award he would receive as a father would ‘cover 
his real need for the foreseeable future’.191 Subsequently, the £2.335m Duxbury award was 
sent back for recalculation. Additionally, the property that Granatino was to be allowed to 
purchase as a home for him and the girls would revert to Radmacher once the parenting years 
were over.  
 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal also touched on what the outcome of the case would have 
been if the agreement had genuinely prevented Granatino from bringing a claim in a situation 
where he was in real need. Lord Justice Wilson asserted that in any analysis of whether 
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preclusion of claims in circumstances of real need was ever fair, it should look at the factors 
that precipitated the prenuptial agreement,192 including whether the claimant was aware of the 
said preclusion.193 This suggested that the Court of Appeal would potentially go as far as 
upholding an autonomously entered agreement even when the agreement prevented a claim 
where one party was in a situation of real ‘need’, provided that there was an awareness of the 
potential financial situation that they would be left in.  
 
Lord Justice Wilson was somewhat wary of this stance. He qualified it by stating that in such 
an instance the ‘proportionate response’194 would of course have been to allow a claim ‘to the 
extent necessary for the service of his real need’.195 However, there was nothing in the facts 
of the current case that could have enabled Mrs Justice Baron to conclude that at any point in 
his life Granatino would find himself in a situation of real need.196 Granatino was seemingly 
afforded a lesser degree of protection on this basis.  
  
It is noticeable that the prefix ‘real’ has attached itself in front of the rationale of need. The 
Court of Appeal decision still left sufficient ambiguity surrounding the effect of an agreement 
that precluded a claim in circumstances of ‘real need’. The Supreme Court then discussed the 
issue and reiterated that ‘real need’ was the ‘irreducible minimum’,197 which would be set at a 
lower threshold than ‘need’ would be set at in an ancillary relief claim.  
 
The Supreme Court majority entered into a detailed dialogue on the three rationales of need, 
compensation and sharing. It was the first two strands, need and compensation, that would 
most often cause the court to determine it unfair to uphold a prenuptial agreement.198 They 
felt that Lord Justice Wilson had ‘inferentially’199 implied that the agreement would still have 
been upheld even if Granatino had been left in a situation of real need. The majority were not 
prepared to go that far.200 However, they concurred that in the circumstances the Court of 
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Appeal had been correct in concluding that Granatino’s needs were not a reason to render the 
prenuptial agreement invalid.201 Again Granatino’s high level of professional qualification, 
alongside the substantial relief that was awarded to him in his role as a homemaker, was cited 
as influencing factors within the judgment.202 This strongly indicated that the courts were 
prepared to allow parties to autonomously contract for a lower settlement than they would be 
afforded through an ancillary relief claim, provided that their real needs were satisfied.  
 
Baroness Hale’s sole dissent was not in complete agreement with the majority judgment.  She 
asserted that need had become ‘shorthand for…mutual commitment’ 203 between spouses. 
This commitment is no longer lifelong, however, the couple’s support for each other may 
‘generate a continued need for support’204 post-separation. In her eyes, the issue was whether 
this support should continue after the youngest daughter had grown up,205 or whether 
Granatino had no right to claim for his needs beyond those of looking after his daughters. 
 
Baroness Hale distinguished the court’s lack of power to make an order for an unmarried 
person from its express power to make awards to married parents.206 She felt that the law 
enables the court to ‘look independently at the needs of the parent’ where the couple are 
married. In not awarding Granatino any needs-based award beyond what he was given in his 
role as a homemaker, she felt that the Court of Appeal had treated the litigants ‘as if they had 
never been married,’207 and that this was an error. She intimated that it was not fair to allow a 
prenuptial agreement to preclude the court from considering making any provision for the 
parents’ future needs, 208displaying an obvious concern for the lack of protection that the 
majority’s test seemed to provide. 
 
As a result of the assortment of differing opinions offered by the judiciary at various levels, 
‘it is not entirely clear when the financial needs’ of one party ‘could mean that it would be 
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unfair’209 to uphold a prenuptial agreement. What is certain is that it is ‘inappropriate…to 
give effect to an agreement…(that) casts’ one party onto state benefits.210 This is a common 
sense approach and it would be contrary to public policy to uphold an agreement that would 
place a burden upon the state. Additionally, this would leave vulnerable individuals with very 
little protection against spouses in a much stronger financial position, who in turn would be 
able to insist upon agreements that might be widely considered to be unfair.  
 
Judges have been plagued by the lack of specific guidance that the courts have given as to 
how ‘need’, and indeed ‘compensation’ and ‘sharing’, are to be interpreted and applied.211 
Jens Scherpe has suggested that the term real need sets a lower hurdle to be reached in this 
context, than the interpretation of need in a standard ancillary relief claim.212 This stance 
certainly justifies the conclusion reached by both the Court of Appeal and the majority in the 
Supreme Court. It is clear that a binding prenuptial agreement would enable a couple to opt 
out of the sharing principle. Further to this, it appears that although need cannot be totally 
disregarded, a couple can autonomously subscribe to conform to a lower standard of need 
than would be applied to a couple without a prenuptial agreement in place.  
 
A two-tier approach to needs has been developed.213 Where there is no prenuptial agreement 
in place, the mandatory ancillary relief approach will continue to lead to needs based awards 
that reflect the lifestyle that the parties have been living. However, where a prenuptial 
agreement is signed it is likely that a ‘reduced quantification of needs’214 will occur as a 
result. This situation has been described as a ‘double whammy’215 for those who opt to sign 
prenuptial agreements. They lose out twice; firstly by not having the opportunity to bring a 
claim for ancillary relief and then secondly because the standard of need that they are judged 
against is lower than it would have been had there not been a prenuptial agreement in place.   
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Using the Radmacher dispute as an example, not only did Nicholas Granatino contract out of 
the sharing principle by signing a prenuptial agreement, he also decreased the size of the 
needs-based award that he received. Those considering signing a prenuptial agreement should 
seriously consider this potential outcome. It seems that, as things stand, they can no longer 
rely upon the protection of a generous needs-based award to counteract the existence of their 
prenuptial agreement. It is clearly much easier for a couple to contract out of the sharing 
principle,216 with the needs principle continuing to ‘form the protective core of ancillary 
relief.’217 That said, terms that purport to reduce needs-based awards will no longer be 
automatically dismissed and, instead, will most likely be adhered to except where they leave 
one party in a situation of real ‘need’. 
 
In Australia, comparable litigation has not occurred in the prenuptial agreement context. This 
is due to the degree of certainty that Part VIIIA FLA 1975 has provided.  Section 90F FLA 
1975 states that: 
 
1) No provision of a financial agreement excludes or limits the power of a court to 
make an order in relation to the maintenance of a party if subsection (1A) 
applies. 
 
1A) This subsection applies if the court is satisfied that, when the agreement 
came into effect, the circumstances of the party were such that, taking into 
account the terms and effect of the agreement, the party was unable to support 
himself or herself without an income test pension, allowance of benefit. 
 
This comes extremely close to being a statutory version of the rule that the appellate courts 
developed in Radmacher. A relatively low hurdle is set for need, with the exclusion of 
maintenance provisions only not permissible where one party would have been left relying 
upon the state financially. This is the Australian equivalent of introducing the real need 
hurdle that English courts will now use when determining whether terms in prenuptial 
agreements that preclude maintenance claims are valid. The statutory provisions appear to 
have settled the debate as to the level of needs based award that the court can make despite 
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the existence of a prenuptial agreement. Couples are afforded a great deal of autonomy to 
contract out of maintenance orders, provided that they are above a relatively low minimum 
threshold. Clearly then any statute introduced within this jurisdiction should attempt to have a 
similar effect.  
 
Undoubtedly, fairness and, more specifically, the principle of need are extremely important 
considerations when it comes to policing prenuptial agreements. Unlike the potential 
requirements for both parties to take independent legal advice and for full and frank 
disclosure to be made, a determination of fairness involves an examination of the actual 
substantive terms of the agreement, rather than simply looking at the procedural 
requirements.  
 
Once more there is a delicate balancing act that must be undertaken, made more difficult by 
the fact, as alluded to previously, what one party views as an exercise of autonomy, the other 
party may view as a restriction of the same principle. There is little point in introducing 
statutorily enforceable prenuptial agreements if a court will be likely to go behind the terms 
that are set out in the majority of cases. By the same token, there must still be a certain level 
of restriction to prevent autonomy being exercised in a way that has a negative effect upon 
one party. The law reform on this aspect is particularly important, as it is effectively the court 
the last line of defence for the protection of vulnerable individuals. 
 
The Law Commission considered the issues surrounding the principle of need in its 
consultation paper Marital Property Agreements. It was asserted that making provisions for 
the needs of the parties is the ‘bed-rock of ancillary relief’218 in England and Wales. The Law 
Commission also recognised the ‘considerable lengths’219 that the courts have gone to at 
common law level in order to ensure that needs continue to be provided for sufficiently. It 
therefore has initially recommended the inclusion of a safeguard in any forthcoming statutory 
regulation that protected both needs and compensation.220 This would result in the court 
retaining considerable discretion to make an award that supplements any terms of a 
prenuptial agreement that fall short of providing for the parties’ needs.  
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Need is undoubtedly an irreducible minimum that a prenuptial agreement should not be able 
to circumvent, although it will not always be particularly pertinent in cases where large sums 
are being contested. The notion of compensation on the other hand is only relevant on the 
occasions that the court is dealing with a ‘super-rich’ couple.221 The publication of the final 
Law Commission report following up Marital Property Agreements has recently been 
delayed, in order for a more detailed review of the extent to which the parties’ needs should 
be met by an agreement.222  It is clearly vital that need continues to be protected in any new 
statute introduced in this country.  
  
It is important to remember that all the ‘furore and complications’223 seen in relation to the so 
called big money cases has ‘very little practical effect’224 on the majority of disputes. 
Prenuptial agreements entered by those without significant assets will be overturned very 
simply if they leave one party in a situation of real need. Where there are significant assets in 
place, a decision must be made by the legislature as to what the minimum standard of need is 
that will be enforced. Agreements that do not deal with excluding maintenance claims and 
instead simply attempt to contract out of the sharing principle will not be problematic. In 
these instances it will often be the case that ‘fairness…may not require a departure from 
the…agreement’.225 In big money cases where the prenuptial agreement attempts to preclude 
any sort of maintenance claim, as was the case in the Radmacher dispute, the statute will 
need to be clear as to where the threshold is set in terms of minimum level of need.  
 
The low threshold set by the section 90F FLA 1975 in Australia, whereby the exclusion of 
maintenance claims is only prevented when it would leave one party requiring state benefits, 
is perhaps a step too far in favour of ‘autonomy’ in this jurisdiction. The legislator will have 
to determine exactly what should be regarded as ‘real need’. This thesis suggests that the 
court should continue to retain some discretion to set aside agreements on this basis. 
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Previously, autonomy has been favoured in the independent legal and advice and full and 
frank disclosure contexts, and so this move will ensure that adequate protection is provided 
for vulnerable spouses. However, this must be tempered to ensure that all of the emphasis 
placed upon individual autonomy at the earlier stages is not negated. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has served to highlight the key substantive and procedural points of contention 
that have arisen in much of the deliberation on prenuptial agreements. By addressing these 
issues, significant suggestions have been made as to how the legislator could go about finding 
an appropriate balance between affording couples the autonomy to enter into prenuptial 
agreements and continuing to provide protection for vulnerable spouses.  
The balancing act being undertaken is extremely delicate. It is also impossible for any new 
statutory provisions to perfectly cover every plausible set of circumstances. There will always 
be litigation surrounding statute, but what the legislator must be sensitive of is the need to 
attempt to draw the line between autonomy and protection at the most appropriate point, and 
it is hoped that the discussion within this last chapter will provide some guidance on the 
matter. 
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Conclusion 
Cretney has stated that, in an ancillary relief context, the best way of ‘reconciling the claims 
of certainty, predictability and personal autonomy’ is to allow couples ‘the liberty…to decide 
for themselves the terms of their own partnership’.1 This thesis has highlighted the main issue 
surrounding the regulation of prenuptial agreements: the tension that exists between 
Cretney’s position and the continuing need for the court to provide an appropriate level of 
protection for individuals. The purpose of this work has been to evaluate the current state of 
the law in this jurisdiction, drawing comparisons with the position of the law in Australia, 
with a view to ultimately helping alleviate this tension.  
This thesis has proceeded on the basis that future law reform in relation to prenuptial 
agreements is a distinct possibility. This stance was adopted from the outset; however, ample 
evidence in support of this understanding has been presented throughout this work. It is 
approaching 15 years since the Government published its Green Paper ‘Supporting Families’2 
in which support was first shown for prenuptial agreements.3 This has now manifested into a 
full Law Commission consultation on the matter and a final report is due within the next 
twelve months.4 Subsequently, every conclusion reached within this thesis has been made 
based on the premise that law reform is likely to occur at some point in the relatively 
immediate future.   
It is also prudent at this stage to reinforce the point that contracts and agreements are 
distinguishable from each other. This thesis has not suggested that prenuptial agreements 
should be regarded as binding contracts. Instead, it is submitted that there must be scope for 
individuals to have an autonomous role in the reallocation of assets process should they so 
desire. The law must provide this, while simultaneously continuing to provide safety nets that 
provide appropriate levels of protection to the individuals that require it.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
1 Stephen Cretney, ‘The Family and the Law – Status or Contract?’ [2003] CFLQ 403, 412. 
2 Home Office, Supporting Families: A Consultation Document (Cm 3922, 1998). 
3 ibid [4.21]. 
4 Law Commission, Marital Property Agreements – A Consultation Paper (Law Com No 198, 2011).	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Before it publicises any recommendations, the Law Commission should be clear as to what it 
is that they are trying to achieve. This thesis has respectfully suggested that the idea of a 
prenuptial agreement being accommodated either under the family law or the contract law 
umbrella is not plausible. Instead, the prenuptial agreement must be treated as a standalone 
concept, deserving of the development of its own strand of law. Once this is accepted, it may 
be that it is easier for law reform to take place. Some of the ideas that underpin relational 
contract theory were therefore drawn into Chapter 1 in order to demonstrate how this may be 
possible. Relational contract theory was useful not because its principles should be adopted as 
part of legislative reform, but because it aids in justifying this hybrid conceptualisation of the 
prenuptial agreement. This was then the platform upon which an evaluation of the current 
laws in both this jurisdiction and Australia was built. 
It would be valid to point to the steadily progressive evolution that is evident within the 
judicial reasoning, and argue that the common law itself has already evolved to a position that 
appropriately balances protection and autonomy. After all, in a relatively short period of time, 
prenuptial agreements have gone from having little or no weight in this jurisdiction,5 to only 
being set aside where it would be unfair to hold the parties to the agreement.6 However, it 
must not be forgotten that law reform is not aimed solely at the judiciary. Legislators, 
practitioners and, perhaps most importantly, the wider public will all be beneficiaries of the 
increased certainty that carefully constructed statutory provisions could bring about.  
The Law Commission’s in-depth exploration of marital property agreements is well under 
way. The fact that publication of the final review paper has been delayed in order to enable a 
further consultation paper that explores the concepts of non-matrimonial property and 
financial need,7 clearly evidences the widespread view that divorcing couples face a lack of 
certainty when it comes to ancillary relief.  
As things currently stand, a couple submitting a claim for ancillary relief are placing their 
finances in the hands of judges, who will use their discretion to take into account all of the 
circumstances of their case as prescribed be section 25(1) MCA 1973. Discretion is nothing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
5 F v F (Ancillary Relief: Substantial Assets) [1995] 2 FLR 45 (F).    
6 Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42. 
7 See Law Commission website for details <http://www.lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/marital-property-
agreements.htm> accessed 28 August 2012.   
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new in this context and it arguable that, by implementing new statutory provisions, all that is 
being done is shifting discretion from one forum to another.  
However, the nature of the discretion that any fresh statutory provisions regulating prenuptial 
agreements will afford to judges is completely different to that which they hold under 
ancillary relief. It is in a sense more realistic and sensitive to the issues that actually affect 
real people. The current laws on ancillary relief are simply not reflective of the fact that 
individuals are eager to plan for the reallocation of their financial assets in the eventuality of 
divorce. This thesis has attempted to find the level of discretion that must continue to be left 
in the hands of the judiciary, in order to balance the sensitive issues of autonomy and 
protection.  
As a result of any future reform the law will become much more reflective of contemporary 
society. Any changes proposed will most likely be reactive rather than proactive, but that 
should not detract from their purpose of ensuring that the law meets the needs of the modern 
day couple. It is therefore respectfully submitted that to suggest that there is little worth in 
implementing statutory provisions regulating prenuptial agreements, on the basis that the 
discretion afforded to judges is simply shifted to a new forum, is failing to view any new 
legislation with a holistic approach. 
This thesis has drawn upon the legal framework of two jurisdictions. Australia was chosen as 
a suitable comparator jurisdiction because of its former social and legal links to England and 
Wales. This meant that it would provide an appropriate benchmark for comparison, which 
was important because if a jurisdiction with significantly different socio-legal conditions in 
place were chosen, then any comparison would have no real validity.  
Further justification for the comparison then became evident as family law in Australia was 
explored. The amendments to the Family Law Act 1975, which introduced a new Part VIIIA 
specifically dealing with marital property agreements through the Family Law Amendment 
Act 2000, meant that there were already statutory provisions in place regulating prenuptial 
agreements. These were ripe for analysis. In fact, there was a decade worth of common law 
decisions to be explored. It became apparent that many of the issues in relation to prenuptial 
agreements that the courts have had to grapple with in this jurisdiction, including independent 
legal advice, full and frank disclosure and the substantive fairness of prenuptial agreements, 
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were also sources of contention over in Australia. The balance between protection and 
autonomy was one that the Australian Government had also been trying to achieve, and a 
number of amendments to Part VIIIA evidenced this fact.   
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis were vital in establishing the base knowledge of both the legal 
intricacies and the context of the topic. Additionally, and equally as importantly, they served 
to highlight the autonomy and protection issues that were then analysed within Chapter 4. 
The development of the common law in England and Wales, stretching right back to the 
beginning of the twentieth century with the decisions in Hyman v Hyman, 8 was mapped. A 
similar exercise was also undertaken based on the law in Australia. This then ensured that the 
actual substantive analysis of the various provisions and precedents was focussed upon the 
most important issues. 
Autonomy versus state protection is a theme that continually recurs throughout all the 
literature. The level of autonomy that couples are afforded in terms of regulating the financial 
side of their divorce has continually increased over the last couple of decades. Through this 
comprehensive analysis of this issue, this thesis concludes that the introduction of statutory 
regulation will potentially serve to cement the position of autonomy as the most important 
justification for prenuptial agreements. However, if this is to occur, it is still necessary to 
maintain a number of checks upon individual autonomy so that appropriate levels of 
protection can continue to be provided to all individuals involved.  
Independent legal advice is perhaps the most significant of these checks. Following an 
analysis of the laws in both jurisdictions, this thesis concludes that such advice is vital both to 
ensure that agreements are genuinely autonomous and that appropriate protection is provided 
to vulnerable individuals. However, in order to provide a greater level of protection, it was 
submitted that the mere presence of independent legal advice would not be enough to make 
an agreement de facto binding. Instead, the lack of such advice would preclude an agreement 
being upheld, save perhaps for in a number of exceptional circumstances, which must be 
clearly defined by any new statutory provisions. It is through such a provision that a large 
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proportion of the protection that fresh statute should provide to those who require it, will be 
provided. 
Of only slightly less significance is the full and frank disclosure of assets. The discussion on 
this point included an exploration of potential self-help methods that vulnerable individuals 
could employ to protect themselves. Ultimately, it was determined that it would not be 
worthwhile to include an absolute requirement of full and frank disclosure in any fresh 
statute. There will be many occasions when a detailed breakdown of financial assets will not 
have any more influence than simply a general awareness as to the level of assets accrued. 
What must be prevented by fresh statute is a material lack of disclosure that would have 
significantly altered one party’s decision to enter into a prenuptial agreement. This is a much 
weaker protective clause than a blanket requirement of full and frank disclosure, but is 
necessary to prevent invasive intrusions upon individual autonomy. Rather than being a 
negative, the uncertainty that such a provision may leave couples which could have positive 
connotations. It may serve to encourage couples to exercise caution when entering into 
agreements in order to satisfy themselves that they have done everything possible to ensure 
that there agreement is valid. 
Equally as importantly, substantive fairness was evaluated, with particular emphasis placed 
upon the courts taking into account the financial needs of the parties. This element of any 
fresh statute introduced would provide the strongest protective element, as it would 
potentially give the courts the opportunity to set aside agreements based upon substantive 
clauses, rather than procedural shortcomings. Financial need was chosen to form the basis of 
the evaluation here, as this forms the irreducible minimum that must be protected. If couples 
choose to autonomously opt out of compensation and sharing with a statutorily provided for 
prenuptial agreement then the court should have much less mandate to interfere, but where an 
agreement potentially leaves one party in a situation of financial need then protection must 
continue to be provided, regardless of the autonomy of the individuals.  
As outlined within Chapter 2, in an ordinary ancillary relief claim, the court will make needs- 
based awards that take into account the lifestyle that the parties have previously enjoyed. 
Chapter 4 suggests that where couples have autonomously chosen to enter into a prenuptial 
agreement, a lower standard of need could be used as a threshold; namely, real need. Such a 
standard will continue to provide vulnerable individuals with protection against being left 
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below the breadline, however, will not necessarily prevent them from autonomously agreeing 
to a lower standard of living than they may have enjoyed during the marriage. 
In relation to imposing a statutory time period for an agreement to be introduced, it is 
suggested in Chapter 4 that such a provision would be both arbitrary and unnecessary. Its 
potential protective capacity is outweighed by the litigation that it could generate. Naturally, 
the timing of the agreement will remain an important consideration when it comes to 
assessing the substantive fairness of an agreement, however, for the reasons outlined in the 
previous chapter, it is not worthy of specific regulation. 
It is clear from the findings that the balance between protection and autonomy cannot be 
struck by dealing with each of the issues in isolation. If this approach was taken, then it is 
likely that the relevant provisions would either fall down too favourably for                                  
one of autonomy and protection, or, more likely, contradict each other to the extent that they 
become untenable. Instead, an approach must be taken that considers the overarching aim of 
any statutory regulation, when dealing with time constraints, independent legal advice, full 
and frank disclosure and substantive fairness.  
For example, the approach that this thesis suggests in the context of full and frank disclosure, 
which is geared towards affording couples the ability to enter into autonomous decisions, is 
viable because at a later stage autonomy it is tempered by substantive fairness provisions that 
provides a much stronger protective element.  
England and Wales is potentially on the verge of rapid developments in the way that 
prenuptial agreements are regulated. Ultimately, it is hoped that this paper helps to cast a new 
perspective through which the reform process can be viewed. 
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